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Chapter 1: Overview (John F. Helliwell,  
Richard Layard, and Jeffrey D. Sachs)
The first World Happiness Report was published 
in April, 2012, in support of the UN High Level 
Meeting on happiness and well-being. Since 
then we have come a long way. Happiness is 
increasingly considered the proper measure  
of social progress and the goal of public policy. 
In June 2016, the OECD committed itself “to 
redefine the growth narrative to put people’s 
well-being at the centre of governments’  
efforts”.1 In a recent speech, the head of the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) spoke against 
what she called the “tyranny of GDP”, arguing 
that what matters is the quality of growth.“ 
Paying more attention to happiness should be 
part of our efforts to achieve both human and 
sustainable development” she said. 
In February 2017, the United Arab Emirates 
held a full-day World Happiness meeting, as part 
of the World Government Summit. Now Inter-
national Day of Happines, March 20th, provides 
a focal point for events spreading the influence 
of global happiness research. The launch of this 
report at the United Nations on International 
Day of Happines is to be preceded by a World 
Happiness Summit in Miami, and followed  
by a three-day meeting on happiness research 
and policy at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. 
Interest, data, and research continue to build in 
a mutually supporting way. 
This is the fifth World Happiness Report. Thanks 
to generous long-term support from the Ernesto 
Illy Foundation, we are now able to combine  
the timeliness of an annual report with adequate 
preparation time by looking two or three years 
ahead when choosing important topics for 
detailed research and invited special chapters. 
Our next report for 2018 will focus on the issue 
of migration.
In the remainder of this introduction, we high-
light the main contributions of each chapter in 
this report.
Chapter 2: The Social Foundations of World 
Happiness (John F. Helliwell, Haifang Huang, 
 and Shun Wang)
This report gives special attention to the social 
foundations of happiness for individuals and 
nations. The chapter starts with global and 
regional charts showing the distribution of 
answers, from roughly 3000 respondents in 
each of more than 150 countries, to a question 
asking them to evaluate their current lives on a 
ladder where 0 represents the worst possible life 
and 10 the best possible. When the global 
population is split into ten geographic regions, 
the resulting distributions vary greatly in both 
shape and average values. Average levels of 
happiness also differ across regions and coun-
tries. A difference of four points in average life 
evaluations, on a scale that runs from 0 to 10, 
separates the ten happiest countries from the 
ten unhappiest countries. 
Although the top ten countries remain the same 
as last year, there has been some shuffling of 
places. Most notably, Norway has jumped into 
first position, followed closely by Denmark, 
Iceland and Switzerland. These four countries 
are clustered so tightly that the differences 
among them are not statistically significant, 
even with samples averaging 3,000 underlying 
the averages. Three-quarters of the differences 
among countries, and also among regions, are 
accounted for by differences in six key variables, 
each of which digs into a different aspect of life. 
These six factors are GDP per capita, healthy 
years of life expectancy, social support (as  
measured by having someone to count on in 
times of trouble), trust (as measured by a 
perceived absence of corruption in government  
and business), perceived freedom to make life 
decisions, and generosity (as measured by recent 
donations). The top ten countries rank highly on 
all six of these factors.
International differences in positive and  
negative emotions (affect) are much less fully 
explained by these six factors. When affect 
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measures are used as additional elements in  
the explanation of life evaluations, only positive 
emotions contribute significantly, appearing to 
provide an important channel for the effects of 
both perceived freedom and social support. 
Analysis of changes in life evaluations from 
2005-2007 to 2014-2016 continue to show big 
international differences in the dynamics of 
happiness, with both the major gainers and the 
major losers spread among several regions. 
The main innovation in the World Happiness 
Report 2017 is our focus on the role of social 
factors in supporting happiness. Even beyond 
the effects likely to flow through better health 
and higher incomes, we calculate that bringing 
the social foundations from the lowest levels  
up to world average levels in 2014-2016 would 
increase life evaluations by almost two points 
(1.97). These social foundations effects are 
together larger than those calculated to follow 
from the combined effects of bottom to average 
improvements in both GDP per capita and 
healthy life expectancy. The effect from the 
increase in the numbers of people having 
someone to count on in times of trouble is by 
itself equal to the happiness effects from the 
16-fold increase in average per capita annual 
incomes required to shift the three poorest 
countries up to the world average (from about 
$600 to about $10,000). 
Chapter 3: Growth and Happiness in China, 
1990-2015 (Richard A. Easterlin, Fei Wang,  
and Shun Wang)
While Subjective well-being (SWB) is receiving 
increasing attention as an alternative or comple-
ment to GDP as a measure of well-being. There 
could hardly be a better test case than China for 
comparing the two measures. GDP in China has 
multiplied over five-fold over the past quarter 
century, subjective well-being over the same 
period fell for 15 years before starting a recovery 
process. Current levels are still, on average, less 
than a quarter of a century ago. These disparate 
results reflect the different scope of the two 
measures. GDP relates to the economic side of 
life, and to just one dimension—the output of 
goods and services. Subjective well-being, in 
contrast, is a comprehensive measure of individual 
well-being, taking account of the variety of 
economic and noneconomic concerns and 
aspirations that determine people’s well-being. 
GDP alone cannot account for the enormous 
structural changes that have affected people’s 
lives in China. Subjective well-being, in contrast, 
captures the increased anxiety and new concerns 
that emerge from growing dependence on the 
labor market. The data show a marked decline in 
subjective well-being from 1990 to about 2005, 
and a substantial recovery since then. The chapter 
shows that unemployment and changes in the 
social safety nets play key roles in explaining both 
the post-1990 fall and the subsequent recovery.
Chapter 4: ‘Waiting for Happiness’ in Africa 
(Valerie Møller, Benjamin J. Roberts, Habib 
Tiliouine, and Jay Loschky)
This chapter explores the reasons why African 
countries generally lag behind the rest of the 
world in their evaluations of life. It takes as its 
starting point the aspirations expressed by the 
Nigerian respondents in the 1960s Cantril study 
as they were about to embark on their first 
experience of freedom from colonialism. Back 
then, Nigerians stated then that many changes, 
not just a few, were needed to improve their  
lives and those of their families. Fifty years on, 
judging by the social indicators presented in this 
chapter, people in many African countries are 
still waiting for the changes needed to improve 
their lives and to make them happy. In short, 
African people’s expectations that they and their 
countries would flourish under self-rule and 
democracy appear not yet to have been met.
Africa’s lower levels of happiness compared to 
other countries in the world, therefore, might  
be attributed to disappointment with different 
aspects of development under democracy.  
Although most citizens still believe that democracy 
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is the best political system, they are critical of 
governance in their countries. Despite significant 
improvement in meeting basic needs according to 
the Afrobarometer index of ‘lived poverty’, popula-
tion pressure may have stymied infrastructure and 
youth development.
Although most countries in the world project 
that life circumstances will improve in future, 
Africa’s optimism may be exceptional. African 
people demonstrate ingenuity that makes life 
bearable even under less than perfect circum-
stances. Coping with poor infrastructure, as in 
the case of Ghana used in the chapter, is just one 
example of the remarkable resilience that African 
people seem to have perfected. African people 
are essentially optimistic, especially the youth. 
This optimism might serve as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy for the continent in the years ahead. 
Chapter 5: The Key Determinants of Happiness 
and Misery (Andrew Clark, Sarah Flèche,  
Richard Layard, Nattavudh Powdthavee, and 
George Ward)
This chapter uses surveys from the United 
States, Australia, Britain and Indonesia to cast 
light on the factors accounting for the huge 
variation across individuals in their happiness 
and misery (both of these being measured in 
terms of life satisfaction). Key factors include 
economic variables (such as income and em-
ployment), social factors (such as education and 
family life), and health (mental and physical).  
In all three Western societies, diagnosed mental 
illness emerges as more important than income, 
employment or physical illness. In every country, 
physical health is also important, yet in no 
country is it more important than mental health.
The chapter defines misery as being below a 
cutoff value for life satisfaction, and shows by 
how much the fraction of the population in 
misery would be reduced if it were possible to 
eliminate poverty, low education, unemploy-
ment, living alone, physical illness and mental 
illness. In all countries the most powerful effect 
would come from the elimination of depression 
and anxiety disorders, which are the main form 
of mental illness. 
The chapter then uses British cohort data to ask 
which factors in child development best predict 
whether the resulting adult will have a satisfying 
life, and finds that academic qualifications are a 
worse predictor than the emotional health and 
behaviour of the child. In turn, the best predic-
tor of the child’s emotional health and behaviour 
is the mental health of the child’s mother. Schools 
are also crucially important determinants of 
children’s well-being. 
In summary, mental health explains more of the 
variance of happiness in Western countries than 
income. Mental illness also matters in Indonesia, 
but less than income. Nowhere is physical illness 
a bigger source of misery than mental illness. 
Equally, if we go back to childhood, the key 
factors for the future adult are the mental health 
of the mother and the social ambiance of primary 
and secondary school. 
Chapter 6: Happiness at Work  
(Jan-Emmanuel De Neve and George Ward)
This chapter investigates the role of work and 
employment in shaping people’s happiness, 
and studies how employment status, job type, 
and workplace characteristics affect subjective 
well-being. 
The overwhelming importance of having a job 
for happiness is evident throughout the analysis, 
and holds across all of the world’s regions. 
When considering the world’s population as a 
whole, people with a job evaluate the quality of 
their lives much more favorably than those who 
are unemployed. The clear importance of em-
ployment for happiness emphasizes the damage 
caused by unemployment. As such, this chapter 
delves further into the dynamics of unemploy-
ment to show that individuals’ happiness adapts 
very little over time to being unemployed and 
that past spells of unemployment can have a 
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lasting impact even after regaining employment. 
The data also show that rising unemployment 
negatively affects everyone, even those still 
employed. These results are obtained at the 
individual level, but they also come through at 
the macroeconomic level, as national unemploy-
ment levels are negatively correlated with aver-
age national well-being across the world.
This chapter also considers how happiness 
relates to the types of job that people do, and finds 
that manual labor is systematically correlated 
with lower levels of happiness. This result holds 
across all labor-intensive industries such as 
construction, mining, manufacturing, transport, 
farming, fishing, and forestry.
Finally, the chapter studies job quality by consid-
ering how specific workplace characteristics relate 
to happiness. Beyond the expected finding that 
those in well-paying jobs are happier and more 
satisfied with their lives and their jobs, a number 
of further aspects of people’s jobs are strongly 
predictive of greater happiness—these include 
work-life balance, autonomy, variety, job security, 
social capital, and health and safety risks.
Chapter 7: Restoring American Happiness 
(Jeffrey D. Sachs)
This chapter uses happiness history over the 
past ten years to show how the Report’s emphasis 
on the social foundations of happiness plays out 
in the case of the United States. The observed 
decline in the Cantril ladder for the United 
States was 0.51 points on the 0 to 10 scale. The 
chapter then decomposes this decline according 
to the six factors. While two of the explanatory 
variables moved in the direction of greater 
happiness (income and healthy life expectancy), 
the four social variables all deteriorated—the 
United States showed less social support, less 
sense of personal freedom, lower donations,  
and more perceived corruption of government 
and business. Using the weights estimated in  
Chapter 2, the drops in the four social factors 
could explain 0.31 points of the total drop of 0.51 
points. The offsetting gains from higher income 
and life expectancy were together calculated to 
increase happiness by only 0.04 points, leaving 
almost half of the overall drop to be explained by 
changes not accounted for by the six factors. 
Overall, the chapter concludes that falling 
American happiness is due primarily to social 
rather than to economic causes.
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Introduction
It is now five years since the publication of the 
first World Happiness Report in 2012. Its central 
purpose was to survey the science of measuring 
and understanding subjective well-being. Subse-
quent World Happiness Reports updated and 
extended this background. To make this year’s 
World Happiness Report more useful to those who 
are coming fresh to the series, we repeat enough 
of the core analysis in this chapter to make it 
understandable. We also go beyond previous 
reports in exploring more deeply the social 
foundations of happiness.
Our analysis of the levels, changes, and determi-
nants of happiness among and within nations 
continues to be based chiefly on individual life 
evaluations, roughly 1,000 per year in each  
of more than 150 countries, as measured by 
answers to the Cantril ladder question: “Please 
imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 
at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the 
ladder represents the best possible life for you 
and the bottom of the ladder represents the 
worst possible life for you. On which step of  
the ladder would you say you personally feel  
you stand at this time?”1 We will, as usual, 
present the average life evaluation scores for 
each country, based on averages from surveys 
covering the most recent three-year period, in 
this report including 2014-2016. 
This will be followed, as in earlier editions, by  
our latest attempts to show how six key variables 
contribute to explaining the full sample of national 
annual average scores over the whole period 
2005-2016. These variables include GDP per 
capita, social support, healthy life expectancy, 
social freedom, generosity, and absence of corrup-
tion. Note that we do not construct our happiness 
measure in each country using these six factors—
rather we exploit them to explain the variation  
of happiness across countries. We shall also show 
how measures of experienced well-being, especially 
positive emotions, add to life circumstances in 
explaining higher life evaluations. 
We shall then turn to consider how different 
aspects of the social context affect the levels and 
distribution of life evaluations among individuals 
within and among countries. Previous World 
Happiness Reports have shown that of the inter-
national variation in life evaluations explainable 
by the six key variables, about half comes from 
GDP per capita and healthy life expectancy, with 
the rest flowing from four variables reflecting 
different aspects of the social context. In World 
Happiness Report 2017 we dig deeper into these 
social foundations, and explore in more detail 
the different ways in which social factors can 
explain differences among individuals and 
nations in how highly they rate their lives. We 
shall consider here not just the four factors that 
measure different aspects of the social context, 
but also how the social context influences the 
other two key variables—real per capita incomes 
and healthy life expectancy.
This chapter begins with an updated review of 
how and why we use life evaluations as our  
central measure of subjective well-being within 
and among nations. We then present data for 
average levels of life evaluations within and 
among countries and global regions. This will  
be followed by our latest efforts to explain the 
differences in national average evaluations, 
across countries and over time. This is followed 
by a presentation of the latest data on changes 
between 2005-2007 and 2014-2016 in average 
national life evaluations. Finally, we turn to  
our more detailed consideration of the social 
foundations of world happiness, followed by  
a concluding summary of our latest evidence 
and its implications.
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Measuring and Understanding  
Happiness
Chapter 2 of the first World Happiness Report 
explained the strides that had been made during 
the preceding three decades, mainly within 
psychology, in the development and validation  
of a variety of measures of subjective well-being. 
Progress since then has moved faster, as the 
number of scientific papers on the topic has 
continued to grow rapidly,2 and as the measure-
ment of subjective well-being has been taken  
up by more national and international statistical 
agencies, guided by technical advice from experts 
in the field. 
By the time of the first report, there was already 
a clear distinction to be made among three main 
classes of subjective measures: life evaluations, 
positive emotional experiences (positive affect), 
and negative emotional experiences (negative 
affect) (see Technical Box 1). The Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) subsequently released Guidelines on 
Measuring Subjective Well-being,3 which included 
both short and longer recommended modules of 
subjective well-being questions.4 The centerpiece 
of the OECD short module was a life evaluation 
question, asking respondents to assess their 
satisfaction with their current lives on a 0 to 10 
scale. This was to be accompanied by two or 
three affect questions and a question about the 
extent to which the respondents felt they had a 
purpose or meaning in their lives. The latter 
question, which we treat as an important support 
for subjective well-being, rather than a direct 
measure of it, is of a type that has come to be 
called “eudaimonic,” in honor of Aristotle, who 
believed that having such a purpose would be 
central to any reflective individual’s assessment 
of the quality of his or her own life.5
Technical Box 1: Measuring Subjective Well-Being
The OECD (2013, p.10) Guidelines on Measuring 
of Subjective Well-being define and recommend 
the following measures of subjective well-being:
“Good mental states, including all of the various 
evaluations, positive and negative, that people 
make of their lives and the affective reactions of 
people to their experiences.
… This definition of subjective well-being hence 
encompasses three elements:
 1.  Life evaluation—a reflective assessment on a 
person’s life or some specific aspect of it.
 2.  Affect—a person’s feelings or emotional 
states, typically measured with reference to 
a particular point in time.
 3.  Eudaimonia—a sense of meaning and purpose 
in life, or good psychological functioning.”
  
Almost all OECD countries6 now contain a life 
evaluation question, usually about life satisfac-
tion, on a 0 to 10 rating scale, in one or more of 
their surveys. However, it will be many years be-
fore the accumulated efforts of national statisti-
cal offices will produce as large a number of 
comparable country surveys as is now available 
through the Gallup World Poll (GWP), which 
has been surveying an increasing number of 
countries since 2005 and now includes almost 
all of the world’s population. The GWP contains 
one life evaluation as well as a range of positive 
and negative experiential questions, including 
several measures of positive and negative affect, 
mainly asked with respect to the previous day. 
In this chapter, we make primary use of the life 
evaluations, since they are, as shown in Table 
2.1, more international in their variation and 
more readily explained by life circumstances. 
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Analysis over the past ten years has clarified 
what can be learned from different measures  
of subjective well-being.7 What are the main 
messages? First, all three of the commonly  
used life evaluations (specifically Cantril ladder, 
satisfaction with life, and happiness with life in 
general) tell almost identical stories about the 
nature and relative importance of the various 
factors influencing subjective well-being. For 
example, for several years it was thought (and  
is still sometimes reported in the literature)  
that respondents’ answers to the Cantril ladder 
question, with its use of a ladder as a framing 
device, were more dependent on their incomes 
than were answers to questions about satisfac-
tion with life. The evidence for this came from 
comparing modeling using the Cantril ladder in 
the Gallup World Poll (GWP) with modeling 
based on life satisfaction answers in the World 
Values Survey (WVS). But this conclusion was 
due to combining survey and method differences 
with the effects of question wording. When it 
subsequently became possible to ask both 
questions8 of the same respondents on the 
same scales, as was the case in the Gallup 
World Poll in 2007, it was shown that the 
estimated income effects and almost all other 
structural influences were identical, and a more 
powerful explanation was obtained by using an 
average of the two answers.9
People also worried at one time that when 
questions included the word “happiness” they 
elicited answers that were less dependent on 
income than were answers to life satisfaction 
questions or the Cantril ladder.10 For this  
important question, no definitive answer was 
available until the European Social Survey (ESS) 
asked the same respondents “satisfaction with 
life” and “happy with life” questions, wisely 
using the same 0 to 10 response scales. The 
answers showed that income and other key 
variables all have the same effects on the “happy 
with life” answers as on the “satisfied with life” 
answers, so much so that once again more 
powerful explanations come from averaging the 
two answers.
A related strand of literature, based on GWP 
data, compared happiness yesterday, which is  
an experiential/emotional response, with the 
Cantril ladder, which is equally clearly an evalua-
tive measure. In this context, the finding that 
income has more purchase on life evaluations 
than on emotions seems to have general applica-
bility, and stands as an established result.11
Another previously common view was that 
changes in life evaluations at the individual level 
were largely transitory, returning to their baseline 
as people rapidly adapt to their circumstances. 
This view has been rejected by four independent 
lines of evidence. First, average life evaluations 
differ significantly and systematically among 
countries, and these differences are substantially 
explained by life circumstances. This implies 
that rapid and complete adaptation to different 
life circumstances does not take place. Second, 
there is evidence of long-standing trends in the 
life evaluations of sub-populations within the 
same country, further demonstrating that life 
evaluations can be changed within policy-rele-
vant time scales.12 Third, even though individu-
al-level partial adaptation to major life events is  
a normal human response, there is very strong 
evidence of continuing influence on well-being 
from major disabilities and unemployment, 
among other life events.13 The case of marriage 
has been subject to some debate. Some results 
using panel data from the UK suggested that 
people return to baseline levels of life satisfaction 
several years after marriage, a finding that has 
been argued to support the more general appli-
cability of set points.14 However, subsequent 
research using the same data has shown that 
marriage does indeed have long-lasting well-be-
ing benefits, especially in protecting the married 
from as large a decline in the middle-age years 
that in many countries represent a low-point in 
life evaluations.15 Fourth, and especially relevant 
in the global context, are studies of migration 
showing migrants to have average levels and 
distributions of life evaluations that resemble 
those of other residents of their new countries 
more than of comparable residents in the 
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countries from which they have emigrated.16 
This confirms that life evaluations do depend  
on life circumstances, and are not destined to 
return to baseline levels as required by the set 
point hypothesis.
Why Use Life Evaluations for  
International Comparisons of  
the Quality of Life?
We continue to find that experiential and evalua-
tive measures differ from each other in ways 
that help to understand and validate both, and 
that life evaluations provide the most informative 
measures for international comparisons because 
they capture the overall quality of life as a whole 
in a more complete and stable way than do 
emotional reports based on daily experiences. 
For example, experiential reports about happiness 
yesterday are well explained by events of the  
day being asked about, while life evaluations 
more closely reflect the circumstances of life as  
a whole. Most Americans sampled daily in the 
Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index Survey feel 
happier on weekends, to an extent that depends 
on the social context on and off the job. The 
weekend effect disappears for those employed in 
a high trust workplace, who regard their superior 
more as a partner than a boss, and maintain their 
social life during weekdays.17
By contrast, life evaluations by the same respon-
dents in that same survey show no weekend 
effects.18 This means that when they are answer-
ing the evaluative question about life as a whole, 
people see through the day-to-day and hour-to-
hour fluctuations, so that the answers they give 
on weekdays and weekends do not differ. 
On the other hand, although life evaluations do 
not vary by the day of week, they are much more 
responsive than emotional reports to differences 
in life circumstances. This is true whether the 
comparison is among national averages19 or 
among individuals.20
Furthermore, life evaluations vary more between 
countries than do emotions. Thus almost 
one-quarter of the global variation in life  
evaluations is among countries, compared to 
three-quarters among individuals in the same 
country. This one-quarter share for life evalua-
tions is far higher than for either positive affect 
(7 percent) or negative affect (4 percent). This 
difference is partly due to the role of income, 
which plays a stronger role in life evaluations 
than in emotions, and is also more unequally 
spread among countries than are life evaluations, 
emotions, or any of the other variables used  
to explain them. For example, more than 40 
percent of the global variation among household 
incomes is among nations rather than among 
individuals within nations.21
These twin facts—that life evaluations vary 
much more than do emotions across countries, 
and that these life evaluations are much more 
fully explained by life circumstances than are 
emotional reports– provide for us a sufficient 
reason for using life evaluations as our central 
measure for making international comparisons.22 
But there is more. To give a central role to life 
evaluations does not mean we must either 
ignore or downplay the important information 
provided by experiential measures. On the 
contrary, we see every reason to keep experiential 
measures of well-being, as well as measures  
of life purpose, as important elements in our 
attempts to measure and understand subjective 
well-being. This is easy to achieve, at least in 
principle, because our evidence continues to 
suggest that experienced well-being and a sense 
of life purpose are both important influences  
on life evaluations, above and beyond the critical 
role of life circumstances. We provide direct 
evidence of this, and especially of the importance 
of positive emotions, in Table 2.1. Furthermore, 
in Chapter 3 of World Happiness Report 2015 we 
gave experiential reports a central role in our 
analysis of variations of subjective well-being 
across genders, age groups, and global regions. 
Although we often found significant differences 
by gender and age, and that these 
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patterns varied among the different measures, 
these differences were far smaller than the 
international differences in life evaluations. 
We would also like to be able to compare  
inequality measures for life evaluations with 
those for emotions, but this is unfortunately  
not currently possible as the Gallup World Poll 
emotion questions all offer only yes and no 
responses. Thus we can know nothing about 
their distribution beyond the national average 
shares of yes and no answers. For life evaluations, 
however, there are 11 response categories, so we 
were able, in World Happiness Report 2016 Update 
to contrast distribution shapes for each country 
and region, and see how these evolved with the 
passage of time. 
Why do we use people’s actual life evaluations 
rather than some index of factors likely to influence 
well-being? We have four main reasons:
First, we attach fundamental importance to the 
evaluations that people make of their own lives. 
This gives them a reality and power that no 
expert-constructed index could ever have. For a 
report that strives for objectivity, it is very important 
that the rankings depend entirely on the basic 
data collected from population-based samples of 
individuals, and not at all on what we think might 
influence the quality of their lives. The average 
scores simply reflect what individual respondents 
report to the Gallup World Poll surveyors. 
Second, the fact that life evaluations represent 
primary new knowledge about the value people 
attach to their lives means we can use the data as 
a basis for research designed to show what helps 
to support better lives. This is especially useful 
in helping us to discover the relative importance 
of different life circumstances, thereby making 
it easier to find and compare alternative ways to 
improve well-being.
Third, the fact that our data come from popula-
tion-based samples in each country means that 
we can present confidence regions for our 
estimates, thus providing a way to see if the 
rankings are based on differences big enough to 
be statistically meaningful. 
Fourth, all of the alternative indexes depend 
importantly, but to an unknown extent, on the 
index-makers’ opinions about what is important. 
This uncertainty makes it hard to treat such an 
index as an overall measure of well-being, since 
the index itself is just the sum of its parts, and 
not an independent measure of well-being.
We turn now to consider the population-weighted 
global and regional distributions of individual 
life evaluations, based on how respondents rate 
their lives. In the rest of this Chapter, the Cantril 
ladder is the primary measure of life evaluations 
used, and “happiness” and “subjective well-be-
ing” are used interchangeably. All the global 
analysis on the levels or changes of subjective 
well-being refers only to life evaluations, specifi-
cally, the Cantril ladder.
Life Evaluations Around the World
The various panels of Figure 2.1 contain bar 
charts showing for the world as a whole, and  
for each of 10 global regions23, the distribution 
of the 2014-2016 answers to the Cantril ladder 
question asking respondents to value their lives 
today on a 0 to 10 scale, with the worst possible 
life as a 0 and the best possible life as a 10. 
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In Table 2.1 we present our latest modeling of 
national average life evaluations and measures 
of positive and negative affect (emotion) by 
country and year. For ease of comparison, the 
table has the same basic structure as Table 2.1  
in the World Happiness Report Update 2016. The 
major difference comes from the inclusion of 
data for late 2015 and all of 2016, which increases 
by 131 (or about 12 percent) the number of 
country-year observations.24 The resulting 
changes to the estimated equation are very 
slight.25 There are four equations in Table 2.1. 
The first equation provides the basis for  
constructing the sub-bars shown in Figure 2.2. 
The results in the first column of Table 2.1 
explain national average life evaluations in terms 
of six key variables: GDP per capita, social 
support, healthy life expectancy, freedom to 
make life choices, generosity, and freedom from 
corruption.26 Taken together, these six variables 
explain almost three-quarters of the variation in 
national annual average ladder scores among 
countries, using data from the years 2005 to 
2016. The model’s predictive power is little 
changed if the year fixed effects in the model are 
removed, falling from 74.6% to 74.0% in terms 
of the adjusted R-squared. 
The second and third columns of Table 2.1 use 
the same six variables to estimate equations for 
national averages of positive and negative affect, 
where both are based on averages for answers 
about yesterday’s emotional experiences. In 
general, the emotional measures, and especially 
negative emotions, are much less fully explained 
by the six variables than are life evaluations. Yet, 
the differences vary greatly from one circum-
stance to another. Per capita income and healthy 
life expectancy have significant effects on life 
evaluations, but not, in these national average 
data, on either positive or negative affect. The 
situation changes when we consider social 
variables. Bearing in mind that positive and 
negative affect are measured on a 0 to 1 scale, 
while life evaluations are on a 0 to 10 scale, 
social support can be seen to have a similar 
proportionate effect on positive and negative 
emotions as on life evaluations. Freedom and 
generosity have even larger influences on  
positive affect than on the ladder. Negative  
affect is significantly reduced by social support, 
freedom, and absence of corruption. 
In the fourth column we re-estimate the life 
evaluation equation from column 1, adding 
both positive and negative affect to partially 
implement the Aristotelian presumption that 
sustained positive emotions are important 
supports for a good life.27 The most striking 
feature is the extent to which the results 
buttress a finding in psychology that the exis-
tence of positive emotions matters much more 
than the absence of negative ones. Positive affect 
has a large and highly significant impact in the 
final equation of Table 2.1, while negative affect 
has none. 
As for the coefficients on the other variables in 
the final equation, the changes are material only 
on those variables—especially freedom and 
generosity—that have the largest impacts on 
positive affect. Thus we can infer first, that 
positive emotions play a strong role in support 
of life evaluations, and second, that most of the 
impact of freedom and generosity on life evalua-
tions is mediated by their influence on positive 
emotions. That is, freedom and generosity have 
large impacts on positive affect, which in turn 
has a major impact on life evaluations. The 
Gallup World Poll does not have a widely avail-
able measure of life purpose to test whether it 
too would play a strong role in support of high 
life evaluations. However, newly available data 
from the large samples of UK data does suggest 
that life purpose plays a strongly supportive role, 
independent of the roles of life circumstances 
and positive emotions.
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Table 2.1: Regressions to Explain Average Happiness across Countries (Pooled OLS)
Notes: This is a pooled OLS regression for a tattered panel explaining annual national average Cantril ladder 
responses from all available surveys from 2005 to 2016. See Technical Box 2 for detailed information about each of 
the predictors. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Cantril Ladder Positive Affect Negative Affect Cantril Ladder
Log GDP per capita 0.341 -.002 0.01 0.343 
(0.06)*** (0.009) (0.008) (0.06)*** 
Social support 2.332 0.255 -0.258 1.813 
(0.407)*** (0.051)*** (0.047)*** (0.407)*** 
Healthy life expectancy at birth 0.029 0.0002 0.001 0.028 
(0.008)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)*** 
Freedom to make life choices 1.098 0.325 -.081 0.403 
(0.31)*** (0.039)*** (0.043)* (0.301) 
Generosity 0.842 0.164 -.006 0.482 
(0.273)*** (0.031)*** (0.029) (0.275)* 
Perceptions of corruption -.533 0.029 0.095 -.607 
(0.287)* (0.028) (0.025)*** (0.276)** 
Positive affect 2.199 
(0.428)*** 
Negative affect 0.153 
(0.474) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included
Number of countries 155 155 155 155 
Number of obs. 1,249 1,246 1,248 1,245 
Adjusted R-squared 0.746 0.49 0.233 0.767 
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Technical Box 2: Detailed Information About Each of the Predictors in Table 2.1
1.  GDP per capita is in terms of Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted to constant 2011 
international dollars, taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) released by 
the World Bank in August 2016. See the 
appendix for more details. GDP data for 2016 
are not yet available, so we extend the GDP 
time series from 2015 to 2016 using coun-
try-specific forecasts of real GDP growth from 
the OECD Economic Outlook No. 99 (Edition 
2016/1) and World Bank’s Global Economic 
Prospects (Last Updated: 01/06/2016), after 
adjustment for population growth. The equa-
tion uses the natural log of GDP per capita, as 
this form fits the data significantly better than 
GDP per capita.
2.  The time series of healthy life expectancy at 
birth are constructed based on data from the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and 
WDI. WHO publishes the data on healthy life 
expectancy for the year 2012. The time series 
of life expectancies, with no adjustment for 
health, are available in WDI. We adopt the 
following strategy to construct the time series 
of healthy life expectancy at birth: first we 
generate the ratios of healthy life expectancy 
to life expectancy in 2012 for countries with 
both data. We then apply the country-specific 
ratios to other years to generate the healthy 
life expectancy data. See the appendix for 
more details. 
3.  Social support is the national average of the 
binary responses (either 0 or 1) to the Gallup 
World Poll (GWP) question “If you were in 
trouble, do you have relatives or friends you 
can count on to help you whenever you need 
them, or not?” 
4.  Freedom to make life choices is the national 
average of binary responses to the GWP 
question “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with your freedom to choose what you do 
with your life?” 
5.  Generosity is the residual of regressing the 
national average of GWP responses to the 
question “Have you donated money to a charity 
in the past month?” on GDP per capita. 
6.  Perceptions of corruption are the average of 
binary answers to two GWP questions: “Is 
corruption widespread throughout the 
government or not?” and “Is corruption 
widespread within businesses or not?” 
Where data for government corruption 
are missing, the perception of business 
corruption is used as the overall corrup-
tion-perception measure. 
7.  Positive affect is defined as the average of 
previous-day affect measures for happiness, 
laughter, and enjoyment for GWP waves 3-7 
(years 2008 to 2012, and some in 2013). It is 
defined as the average of laughter and enjoy-
ment for other waves where the happiness 
question was not asked. 
8.  Negative affect is defined as the average of 
previous-day affect measures for worry, sad-
ness, and anger for all waves. See the appendix 
for more details.
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Ranking of Happiness by Country
Figure 2.2 (pp. 20-22) shows the average ladder 
score (the average answer to the Cantril ladder 
question, asking people to evaluate the quality  
of their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10) for 
each country, averaged over the years 2014-2016. 
Not every country has surveys in every year; the 
total sample sizes are reported in the statistical 
appendix, and they are reflected in Figure 2.2  
by the horizontal lines showing the 95 percent 
confidence regions. The confidence regions  
are tighter for countries with larger samples.  
To increase the number of countries ranked, we 
also include one that had no 2014-2016 surveys, 
but did have one in 2013. This brings the num-
ber of countries shown in Figure 2.2 to 155.
The length of each overall bar represents the 
average score, which is also shown in numerals. 
The rankings in Figure 2.2 depend only on  
the average Cantril ladder scores reported by 
the respondents. 
Each of these bars is divided into seven seg-
ments, showing our research efforts to find 
possible sources for the ladder levels. The first 
six sub-bars show how much each of the six key 
variables is calculated to contribute to that 
country’s ladder score, relative to that in a 
hypothetical country called Dystopia, so named 
because it has values equal to the world’s lowest 
national averages for 2014-2016 for each of  
the six key variables used in Table 2.1. We use 
Dystopia as a benchmark against which to 
compare each other country’s performance in 
terms of each of the six factors. This choice of 
benchmark permits every real country to have  
a non-negative contribution from each of the  
six factors. We calculate, based on estimates in 
Table 2.1, that Dystopia had a 2014-2016 ladder 
score equal to 1.85 on the 0 to 10 scale. The final 
sub-bar is the sum of two components: the 
calculated average 2014-2016 life evaluation in 
Dystopia (=1.85) and each country’s own predic-
tion error, which measures the extent to which 
life evaluations are higher or lower than predicted 
by our equation in the first column of  
Table 2.1. The residuals are as likely to  
be negative as positive.28
Returning to the six sub-bars showing the 
contribution of each factor to each country’s 
average life evaluation, it might help to show in 
more detail how this is done. Taking the example 
of healthy life expectancy, the sub-bar for this 
factor in the case of Mexico is equal to the 
amount by which healthy life expectancy in 
Mexico exceeds the world’s lowest value, multi-
plied by the Table 2.1 coefficient for the influence 
of healthy life expectancy on life evaluations. 
The width of these different sub-bars then 
shows, country-by-country, how much each of 
the six variables is estimated to contribute to 
explaining the international ladder differences. 
These calculations are illustrative rather than 
conclusive, for several reasons. First, the selection 
of candidate variables is restricted by what is 
available for all these countries. Traditional 
variables like GDP per capita and healthy life 
expectancy are widely available. But measures of 
the quality of the social context, which have been 
shown in experiments and national surveys to 
have strong links to life evaluations, have not 
been sufficiently surveyed in the Gallup or other 
global polls, or otherwise measured in statistics 
available for all countries. Even with this limited 
choice, we find that four variables covering 
different aspects of the social and institutional 
context—having someone to count on, generosity, 
freedom to make life choices and absence of 
corruption—are together responsible for more 
than half of the average difference between each 
country’s predicted ladder score and that in 
Dystopia in the 2014-2016 period. As shown in 
Table 18 of the Statistical Appendix, the average 
country has a 2014-2016 ladder score that is  
3.5 points above the Dystopia ladder score of 
1.85. Of the 3.5 points, the largest single part  
(34 percent) comes from social support, followed 
by GDP per capita (28 percent) and healthy life 
expectancy (16 percent), and then freedom (12 
percent), generosity (7 percent), and corruption 
(4 percent).29
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Our limited choice means that the variables we 
use may be taking credit properly due to other 
better variables, or to un-measurable other 
factors. There are also likely to be vicious or 
virtuous circles, with two-way linkages among 
the variables. For example, there is much  
evidence that those who have happier lives are 
likely to live longer, be most trusting, be more 
cooperative, and be generally better able to meet 
life’s demands.30 This will feed back to improve 
health, GDP, generosity, corruption, and sense 
of freedom. Finally, some of the variables are 
derived from the same respondents as the life 
evaluations and hence possibly determined by 
common factors. This risk is less using national 
averages, because individual differences in 
personality and many life circumstances tend to 
average out at the national level. 
To provide more assurance that our results are 
not seriously biased because we are using the 
same respondents to report life evaluations, 
social support, freedom, generosity, and  
corruption, we have tested the robustness of  
our procedure this year (see Statistical Appendix 
for more detail). We did this by splitting each 
country’s respondents randomly into two 
groups, and using the average values for one 
group for social support, freedom, generosity, 
and absence of corruption in the equations to 
explain average life evaluations in the other half 
of the sample. The coefficients on each of the 
four variables fall, just as we would expect. But 
the changes are reassuringly small (ranging 
from 1% to 5%) and are far from being statisti-
cally significant.31
The seventh and final segment is the sum of  
two components. The first component is a fixed 
number representing our calculation of the 
2014-2016 ladder score for Dystopia (=1.85). The 
second component is the average 2014-2016 
residual for each country. The sum of these two 
components comprises the right-hand sub-bar 
for each country; it varies from one country  
to the next because some countries have life 
evaluations above their predicted values, and 
others lower. The residual simply represents that 
part of the national average ladder score that is 
not explained by our model; with the residual 
included, the sum of all the sub-bars adds up to 
the actual average life evaluations on which the 
rankings are based.
20
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2014-2016 (Part 2)
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2014-2016 (Part 3)
Explained by: GDP per capita
Explained by: social support
Explained by: healthy life expectancy
Explained by: freedom to make life choices
Explained by: generosity 
Explained by: perceptions of corruption
Dystopia (1.85) + residual
95% confidence interval


















124. Congo (Brazzaville) (4.291)
125. Georgia (4.286)
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155. Central African Republic (2.693)
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What do the latest data show for the 2014-2016 
country rankings? Two features carry over from 
previous editions of the World Happiness Report. 
First, there is a lot of year-to-year consistency  
in the way people rate their lives in different 
countries. Thus there remains a four-point  
gap between the 10 top-ranked and the 10 
bottom-ranked countries. The top 10 countries 
in Figure 2.2 are the same countries that were 
top-ranked in World Happiness Report 2016 
Update, although there has been some swapping 
of places, as is to be expected among countries 
so closely grouped in average scores. The top 
four countries are the same ones that held the 
top four positions in World Happiness Report 2016 
Update, with Norway moving up from 4th place 
to overtake Denmark at the top of the ranking. 
Denmark is now in 2nd place, while Iceland 
remains in 3rd, Switzerland is now 4th, and 
Finland remains in 5th position. Netherlands 
and Canada have traded places, with Netherlands 
now 6th, and Canada 7th. The remaining three 
in the top ten have the same order as in the 
World Happiness Report 2016 Update, with New 
Zealand 8th, Australia 9th, and Sweden 10th. In 
Figure 2.2, the average ladder score differs only 
by 0.25 points between the top country and the 
10th country, and only 0.043 between the 1st 
and 4th countries. The 10 countries with the 
lowest average life evaluations are somewhat 
different from those in 2016, partly due to some 
countries returning to the surveyed group—the 
Central African Republic, for example, and some 
quite large changes in average ladder scores, up 
for Togo and Afghanistan, and down for Tanza-
nia, South Sudan, and Yemen. Compared to the 
top 10 countries in the current ranking, there is 
a much bigger range of scores covered by the 
bottom 10 countries. Within this group, average 
scores differ by as much as 0.9 points, more 
than one-quarter of the average national score in 
the group. Tanzania and Rwanda have anomalous 
scores, in the sense that their predicted values, 
which are based on their performance on the six 
key variables, are high enough to rank them 
much higher than do the survey answers. 
Despite the general consistency among the top 
countries scores, there have been many signifi-
cant changes in the rest of the countries. Looking 
at changes over the longer term, many countries 
have exhibited substantial changes in average 
scores, and hence in country rankings, between 
2005–2007 and 2014–2016, as shown later in 
more detail.
When looking at average ladder scores, it is also 
important to note the horizontal whisker lines  
at the right-hand end of the main bar for each 
country. These lines denote the 95 percent 
confidence regions for the estimates, so that 
countries with overlapping error bars have 
scores that do not significantly differ from each 
other. Thus it can be seen that the five top-
ranked countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, 
Switzerland, and Finland) have overlapping 
confidence regions, and all have national average 
ladder scores either above or just below 7.5. The 
remaining five of the top ten countries are closely 
grouped in a narrow range from 7.377 for 
Netherlands in 6th place, to 7.284 for Sweden in 
10th place.
Average life evaluations in the top 10 countries 
are thus more than twice as high as in the 
bottom 10. If we use the first equation of Table 
2.1 to look for possible reasons for these very 
different life evaluations, it suggests that of the  
4 point difference, 3.25 points can be traced to 
differences in the six key factors: 1.15 points 
from the GDP per capita gap, 0.86 due to 
differences in social support, 0.57 to differences 
in healthy life expectancy, 0.33 to differences in 
freedom, 0.2 to differences in corruption, and 
0.13 to differences in generosity. Income differ-
ences are more than one-third of the total 
explanation because, of the six factors, income is 
the most unequally distributed among countries. 
GDP per capita is 25 times higher in the top 10 
than in the bottom 10 countries.32
Overall, the model explains quite well the life 
evaluation differences within as well as between 
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regions and for the world as a whole.33 On 
average, however, the countries of Latin America 
still have mean life evaluations that are higher 
(by about 0.6 on the 0 to 10 scale) than predicted 
by the model. This difference has been found in 
earlier work and been considered to represent 
systematic personality differences, some unique 
features of family and social life in Latin countries, 
or some other cultural differences.34 In partial 
contrast, the countries of East Asia have average 
life evaluations below those predicted by the 
model, a finding that has been thought to 
reflect, at least in part, cultural differences in 
response style. It is also possible that both 
differences are in substantial measure due to 
the existence of important excluded features of 
life that are more prevalent in those countries 
than elsewhere.35 It is reassuring that our 
findings about the relative importance of the 
six factors are generally unaffected by whether 
or not we make explicit allowance for these 
regional differences.36
Technical Box 3: Country Happiness Averages are Based on Resident Populations,  
Sometimes Including Large Non-national Populations
The happiness scores used in this report are in-
tended to be representative of resident popula-
tions of each country regardless of their citizen-
ship. This reflects standard census practice, and 
thereby includes all of the world’s population in 
the survey frame, as appropriate for a full ac-
counting of world happiness. Some countries 
have very large shares of residents who are not 
citizens (non-Nationals). This is especially true 
for member countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). In United Arab Emirates and 
Qatar, for example, non-Nationals are estimated 
to comprise well over 80% of the country’s total 
population. The following table compares the 
happiness scores of GCC countries’ Nationals 
and non-Nationals over the period from 2014-
2016, focusing on those that have sufficiently 
large numbers of survey respondents in both 
categories of Nationals and non-Nationals (ex-
ceeding 300 over the 3-year period).  
The table does not include Oman because it was 
not surveyed between 2014 and 2016. It does 
not include Qatar because there was only one 
survey in the period, with the number of Nation-
als surveyed being less than 100. We are grateful 
to Gallup for data and advice on tabulations.
The sources and nature of the differences in life 
evaluations between migrants and non-migrants 
deserve more research in a world with increas-
ingly mobile populations. We are planning in 
World Happiness Report 2018 to do a deeper anal-
ysis of migration and its consequences for the 
happiness of migrants and others in the nations 






Bahrain 6.09 5.64 6.41
Kuwait 6.10 6.58 5.85
Saudi Arabia 6.34 6.45 6.13
UAE 6.65 7.11 6.57
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 (Part 1)
Changes from 2005–2007 to 2014–2016 95% confidence interval
Changes in the Levels of Happiness
In this section we consider how life evaluations 
have changed. For life evaluations, we consider 
the changes from 2005-2007 before the onset  
of the global recession, to 2014-2016, the most 
recent three-year period for which data from the 
Gallup World Poll are available. We present  
first the changes in average life evaluations. In 
Figure 2.3 we show the changes in happiness 
levels for all 126 countries having sufficient 
numbers of observations for both 2005-2007 
and 2014-2016.37
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 (Part 2)
Changes from 2005–2007 to 2014–2016 95% confidence interval
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 (Part 3)
Changes from 2005–2007 to 2014–2016 95% confidence interval
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Of the 126 countries with data for 2005-2007 
and 2014-2016, 95 had significant changes, 58 
of which were significant increases, ranging 
from 0.12 to 1.36 points on the 0 to 10 scale. 
There were 38 showing significant decreases, 
ranging from -0.12 to -1.6 points, while the 
remaining 30 countries revealed no significant 
trend from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016. As shown 
in Table 34 of the Statistical Appendix, the 
significant gains and losses are very unevenly 
distributed across the world, and sometimes  
also within continents. For example, in Western 
Europe there were 11 significant losses but only  
1 significant gain. In Central and Eastern Europe, 
by contrast, these results were reversed, with 12 
significant gains against 1 loss. Two other regions 
had many more significant gainers than losers, 
as measured by country counts. Latin America 
and the Caribbean had 13 significant gainers 
against 4 losses, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States had 8 gains against 2 losses. 
In all other world regions, the numbers of 
significant gains and losses were much more 
equally divided. 
Among the 20 top gainers, all of which showed 
average ladder scores increasing by 0.50 or 
more, eleven are in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Central and Eastern Europe, 
five in Latin America, two in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Thailand and Philippines in Asia. Among the 20 
largest losers, all of which showed ladder reduc-
tions of 0.5 or more, five were in the Middle East 
and North Africa, five in sub-Saharan Africa, 
four in Western Europe, three in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and one each in South Asia, 
Central and Eastern Europe, and the Common-
wealth of Independent States.
These gains and losses are very large, especially 
for the 10 most affected gainers and losers.  
For each of the 10 top gainers, the average life 
evaluation gains exceeded those that would be 
expected from a doubling of per capita incomes. 
For each of the 10 countries with the biggest 
drops in average life evaluations, the losses were 
more than would be expected from a halving of 
GDP per capita. Thus the changes are far more 
than would be expected from income losses or 
gains flowing from macroeconomic changes, 
even in the wake of an economic crisis as large 
as that following 2007. 
On the gaining side of the ledger, the inclusion 
of five transition countries among the top 10 
gainers reflects the rising average life evalua-
tions for the transition countries taken as a 
group. The appearance of sub-Saharan African 
countries among the biggest gainers and the  
biggest losers reflects the variety and volatility of 
experiences among the sub-Saharan countries 
for which changes are shown in Figure 2.3, and 
whose experiences are analyzed in more detail 
in Chapter 4. 
The 10 countries with the largest declines in 
average life evaluations typically suffered some 
combination of economic, political, and social 
stresses. In the World Happiness Report 2016 
Update, 3 of the 10 largest losers (Greece, Italy, 
and Spain) were among the four hard-hit Euro-
zone countries whose post-crisis experience was 
analyzed in detail in World Happiness Report 2013. 
Of the three, Greece, the hardest hit, is the only 
one still ranked among the ten largest declines, 
with a net decline of 1.1, compared to 1.3 previously. 
The other nine countries come from six of the 
ten global regions, with separate circumstances 
at play in each case.
Figure 18 and Table 33 in the Statistical Appendix 
show the population-weighted actual and predicted 
changes in happiness for the ten regions of  
the world from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016. The 
correlation between the actual and predicted 
changes is 0.35, with the predicted matching the 
actual exactly only for the largest gaining region, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
which had life evaluations up by 0.43 points on 
the 0 to 10 scale. South Asia had the largest drop 
in actual life evaluations while predicted to have 
a substantial increase. Sub-Saharan Africa was 
predicted to have a substantial gain, while the 
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actual change was a very small drop. For all 
other regions, the predicted and actual changes 
were in the same direction, with the substantial 
reductions in the United States (the largest 
country in the NANZ group), Western Europe, 
and the Middle East and North Africa being 
larger in each case than predicted. The substantial 
happiness gains in Southeast Asia, East Asia, and 
Central and Eastern Europe were all predicted  
to be substantial, while the Latin American gain 
was not predicted by the equation. As Figure 18 
shows, changes in the six factors are only mod-
erately successful in capturing the evolving 
patterns of life over what have been tumultuous 
times for many countries. Most of the directions 
of change were predicted, but generally not the 
amounts of change.
Social Foundations of Happiness
In this central section of the chapter we examine 
the social foundations of world happiness. 
Within the six-factor explanatory framework we 
have adopted to explain levels and changes of 
life evaluations, four—social support, freedom 
to make life choices, generosity, and absence of 
corruption in government and business—are 
best seen as representative of different aspects 
of the social foundations of well-being. The 
other two—GDP per capita and healthy life 
expectancy—both long-established as goals for 
development, are not themselves measures of 
the quality of a nation’s social foundations, but 
they are nonetheless strongly affected by the 
social context. So where do we start in attempt-
ing to understand the importance of the social 
context to the quality of life? After toying with  
a number of approaches, we come back to the 
simplest, and organize our discussion under the 
headings provided by our six explanatory variables, 
followed by some links to what this method 
fails to cover.
We start by reviewing some of the linkages 
between the quality of the social context and real 
incomes as well as healthy life expectancy. We 
then turn to consider the mechanisms whereby 
the other four variables, themselves more 
plausibly treated as primary measures of the 
quality of a society’s social foundations, establish 
their additional linkages to the quality of life, as 
revealed by individual life assessments. We then 
consider how inequality affects the social foun-
dations, and vice versa, followed by some links 
to our earlier analysis of the social foundations 
of resilience. Finally, we consider new evidence 
about the social foundations of well-being over 
the life course, arguing that the age-profiles of 
happiness in different societies reflect the 
relative quality of the social fabric for people at 
different ages and stages of life.
Social Foundations of Income
As human lives and technologies have become 
more complicated and intertwined over the 
centuries, the benefits of a bedrock of stable 
social norms and institutions have become 
increasingly obvious. There have been many 
strands of opinion and research about which 
social norms are most favorable for human 
development. Adam Smith highlighted two of 
these strands. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
Smith argued that human beings are inherently 
sympathetic to the fates of others beyond them-
selves, but too imperfect to apply such sympathies 
beyond themselves, their friends and family, and 
perhaps their countries. The power and respon-
sibility for achieving general happiness of the 
world population lay with God, with individuals 
and families presumed able to be fully sympathetic 
only with those close to themselves. Modern 
experimental research in psychology echoes this 
view, since the willingness of students to mark 
in their own favor has been found to be signifi-
cant, but reversed by reminders of instructions 
from a higher power.38 Smith’s idea of a strong 
but limited sense of sympathy underpinned  
his later and more influential arguments in  
the Wealth of Nations. Therein, he extolled the 
capacities of impersonal markets to facilitate 
specialization in production, with trade being 
used to share efforts and rewards to mutual 
advantage as long as these markets were  
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sufficiently underpinned by social norms. These 
norms are needed to enable people to plan in 
some confidence that others would deliver as 
promised, as well as to limit the use of coercion. 
Much subsequent research in economics has 
tended to follow Smith’s presumption that each 
individual’s moral sympathy is limited mainly to 
family and friends, with individual self-interest 
serving to explain their decisions. Over the past 
century, there has been increasing realization of 
the importance of social norms for any joint 
activity, especially including the production and 
distribution of goods and services, as measured 
by GDP. Indeed, research, including that in this 
chapter, shows that people routinely act more 
unselfishly than Smith presumed39, and are 
happier when they do so40.
Trust has long been seen as an especially im-
portant support for economic efficiency. Trust 
among participants is an asset vital to dealing 
with the many contingencies that lie beyond the 
power of contracts to envisage. It also helps  
to ensure that contracts themselves will be 
reliable.41 Empirical research over the past 
twenty years on the social basis of economic 
efficiency has given trust a central role, seen as 
an element or consequence of social capital, 
which the OECD has defined as “networks 
together with shared norms, values and under-
standings that facilitate co-operation within or 
among groups.”42 Evidence that average levels  
of economic performance and rates of economic 
growth have been higher in regions or countries 
with higher trust levels is accumulating.43 To the 
extent that these social norms are present in and 
protected by public institutions, their capacity  
to support economic performance is thereby 
increased.44 There is thus much evidence that 
good governance is a key foundation for economic 
growth; we shall see later that it has benefits for 
happiness that extend beyond its support for 
economic progress.
Social Foundations of Health
There is a long-standing research literature on 
the social determinants of health. The primary 
factors considered to represent social determi-
nants are measures of social and economic 
status, primarily income, education, and job 
status.45 For all three of these markers, both 
within and across societies, those at the top fare 
better, in terms of both death and illness, than 
do those at the bottom.46 The channels for these 
effects are not yet widely understood, but are 
thought to include access to health care, better 
health behaviors, and better nutrition. There  
has also been some evidence that addressing 
inequalities of income and education would not 
only narrow health inequalities, but also raise 
average levels at the same time. This literature 
suggests that at least some of the total influence 
of income, and perhaps a larger part of the 
influence of education, on well-being flows 
through its influence on healthy life expectancy.
Another stream of research has tested and found 
significant links between social trust and health 
status.47 The case was made that inequalities  
in income might have effects on health status 
through the established linkage between income 
inequality and social trust.48 Global evidence also 
suggests that two key social variables—social 
support and volunteering—are in most countries 
consistently associated with better self-reported 
health status.49 Furthermore, the quality of social 
institutions also has important direct effects  
on health, as health outcomes are better where 
corruption is less and government quality 
generally higher.50
More generally, there are many studies showing 
that maintaining or improving the quality of the 
social context, whether within the operating 
room51, in post-operative care, among those 
recovering from trauma52 or hoping to avoid a 
new or recurring disease, or among those in 
elder care53, is a notable protective and healing 
agent. Both the extent and the quality of social 
relationships are important. Social support also 
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delivers better health by reducing the damage  
to health from stressful events. For example, a 
prospective study of Swedish men found that 
prior exposure to stressful events sharply in-
creased subsequent mortality among previously 
healthy men, but that this risk was almost 
eliminated for those who felt themselves to have 
high levels of emotional support.54 More direct 
beneficial health effects of social integration, 
without mediation through stressful events, is 
revealed by a variety of community-level pro-
spective studies wherein those with more active 
social networks had lower subsequent mortality, 
even after taking into account initial health 
status and a variety of other protective factors.55
Generosity, which we have found to be an 
important source of happiness, also turns out to 
benefit physical health, with a variety of studies 
showing that health benefits are greater for the 
givers than for the receivers of peer-to-peer and 
other forms of support.56
Experimental evidence has shown that those 
with a broader range of social contacts have 
significantly lower susceptibility to a common 
cold virus to an extent that reflects the range  
of social roles they play.57 By similar reasoning, 
negative social relations can impose a health 
cost. For example, those with enduring social 
conflicts were more than twice as likely to 
develop a cold from an experimentally delivered 
cold virus.58
The bulk of the evidence on the health-giving 
powers of social capital relates to the presence  
or maintenance of pre-existing natural social 
connections. The evidence from social support 
interventions for those with serious life-threat-
ening illnesses is more mixed, leading some to 
suggest that improving natural social networks 
may be more effective than more targeted 
patient support.59
The Direct Role of Social Support
Social support has been shown in the previous 
section to have strong linkages to happiness 
through its effects on physical and mental 
health. This is only part of the story, however. 
We have already seen in Table 2.1 that having 
someone to count on has a very large impact on 
life evaluations even after allowing for the effects 
flowing through higher incomes and better 
health. The percentage of the population who 
report that they have someone to count on in 
times of trouble ranges from 29% in Dystopia  
to almost 99% in Iceland. For a country to have 
10% more of its population with someone to 
count on, (not a large change given the range of 
70% between the highest and lowest countries) 
is associated with an increase in average life 
evaluations of 0.23 points on the 0 to 10 scale. 
An increase of that size in life evaluations is 
equivalent to that from a doubling of GDP per 
capita, or, for the median country, a ranking 
increase of seven places in Figure 2.2. These 
effects are above and beyond those that might 
flow through higher incomes or better health. 
Having just one person to count on is not a very 
demanding definition of social support, as 
revealed by the large number of countries where 
more than 90% of respondents have someone to 
count on. We suspect that a more informative 
measure of social support might show even 
larger effects, and, of course, there are many 
other dimensions of the social support available 
to people in their homes, on the streets, in their 
workplaces, among their neighbors, and within 
their social networks. Having someone to count 
on is of fundamental importance, but having a 
fuller set of supporting friendships and social 
contacts must be even better. 
How Does a sense of freedom affect happiness?
The Gallup World Poll asks respondents if they 
are satisfied or dissatisfied with their freedom to 
choose what to do with their lives. The generality 
of the question is a virtue, as people are free to 
focus on whatever aspects of life they find most 
important. The fact that 0 and 1 are the only 
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possible answers does pose a problem, as it stops 
us from deriving a measure of just how free 
people feel, and how evenly this sense of freedom 
is spread among the population. Even the simple 
measure has considerable power to explain 
international differences in life evaluations, 
however. The variation across countries is even 
larger than for social support, ranging from 26% 
to 98%, with an average of 71%. Moving 10%  
of the population from dissatisfied to satisfied 
with their life-choice freedom is matched by an  
increase in average life evaluations of 0.11 points 
on the 0 to 10 scale. This is slightly less than 
half of what was calculated for having someone 
to count on. It is nonetheless a very substantial 
effect, equivalent to an increase of 40% in GDP 
per capita, or a few places on the ranking tables.
How do answers to the freedom question relate 
to the social foundations of happiness? In some 
ways the freedom and social support questions 
cover different but tightly related aspects of the 
social fabric. To feel secure, people need to feel 
that others care for them and will come to their 
aid when needed. To some extent, being in such 
a network of usually mutual obligations sets 
limits on each person’s freedom to make life 
choices freely, as the interests of others must 
always be borne in mind. It is apparent from our 
results that both features are important for a 
good life. It is also clear from the data that these 
different aspects need not conflict with each 
other, as the most successful societies are ones 
where both measures of the social fabric are 
strong. Indeed, some of the features of the social 
fabric that reflect its ability to care for people, in 
particular the health and education systems, also 
serve to level out the differences in life opportu-
nities that affect the breadth and reality of the life 
choices open to each individual. For example, 
some Northern European countries ranking 
high in both social support and life-choice 
freedom have education systems that combine 
high average success while also narrowing the 
gaps in performance, and hence future life 
choices, between children raised in homes with 
very different levels of parental education.60
Generosity
The Gallup World Poll asked respondents if  
they have given money for a charitable purpose 
within the past 30 days. When we use the 
resulting national averages to explain happiness, 
we first take out whatever variance is explained 
by international differences in GDP per capita. 
Giving money to others is more prevalent in 
richer countries, in part because higher incomes 
provide more resources available for sharing. We 
adjust for income effects so that we can be sure 
that the effect we find is not a consequence of 
higher incomes. By doing this, we also increase 
the estimated effects of per capita incomes, 
since they now include the effects flowing 
through greater generosity.
To have 10% more of the population donating  
is associated with a 0.084 increase in average 
life evaluations. This is roughly equivalent to  
the effect of per capita GDP being more than  
25% higher.
There are two types of evidence that have been 
used to assess the happiness effects of generosity. 
Survey evidence can measure average frequency 
of generous acts and show how these are related 
to life evaluations. In lab experiments used to dig 
deeper into the motivations and consequences of 
generous acts, the changes under study are too 
small and too temporary to affect life evaluations, 
so various positive and negative emotions,  
measured before, after, and sometimes during 
the experiments, are used instead61.
Experimental research has routinely found 
people being more benevolent and altruistic 
than their self-interest would seem to predict, 
defying efforts made to explain this in terms of 
expected reciprocity or other longer term versions 
of self-interest. But subjective well-being research 
is now showing that in all cultures62, and even 
from infancy63, people are drawn to pro-social 
behavior64, and that they are happier when they 
act pro-socially65.
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Corruption, Trust, and Good Governance
Social trust, as we have shown above, has been 
found to be an important support for economic 
efficiency and physical health. But beyond these 
channels, the evidence shows that high-trust 
communities and societies are happier places  
to live, even after allowing for the effects of 
higher incomes and better health. The Gallup 
World Poll does not include the social trust 
question on a regular basis, so we must rely on 
the regularly asked questions about perceptions 
of corruption in business and government to 
provide a proxy measure. 
Respondents are asked separately about corrup-
tion in business and government in their own 
countries, and we use the average of those 
responses in our estimates of the effects of 
corruption. Unfortunately, the answers to  
whether corruption is a problem in one or the 
other aspect of life are simply ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ so  
we are unable to properly measure just how bad 
the problem is seen to be; nor can we see how 
unequally corruption assessments are distribut-
ed. Looking at the 2005 to 2016 data as a whole, 
the national average corruption assessments 
vary from 4% to 98%, with an average of 76%. 
To decrease by 10% the share of the population 
who think that corruption is a problem is  
estimated by our model to increase average life 
evaluations by 0.05 points on the 0 to 10 
scale—a smaller amount than for social support, 
freedom, and generosity, but still substantial, 
equivalent to an increase of GDP per capita of 
almost 20%. These happiness gains lie above 
and beyond the well-established effects of 
corruption on real GDP per capita.
The full happiness effects of a trustworthy 
environment are likely to be significantly greater 
than can be captured by a simple measure of the 
presence or absence of corruption in business 
and government. It has already been established 
that even beyond social trust and absence of 
corruption there are several different aspects of 
life where trust is important for well-being—in 
the workplace, on the streets, in neighborhoods, 
in business dealings, and in several aspects of 
government. The European Social Survey (ESS) 
has several different measures of trust, making it 
possible to see to what extent they have indepen-
dent impacts on happiness. If all trust measures 
are tapping into the same space, then one mea-
sure might be as good as another, and it might 
not matter which is used. The ESS evidence 
shows that several different measures of trust 
have independently important consequences for 
well-being, and that the total effects of improve-
ments in several types of trust are significantly 
higher than would be estimated using a single 
measure to stand in for all measures. The ESS 
also helpfully asks for trust assessments on a 0 
to 10 scale, which provides better measures of 
the levels and distribution of trust, while also 
increasing the chances for distinguishing the 
effects of different sorts of trust. The ESS indi-
vidual-level results show that five different sorts 
of trust contribute independently to life satisfac-
tion. The two most important are social trust and 
trust in police, each of which increases life 
satisfaction by about .08 points for a 1-point 
improvement on the 0 to 10 scale used for trust 
assessments in the ESS. Smaller contributions, 
each about one-third as great as for social trust 
and trust in police, come from trust in the legal 
system, trust in parliament, and trust in politi-
cians. Single-point increases in all five types of 
trust are estimated to increase an individual’s 
satisfaction with life by 0.23 points on the 0 to 10 
scale. If social trust is used on its own to stand in 
for all forms of trust, the estimated effect is less 
than half as great, at 0.11 points.66
Even if only social trust is used as a basis for 
estimating the aggregate value of a nation’s 
social capital, evidence from 132 countries, using 
wealth-equivalent trust valuations from three 
different international surveys, shows that social 
trust represents a substantial share of national 
wealth in all countries and regions. There are 
nonetheless big differences among world  
regions, ranging from 12% of total wealth in 
Latin America to 28% in the OECD countries.67
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While absence of corruption and presence of 
trust are both useful measures of the quality of  
a country’s institutions, they are clearly much 
too limited in scope to provide a broader view of 
how the quality of governance affects life evalua-
tion beyond the effects flowing through income 
and health. In looking at the quality of governance 
more generally, there is a useful distinction to be 
drawn between the formal structure of institutions 
and the way they operate on a day-to-day basis. 
The former is much more frequently studied 
than the latter, partly because it is more easily 
measured and categorized. But even when we 
consider the formal structure of national institu-
tions, such as a country’s parliament, courts, or 
electoral systems, their effects on life evaluations 
depend less on what is said in the laws that set 
them up than in how well they are seen to 
perform.68 At the aggregate level, several studies 
have compared the well-being links between two 
major sets of government characteristics and 
average life evaluations. The first set of charac-
teristics relates to the reliability and responsiveness 
of governments in their design and delivery of 
services, referred to here as the quality of delivery. 
The second set of characteristics relate to the 
presence and pervasiveness of key features of 
democratic electoral elections and representation. 
The quality of delivery was measured as the 
average of four World Bank measures: govern-
ment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and the control of corruption.69 The quality 
of a country’s democratic processes was based 
on the average of the remaining two World Bank 
measures: voice and accountability, and political 
stability and absence of violence. The results 
showed that for all countries taken together, the 
quality of delivery mattered more for well-being 
than did the presence or absence of democracy.70 
The quality of delivery was strongly important 
for all groups of countries, while the democracy 
variable had a zero effect for all countries as a 
group, with a positive effect among richer 
countries offset by a negative effect among the 
poorer countries. Subsequent studies using 
larger country samples, and a variety of survey 
sources and life evaluations, have generally 
supported this ranking of the relative effects of 
the delivery and democratic aspects of govern-
ment quality as supports for happier lives.71
Previous reports considered evidence that good 
governance has enabled countries to sustain or 
improve happiness, even during an economic 
crisis. Results presented there suggested not just 
that people are more satisfied with their lives in 
countries with better governance, but also that 
actual changes in governance quality since 2005 
have led to significant changes in the quality of 
life. For this report we have updated that analy-
sis using an extended version of the model that 
includes country fixed effects, and hence tries to 
explain the changes going on from year to year 
in each country. Our updated results, in Table 17 
of the Statistical Appendix, show both GDP per 
capita and changes in governmental quality to 
have contributed significantly to changes in life 
evaluations over the 2005 to 2016 period.72
How does inequality affect the social  
foundations of happiness?
In World Happiness Report Update 2016, we 
argued that well-being inequality may be as or 
more relevant than the more commonly used 
measures of inequality in income and wealth. If 
happiness is a better measure of well-being than 
is income, then we might expect concerns about 
inequality to be focused more on well-being 
inequality than on the narrower concept of 
income inequality. We discussed evidence from 
three international datasets (the World Values 
Survey, the European Social Survey, and the 
Gallup World Poll) suggesting that well-being 
inequality, as measured by the standard deviation 
of life satisfaction responses within the sample 
populations, does indeed outperform income 
inequality as a predictor of life satisfaction 
differences among individuals. In addition, the 
estimated effects of well-being inequality on life 
satisfaction are significantly larger for those 
individuals who agree with the statement that 
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income inequalities should be reduced.73  
Furthermore, well-being inequality performs 
much better than income inequality in one of 
the key causal roles previously found for income 
inequality—as a factor explaining differences  
in social trust.74 Thus we find that well-being 
inequality is likely to damage social trust, itself 
an important index of the strength and quality  
of the social fabric.75
Another recently exposed link between the social 
foundations and inequality is that improvements 
in social trust have been shown to have greater 
happiness payoffs for the unemployed, those 
with health problems, and those subject to 
discrimination, than for others.76 Since these 
three conditions are much more prevalent 
among those with the lowest life evaluations, 
increases in social trust improve average life 
evaluations both directly and also indirectly by 
reducing the inequality of well-being.
Social Foundations of Resilience
The argument was made in previous World 
Happiness Reports that the strength of the under-
lying social fabric, as represented by levels of 
trust and institutional quality, affects a society’s 
resilience in response to economic and social 
crises. We gave Greece, which is the third 
biggest happiness loser in Figure 2.3 (improved 
from earlier World Happiness Reports, but still 1.1 
points down from 2005-2007 to 2014-2016), 
special attention, because the well-being losses 
were so much greater than could be explained 
directly by economic outcomes. The reports 
provided evidence of an interaction between 
social capital and economic or other crises, with 
the crisis providing a test of the quality of the 
underlying social fabric.77 If the fabric is suffi-
ciently strong, then the crisis may even lead to 
higher subjective well-being, in part by giving 
people a chance to do good works together and 
to realize and appreciate the strength of their 
mutual social support78, and in part because the 
crisis will be better handled and the underlying 
social capital improved in use. 
For this argument to be convincing, we realized 
that we needed examples on both sides of the 
ledger. It is one thing to show cases where the 
happiness losses were large and where the 
erosion of the social fabric appeared to be a part 
of the story. But what examples are there on  
the other side? With respect to the post-2007 
economic crisis, the best examples of happiness 
maintenance in the face of large external shocks 
were Ireland and especially Iceland.79 Both 
suffered decimation of their banking systems  
as extreme as anywhere, and yet suffered incom-
mensurately small happiness losses. In the 
Icelandic case, the post-shock recovery in life 
evaluations has been great enough to put Iceland 
third in the global rankings for 2014-2016. That 
there is a continuing high degree of social 
support in both countries is indicated by the fact 
that of all the countries surveyed by the Gallup 
World Poll, the percentage of people who report 
that they have someone to count on in times of 
crisis remains highest in Iceland and very high 
in Ireland.80
Social Foundations of the Life Course  
of Happiness
In Chapter 3 of World Happiness Report 2015 we 
analyzed how several different measures of 
subjective well-being, including life evaluations 
and emotions, have varied by age and gender. 
Chapter 5 of this report makes use of surveys 
that follow the same people over time to show 
how well-being varies with age in ways that 
reflect individual personalities and a variety of 
past and current experiences and living condi-
tions. Both these sources as well as a variety of 
other research81 have shown that life satisfaction 
in many countries exhibits a U-shape over the 
life course, with a low point at about the age of 
50. Yet there is also much variety, with some 
countries showing little or no tendency to rise 
after middle age, while elsewhere there is  
evidence of an S-shape, with the growing life 
evaluations after middle age becoming declines 
again in the late 70s.82 The existence and size  
of these trends depends on whether they are 
36
measured with or without excluding the effects 
of physical health. Rises in average life evalua-
tions after middle age are seen in many countries 
even without excluding the increasing negative 
effects due to health status, which gradually 
worsens with age. Because the U-shape in age is 
quite prevalent, some researchers have thought 
that it might represent something beyond the 
scope of life experiences, also since it has been 
found in a similar form among great apes.83
We shall consider instead the possibility that 
what has been taken as a natural feature of the 
life course may be primarily a reflection of a 
changing pattern of social relationships, and 
hence likely to appear in some places and not  
in others, and for some people but not others, 
depending on the social circumstances in which 
they live.84 Our analysis of this is very prelimi-
nary, and based on a few scattered findings, 
since the idea itself is fresh and hence largely 
unstudied. As the empirical science of well-be-
ing has developed, and as the available data 
become richer, it is becoming natural to consider 
not just the possible separate effects of age, 
marriage, employment, income, and the social 
context, but also to consider interactions between 
them. In the present case, we are asking whether 
the U-shape in age applies equally to people in 
different social contexts. The simple answer is 
that it does not. For example, the U-shape in age 
is significantly less for those who are married 
than those who are not.85 This suggests that 
together spouses can better shoulder the extra 
demands that may exist mid-life when career and 
other demands coincide. Yet if the U-shape is 
partly due to workplace stress and its carry-over 
into the rest of life, then we might also expect to 
find the U-shape in age smaller for those whose 
workplace provides a more welcoming social 
context. That indeed seems to be the case, so 
much so that among employed respondents to 
the Gallup-Healthways Daily Poll who regard 
their immediate work superior as a partner 
(rather than a boss), life evaluations show no 
reduction from the under-30s into middle age. 
By contrast, for those whose superior is seen as 
a boss, there is a significant U-shape, with life 
evaluations significantly lower at ages 45–54 
than for those under 30.86
If the U-shape in age is importantly based on the 
quality of the social context, we might also expect 
to find the U-shape to be less for those who have 
lived for longer in their local communities as 
social foundations take time to build. Danish 
researchers calculated age distributions separately 
for those residing for more or less than 15 years 
in their communities, and found that there was 
some U-shape in age for both groups, with a 
much deeper mid-life drop for those who arrived 
more recently in the community.87
Summary of Social Foundations 
We have seen that the roles of social factors as 
supports for happiness are pervasive and encom-
passing. Wherever we looked, from income and 
health to life in the workplace and on the streets, 
the quality of the social fabric is seen to be 
important. Even the widely investigated U-shape 
in life evaluations over the life course has come 
to be seen as importantly driven by changes in 
the supporting power of the social foundations. 
While the importance of social factors is becom-
ing more widely recognized, the underlying 
mechanisms are just barely beginning to be 
understood. Our brief review of some recent 
research covers only a tiny fraction of what has 
been done, and a smaller fraction still of what 
needs to be known. In the design and delivery of 
services, the care for the ailing, and the creation 
of purpose and opportunities for those who have 
had neither, a deeper understanding of how 
people can work better together in achieving 
happier lives must be thought of as a primary 
objective. Acceptance of this objective would in 
turn help to ensure that subjective well-being 
data are collected wisely and routinely, that  
new ideas are tested more methodically against 
currently accepted practice, and that the results 
of these experiments are shared across commu-
nities, disciplines, and cultures. 
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The potential benefits from improving the social 
foundations of well-being are enormous. Appendix 
Table 18 gives some impression of the scale of 
what might be achieved. It reports the improve-
ments in life evaluations if each of the four 
social variables we use in Table 2.1 could be 
improved from the lowest levels that were 
observed in the 2014-2016 period to world 
average levels. To do this, we multiply the 
lowest-to-average distances for each of the social 
variables—social support, freedom, generosity, 
and perceived corruption—with the estimated 
per-unit contributions of those variables, shown 
in Table 2.1. 
Even ignoring the effects likely to flow through 
better health and higher incomes, we calculate 
that bringing the social foundations up to world 
average levels would increase life evaluations by 
almost two points (1.97) on the 0 to 10 scale. 
This comprises 1.19 points from having some-
one to count on, 0.41 from a greater sense of 
freedom to make life choices, 0.25 from living in 
a more generous environment, and 0.12 from 
less perceived corruption. These social foundation 
effects are together larger than those calculated 
to follow from the combined effects of bottom  
to average improvements in both GDP per 
capita and healthy life expectancy. The effects 
from the increase in the numbers of people 
having someone to count on in times of trouble 
are by themselves equal to the happiness effects 
from the 16-fold increase in average per capita 
incomes required to shift the three poorest 
countries up to the world average (from about 
$600 to about $10,000). 
If the countries with the weakest social founda-
tions for happiness were able not just to improve 
to world average standards, but also to match the 
performance of the three top countries for each 
of four factors, they would harvest another 1.27 
points of happiness, for a total of 3.24 points. 
Such a move from dystopian to utopian social 
circumstances is of course not feasible any time 
soon, but it does show the importance of paying 
attention to the oft-ignored social foundations. 
These calculations do not take into account any 
improvements flowing through the better 
health and higher incomes made possible  
from the better social foundations. Moving 
from bottom to top-three levels of healthy life 
expectancy (an increase of 34 healthy years) or 
GDP per capita (from $600 to $100,000 per 
year) are calculated to improve life evaluations 
by 0.98 and 1.78 points, respectively.88 Thus  
we can see that while all of our six explanatory 
factors are important in explaining what life 
looks like in Dystopia and Utopia, the four 
elements of the social foundations together 
comprise the largest part of the story.
Conclusions
In presenting and explaining the national-level 
data in this chapter, we continue to highlight 
people’s own reports of the quality of their lives, 
as measured on a scale with 10 representing the 
best possible life and 0 the worst. We average 
their reports for the years 2014 to 2016, providing 
a typical national sample size of 3,000. We then 
rank these data for 155 countries, as shown in 
Figure 2.2. The 10 top countries are once again 
all small or medium-sized western industrial 
countries, of which seven are in Western  
Europe. Beyond the first ten, the geography 
immediately becomes more varied, with the 
second 10 including countries from 4 of the 10 
global regions. 
In the top 10 countries, life evaluations average 
7.4 on the 0 to 10 scale, while for the bottom 10 
the average is less than half that, at 3.4. The 
lowest countries are typically marked by low 
values of all six variables used here to explain 
international differences—GDP per capita, 
healthy life expectancy, social support, freedom, 
generosity, and absence of corruption—and in 
addition, often subject to violence and disease. 
Of the 4-point gap between the top 10 and 
bottom 10 countries, more than three-quarters is 
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accounted for by differences in the six variables, 
with GDP per capita, social support, and healthy 
life expectancy as the largest contributors.
When we turn to consider life evaluation changes 
for 126 countries between 2005-2007 and 
2014-2016, we see much evidence of movement, 
including 58 significant gainers and 38 signifi-
cant losers. Gainers especially outnumber  
losers in Latin America, the Commonwealth of  
Independent States, and Central and Eastern 
Europe. Losers outnumber gainers in Western 
Europe, while in the rest of the world the 
numbers of gainers and losers are in rough 
balance. Changes in the six key variables  
explain a significant proportion of these changes, 
although the magnitude and nature of the crises 
facing nations since 2005 have been such as  
to move some countries into poorly charted 
waters. We continue to see evidence that major 
crises have the potential to alter life evaluations 
in quite different ways according to the quality 
of the social and institutional infrastructure. In 
particular, as shown in previous World Happiness 
Reports, there is evidence that a crisis imposed 
on a weak institutional structure can actually 
further damage the quality of the supporting 
social fabric if the crisis triggers blame and 
strife rather than co-operation and repair. On 
the other hand, economic crises and natural 
disasters can, if the underlying institutions are 
of sufficient quality, lead to improvements 
rather than damage to the social fabric.89 These 
improvements not only ensure better responses 
to the crisis, but also have substantial additional 
happiness returns, since people place real value 
on feeling that they belong to a caring and 
effective community. 
In the World Happiness Report Update 2016, we 
showed that the inequality of well-being, as 
measured by the standard deviation of life 
evaluations within each country, varies among 
countries quite differently from average  
happiness, and from the inequality of income. 
We also found evidence that greater inequality  
of well-being contributes to lower average 
well-being. We noted that broadening the focus 
from income to happiness greatly increases  
the number of ways of improving lives for the 
unhappy without making others worse off, and 
further, this can be achieved in more sustainable 
and less resource-demanding ways. 
This is especially clear for improvements in the 
social foundations of happiness, the primary 
focus of our chapter this year. Whether we 
looked at social support, generosity, or a trust-
worthy environment, we found that all can be 
built in ways that improve the lives of both 
givers and receivers, those on both ends of the 
handshake or the exchange of smiles, and 
whatever the ranks of those who are pooling 
ideas or sharing tasks.
Targeting the social sources of well-being, which 
is encouraged by considering a broader measure 
of well-being, uncovers fresh possibilities for 
increasing happiness while simultaneously 
reducing stress on scarce material resources. 
Much more research is needed to fully under-
stand the interplay of factors that determine the 
social foundations of happiness and consider 
alternative ways of improving those foundations. 
There is every hope, however, that simply chang-
ing the focus from the material to the social 
foundations of happiness will improve the rate at 
which lives can be sustainably improved for all, 
throughout the world and across generations.
1    It is also called Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale 
(Cantril, 1965).
2    Diener, Lucas, & Oishi (2016) estimate the number of new 
scientific articles on subjective well-being to have grown by 
two orders of magnitude over 25 years, from about 130 per 
year in 1980 to almost 15,000 in 2014.
3   See OECD (2013).
4    As foreshadowed by an OECD case study in the first WHR, 
and more fully explained in the OECD Chapter in WHR 
2013. See Durand & Smith (2013).
5    See Ryff & Singer (2008). The first use of a question about 
life meaning or purpose in a large-scale international 
survey was in the Gallup World Poll waves of 2006 and 
2007. It was also introduced in the third round of the 
European Social Survey (Huppert et al. 2009). It has since 
become one of the four key well-being questions asked by 
the UK Office for National Statistics (Hicks, Tinkler, & 
Allin, 2013).
6    The latest OECD list of reporting countries in in Exton et 
al (forthcoming) and also as an online annex to this report. 
See here
7    See Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs (2015, Chapter 2, p.14-16). 
That chapter of World Happiness Report 2015 also explained, 
on pp. 18-20, why we prefer direct measures of subjective 
well-being to various indexes of well-being. 
8    The Gallup Organization kindly agreed to include the life 
satisfaction question in 2007 to enable this scientific issue 
to be addressed. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible, 
because of limited space, to establish satisfaction with life 
as a core question in subsequent Gallup World Polls.
9    See Table 10.1 of Helliwell, Barrington-Leigh, Harris, & 
Huang (2010, p. 298).
10    See Table 1.2 of Diener, Helliwell, & Kahneman (2010), 
which shows at the national level GDP per capita 
correlates more closely with WVS life satisfaction answers 
than with happiness answers. See also Figure 17.2 of 
Helliwell & Putnam (2005, p. 446), which compares 
partial income responses within individual-level equations 
for WVS life satisfaction and happiness answers. One 
difficulty with these comparisons, both of which do show 
bigger income effects for life satisfaction than for 
happiness, lies in the different response scales. This 
provides one reason for differing results. The second, and 
likely more important, reason is that the WVS happiness 
question lies somewhere in the middle ground between 
an emotional and an evaluative query. Table 1.3 of Diener 
et al. (2010) shows a higher correlation between income 
and the ladder than between income and life satisfaction 
using Gallup World Poll data, but this is shown, by Table 
10.1 of Helliwell et al. (2010), to be because of using 
non-matched sets of respondents.
11    See, for an example using individual-level data, Kahneman 
& Deaton (2010), and for national-average data Table 2.1 of 
Helliwell, Huang, & Wang (2015, p. 22) or Table 2.1 of this 
chapter.
12    Barrington-Leigh (2013) documents a significant upward 
trend in life satisfaction in Québec, compared to the rest 
of Canada, of a size accumulating over 25 years to an 
amount equivalent to more than a trebling of mean 
household income.
13   See Lucas (2007) and Yap, Anusic, & Lucas (2012).
14   See Lucas et al. (2003) and Clark & Georgellis (2013).
15   See Yap et al. (2012) and Grover & Helliwell (2014).
16    See International Organization for Migration (2013, 
chapter 3), Frank, Hou, & Schellenberg (2016), and 
Helliwell, Bonikowska and Shiplett (2016).
17    See Stone, Schneider, & Harter (2012) and Helliwell & 
Wang (2015). The presence of day-of-week effects for 
mood reports is also shown in Ryan, Bernstein, & Brown 
(2010). 
18    See Stone et al. (2012), Helliwell & Wang (2014) and 
Bonikowska, Helliwell, Hou, & Schellenberg (2013).
19    Table 2.1 of this chapter shows that a set of six variables 
descriptive of life circumstances explains almost 75 
percent of the variations over time and across countries of 
national average life evaluations, compared to 49 percent 
for a measure of positive emotions and 23 percent for 
negative emotions. 
20    Using a global sample of roughly 650,000 individual 
responses, a set of individual-level measures of the same 
six life circumstances (using a question about health 
problems to replace healthy life expectancy) explains 19.5 
percent of the variations in life evaluations, compared to 
7.4 percent for positive affect, and 4.6 percent for 
negative affect. 
21    As shown in Table 2.1 of the first World Happiness Report. 
See Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs (2012, p. 16).
22    For these comparisons to be meaningful, it should be the 
case that life evaluations relate to life circumstances in 
roughly the same ways in diverse cultures. This important 
issue was discussed some length in World Happiness 
Report 2015. The burden of the evidence presented was 
that the data are internationally comparable in structure 
despite some identified cultural differences, especially in 
the case of Latin America. Subsequent research by Exton, 
Smith, & Vandendriessche (2015) confirms this conclu-
sion. 
23    Gallup weights sum up to the number of respondents 
from each country. To produce weights adjusted for 
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population size in each country for the period of 2014-
2016, we first adjust the Gallup weights so that each coun-
try has the same weight (one-country-one-vote) in the peri-
od. Next we multiply total population aged 15+ in each 
country in 2015 by the one-country-one-vote weight. To 
simplify the analysis, we use population in 2015 for the 
period of 2014-2016 for all the countries/regions. Total 
population aged 15+ is equal to the proportion of popula-
tion aged 15+ (=one minus the proportion of population 
aged 0-14) multiplied by the total population. Data are 
mainly taken from WDI (2016). Specifically, the total 
population and the proportion of population aged 0-14 are 
taken from the series “Population ages 0-14 (percent of 
total)” and “Population, total” respectively from WDI 
(2016). There are a few regions which do not have data in 
WDI (2016), such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern 
Cyprus, Somaliland, and Taiwan. In this case, other 
sources of data are used if available. The population in 
Taiwan is 23,492,000, and the aged 15+ is 20,305,000 in 
2015 (Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2015, 
Table 3). The total population in Northern Cyprus in 2015 
is not available, thus we use its population in 2014. It is 
313,626 according to Economic and Social Indicators 2014 
published by State Planning Organization of Northern 
Cyprus in December 2015 (p. 3). The ratio of population 
0-14 is not available in 2015, so we use the one in 2011, 
18.4 percent, calculated based on the data in 2011 
Population Census, reported in Statistical Yearbook 2011 by 
State Planning Organization of Northern Cyprus in April 
2015 (p. 13). There are no reliable data on population and 
age structure in Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland 
region, therefore these two regions are not included in the 
calculation of world or regional distributions.
24    The statistical appendix contains alternative forms 
without year effects (Appendix Table 13), and a repeat 
version of the Table 2.1 equation showing the estimated 
year effects (Appendix Table 8). These results confirm, as 
we would hope, that inclusion of the year effects makes 
no significant difference to any of the coefficients.
25    As shown by the comparative analysis in Table 7 of the 
Statistical Appendix.
26    The definitions of the variables are shown in the notes to 
Table 2.1, with additional detail in the online data 
appendix.
27    This influence may be direct, as many have found, e.g. De 
Neve, Diener, Tay, & Xuereb (2013). It may also embody 
the idea, as made explicit in Fredrickson’s broaden-and-
build theory (Fredrickson, 2001), that good moods help to 
induce the sorts of positive connections that eventually 
provide the basis for better life circumstances. 
28    We put the contributions of the six factors as the first 
elements in the overall country bars because this makes it 
easier to see that the length of the overall bar depends 
only on the average answers given to the life evaluation 
question. In World Happiness Report 2013 we adopted a 
different ordering, putting the combined Dystopia+resid-
ual elements on the left of each bar to make it easier to 
compare the sizes of residuals across countries. To make 
that comparison equally possible in subsequent World 
Happiness Reports, we include the alternative form of the 
figure in the on-line statistical appendix (Appendix 
Figures 7-9).
29    These calculations are shown in detail in Table 18 of the 
on-line Statistical Appendix.
30    The prevalence of these feedbacks was documented in 
Chapter 4 of World Happiness Report 2013, De Neve et al. 
(2013).
31    The coefficients on GDP per capita and healthy life 
expectancy are affected even less, and in the opposite 
direction in the case of the income measure, being 
increased rather than reduced, once again just as expected. 
The changes are tiny because the data come from other 
sources, and are unaffected by our experiment. However, 
the income coefficient does increase slightly, since income 
is positively correlated with the other four variables being 
tested, so that income is now able to pick up a fraction of 
the dropin influence from the other four variables. We 
also performed an alternative robustness test, using the 
previous year’s values for the four survey-based variables. 
This also avoids using the same respondent’s answers on 
both sides of the equation, and produces similar results, 
as shown in Table 12 of the Statistical Appendix. The Table 
12 results are very similar to the split-sample results 
shown in Tables 10 and 11, and all three tables give effect 
sizes very similar to those in Table 2.1.
32    The data and calculations are shown in detail in Table 19 
of the Statistical Appendix. Annual per capita incomes 
average $45,000 in the top 10 countries, compared to 
$1,500 in the bottom 10, measured in international 
dollars at purchasing power parity. For comparison, 94 
percent of respondents have someone to count on in the 
top 10 countries, compared to 58 percent in the bottom 
10. Healthy life expectancy is 71.7 years in the top 10, 
compared to 52 years in the bottom 10. 93 percent of the 
top 10 respondents think they have sufficient freedom to 
make key life choices, compared to 63 percent in the 
bottom 10. Average perceptions of corruption are 35 
percent in the top 10, compared to 73 percent in the 
bottom 10.
33    Actual and predicted national and regional average 
2014-2016 life evaluations are plotted in Figure 16 of the 
Statistical Appendix. The 45-degree line in each part of the 
Figure shows a situation where the actual and predicted 
values are equal. A predominance of country dots below 
the 45-degree line shows a region where actual values are 
below those predicted by the model, and vice versa. East 
Asia provides an example of the former case, and Latin 
America of the latter.
34    See the Latin American panel of Figure 16 of the Statisti-
cal Appendix, showing almost all countries to have 
measured ladder averages higher than predicted. Mariano 
Rojas has previously noted that if our figure were drawn 
using satisfaction with life rather than the ladder it would 
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show an even larger Latin American premium (based on 
data from 2007, the only year when the GWP asked both 
questions of the same respondents). It is also true that 
looking across all countries, satisfaction with life is on 
average higher than the Cantril ladder scores, by an 
amount that is higher at higher levels of life evaluations.
35   For example, see Chen, Lee, & Stevenson (1995).
36    One slight exception is that the negative effect of corrup-
tion is estimated to be slightly larger, although not 
significantly so, if we include a separate regional effect 
variable for Latin America. This is because corruption is 
worse than average in Latin America, and the inclusion of 
a special Latin American variable thereby permits the 
corruption coefficient to take a higher value. 
37    There are thus, as shown in Table 15 of the Statistical 
Appendix, 29 countries that are in the 2014-2016 ladder 
rankings of Figure 2.2 but without changes shown in 
Figure 2.3. These countries for which changes are missing 
include some of the 10 lowest ranking countries in Figure 
2.2. Several of these countries might well have been 
shown among the 10 major losers had their earlier data 
been available.
38    Merely being asked to remember the Ten Command-
ments removed any tendency for the students to mark 
falsely in their own favour. See Mazar et al (2008).
39   See, for example, Ostrom (2000).
40   See Ricard (2015).
41   See Solow (2000, p.8) and Fukuyama (1995).
42   OECD (2001, p. 41). See also Putnam (2001).
43    See, in chronological order, Knack & Keefer (1997), Zak & 
Knack (2001), Beugelsdijk et al (2004). Algan & Cahuc 
(2010), and Bjørnskov (2012).
44    For a review of the global evidence, see Acemoglu & 
Robinson (2012).
45    For a recent review combining the income and education 
channels with more direct consideration of supportive 
social networks, see Havranek et al (2015).
46    See Marmot et al (1997), Evans et al (1994), Marmot 
(2005) and Wilkinson & Marmot (2003).
47   See Kawachi & Berkman (2000). 
48   See Kawachi et al (1997).
49   See Kumar et al (2012).
50   See Holmberg & Rothstein (2011).
51    The use of surgical safety checklists has become globally 
widespread following the adoption of the WHO guidelines 
(Haynes et al 2009). Subsequent research has shown that 
typical application of the checklist procedures may not be 
enough to significantly improve outcomes (Urbach et al 
2014). What seems to be most important in achieving 
safety improvements are improvements in team training 
(Neily et al 2010), team involvement (Rydenfält et al 2013, 
Walker et al 2012) and teamwork and communication in 
the operating room (Russ et al 2013). These latter are all 
elements contributing directly to the subjective well-being 
of team members as well as to the safety of the patients.
52   See C. Haslam et al (2008).
53   See Theurer et al (2015).
54    See Rosengren et al (1993). The protective effects of social 
integration and emotional support were both evident, but 
much larger for emotional support.
55    The initial Almeda County study was reported by Berk-
man & Syme (1979), and the results confirmed by a 
number of subsequent studies reviewed by Berkman & 
Glass (2000). There are many more recent studies in 
smaller settings showing that those who are able to 
maintain their social networks have better post-stroke 
recoveries (C. Haslam et al, 2008) and are less likely to 
suffer post-partum depression (Seymour-Smith et al 
2016). And altruism has found to be health predicting in 
elder care settings, e.g. Theurer & Wister (2010)
56    See Abolfathi Momtaz (2014), Brown et al. (2003), 
Thomas (2009) and Weinstein & Ryan (2010).
57   See Cohen et al (1997).
58   See Cohen et al (1998).
59    See Cohen (2004, 681-2). For example, Helgeson et al 
(2000) found that peer emotional support groups helped 
women cancer patients who lacked support from their 
partners or physicians but harmed women who had high 
levels of natural support.
60    See Willms (2003, Figure 1) showing that the two 
Northern European countries in the 12-country sample, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, had the highest average 
literacy levels for their students, and also the smallest 
impact flowing from parental education.
61   See, e.g. Aknin et al (2017).
62   See Aknin et al (2013).
63   See Aknin et al (2012).
64   See Shultz and Dunbar (2007).
65   See Schwartz & Sendor (1999).
66    These results are drawn from Appendix Table 6 of 
Helliwell, Huang & Wang (2016).
67   See Hamilton et al (2016).
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68    There are thus complicated links among public institu-
tions, trust and corruption. High quality institutions have 
been shown to favour the development of social trust, 
above and beyond trust in the institutions themselves 
(Charron & Rothstein 2017). It has also been argued that 
social trust and trustworthy institutions are both more 
likely to be developed where historical circumstances 
(such as high climate variability) require more cooper-
ation and better institutions (Buggle &Durante 2016).
69    From Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2009) and 
Helliwell &Huang (2008).
70   See Helliwell & Huang (2008).
71    See Ott (2010) and Helliwell, Huang, Grover & Wang 
(2014).
72    Columns 8 and 9 in Table 17, which include country fixed 
effects, show the links between changes in governance 
and GDP and those of life evaluations. In these annual 
data, causality is much more likely to be flowing from 
GDP and delivery quality (both measured independently 
from the GWP survey data) to life evaluations than in the 
reverse direction.
73   See Goff et al (2016).
74    Evidence for a central trust-destroying role for income 
inequality is provided by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005). 
Goff et al. (2016, Table 6) have since shown, using three 
international datasets, that well-being inequality is much 
more important than is income inequality as a factor 
explaining differences among people in how much they 
think that others can be trusted.
75    Of course, the positive linkages between inequality and 
social trust are likely to run in both directions. What the 
evidence in Goff et al (2016) shows is that the combined 
effect of the two-way linkage between social trust and 
inequality is larger for well-being inequality than for 
income inequality.
76   See Helliwell, Huang & Wang (2016).
77   See Helliwell, Huang, & Wang (2014).
78    See Ren & Ye (2016), Brown & Westaway (2011), Uchida 
et al (2014) and Yamamura et al, (2015).
79    Gudmundsdottir (2013) presents data from a longitudinal 
survey showing stability of life satisfaction ratings in 
Iceland from 2007 to 2009.
80    Averaging across the 2014-16 GWP surveys, Iceland and 
Ireland are ranked first and fourth, respectively, in terms 
of social support, with over 98 percent of Icelandic 
respondents, and 96% of Irish ones, having someone to 
count on, compared to an international average of 80 
percent.
81   See, for example, Blanchflower & Oswald (2008).
82   See Bonke et al (2016).
83   See Weiss et al (2012).
84    This is one way of interpreting the results of Frijters and 
Beatton (2012) who find little evidence of a U-shape when 
they include individual fixed effects in three panel 
surveys. For most continuing panel members, there 
would be little change in the quality of the social contexts 
of their lives. 
85   See Grover and Helliwell (2014). 
86    For those whose superior is seen as a partner, the average 
Cantril ladder score is 7.1 (se=.005) for those under 30, 
and 7.1 (se=.004) for those aged 45-54. For those whose 
superior is seen as a boss, the average ladder score is 
6.88 (se=.007) for those under 30 and 6.67 (se=.006) for 
those aged 45-54. In the same vein, the age U-shape in 
daily happiness ratings is much flatter for reports relating 
to weekend days and holidays than for regular weekdays. 
See Helliwell (2014, p.128) for the latter evidence. 
87   See Bonke et al (2016).
88    The calculations above, as well as those reported in Tables 
18 and 19, are based on country-period averages for 155 
countries for the 2014-2016 period. The minimum, 
maximum and averages are thus slightly different from 
the summary statistics reported in Table 6 of the 
Statistical Appendix, which is based on country-year 
observations instead of country-period observations.
89    See Dussaillant & Guzmán (2014). In the wake of the 
2010 earthquake in Chile, there was looting in some 
places and not in others, depending on initial trust levels. 
Trust subsequently grew in those areas where helping 
prevailed instead of looting.
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Can’t get no satisfaction! 
Rolling Stones, 1965
In the past quarter century China’s real GDP per 
capita has multiplied over five times, an unprec-
edented feat.1 By 2012 virtually every urban 
household had, on average, a color TV, air 
conditioner, washing machine, and refrigerator. 
Almost nine in ten had a personal computer, 
and one in five, an automobile. Rural house-
holds lagged somewhat behind urban, but these 
same symptoms of affluence, which were virtu-
ally nonexistent in the countryside in 1990, had 
become quite common by 2012.2 In the face of 
such new-found plenitude, one would suppose 
that the population’s feelings of well-being 
would have enjoyed a similar multiplication. Yet, 
as will be discussed, well-being today is probably 
less than in 1990.
This chapter, which builds on a prior study3, 
describes the evolution of China’s well-being  
in the quarter century since 1990 and suggests 
the likely reasons for the disparate trajectories 
of subjective well-being (SWB) and GDP per 
capita (hereafter, simply GDP). The terms 
subjective well-being, life satisfaction, and 
happiness are used here interchangeably, and 
refer to people’s overall evaluation of their 
lives. The chapter also describes important 
differences in subjective well-being among 
various groups in the population and notes 
some possible reasons for these differences.
As in any historical study of a developing country, 
quantitative data are in short supply—though 
typically expanding and improving with time. 
The task of empirical study is to assemble and 
evaluate the quantitative evidence available and 
assess its fit with the broader historical context, 
as is attempted here. Although the available 
measures of China’s SWB in the period under 
study tend to be biased toward the urban sector, 
the same is true of economic growth.4 Hence 
 the present data should provide a reasonable 
perspective on the course of well-being in an 
area experiencing an unparalleled increase 
in the per capita output and consumption of 
goods and services. 
Long Term Movement
Since 1990 China’s SWB has been U-shaped 
over time, falling to a 2000-2005 trough and 
subsequently recovering (Fig. 3.1).5 This pattern 
is found in four different series that reach back 
into the 1990s—WVS, Gallup1 and 2, and 
Horizon. The fifth series in Figure 3.1, based on 
the China General Social Survey (CGSS) only 
starts in the 2000s, and trends upward, like  
the other series in the same time span. The 
series that include 1990s data come from three  
different survey organizations, two American 
and one Chinese. In every series both pre- and 
post-trough values are higher than those in 
2000-2005, even though the series differ in 
their origin, measure of SWB, and sample size 
(see Technical Box 1). The consistency of the 
results from these different series strengthens 
the finding on the overall movement. Lack of 
annual data prevents more precise dating of  
the trough in SWB. Additional support for the 
U-shape is provided by the 95% confidence 
interval bars presented for the WVS data. There 
is no overlap between the confidence interval at 
the 2000-2005 trough and the corresponding 
intervals for the initial value of the series in 
1990 and the terminal value in 2012.
The 1990 WVS value of 7.29 for SWB seems 
high for what was then a poor country, but 
several considerations point to its plausibility.6 
China’s urban labor market at that time has 
been described as a “mini-welfare state,” its 
workers as having an “iron rice bowl.”7 Concerns 
about one’s current and future job and family 
security were virtually non-existent. Those 
employed by public enterprises (which accounted 
for the bulk of urban employment) were essen-
tially guaranteed life-time jobs and had benefits 
that included subsidized food, housing, health 
care, child care, and pensions, as well as assur-
ance of jobs for their grown children. Russia’s 
50
Fig. 3.1. Mean Subjective Well-Being, Five Series, 1990-2015
labor and wage policies served as the model  
for communist China, and China’s value of 7.29 
is almost identical to the 7.26 value found in  
the available data for pre-transition Russia.8 In 
1990 life satisfaction differences by socio-eco-
nomic status in China were very small, as was 
true also of former Soviet Union countries prior 
to transition.9 In the 1990 survey data for China, 
mean values exceeding 7.0 are found across  
the distributions by education, occupation,  
and income; hence the high overall average 
cannot be attributed to a disproportionate 
representation in the 1990 survey of those  
with high life satisfaction.
It is doubtful that the recovery in SWB by the 
end of the period reaches a value equal to that in 
1990. In the WVS series, the one covering the 
longest time span, the terminal value of 6.85 in 
2012 is significantly less than the 1990 value of 
7.29. The upper bound of the 95% confidence 
interval in 2012 is 6.93, well below the lower 
bound of 7.16 in 1990. Another indication that 
China has not recovered to its 1990 value is the 
slippage in its worldwide ranking by SWB. If  
the 2012 high-to-low array of 100 countries with 
recent WVS data is taken as a reference,10 China 
falls from 28th to 50th between 1990 and 2012. 
The middling position of China in the 2012 
Source: Appendix, Table A3.1.
Notes: Horizon series is 3-year moving average, centered, of annual data for 1997-2015; Gallup 2, after 2004, is three-year 
moving average, centered, of annual data for 2006-2015; CGSS is three item moving average for dates given in Technical Box 
1. Series with response options of 1-4 or 1-5 are plotted to twice the scale of series with response options of 1-10 and 0-10. For 
survey questions and response options, see Technical Box 1.
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WVS ranking is fairly consistent with that in the 
current Gallup World Poll ladder-of- life array for 
157 countries—in 2013-15 China was 83rd.11
In the research literature on SWB, cross section 
studies typically find that happiness varies 
positively with GDP, and this finding is  
frequently cited as evidence that economic 
growth increases subjective well-being.12 The 
SWB data for China call into question the 
validity of this assertion. Based on the regression 
results of such cross section studies, China’s 
striking five-fold multiplication of GDP since 
1990 would be expected to increase SWB by 
upwards of a full point or more on a 1–10 life 
satisfaction scale. It is noteworthy that four 
different surveys reaching back to the 1990s fail 
to give evidence of an overall increase approach-
ing this magnitude (Figure 3.1). 
The positive cross section relation of SWB to 
GDP reported in prior happiness research 
implies that the growth rates of GDP and SWB 
are positively related. Yet China’s GDP growth 
Technical Box 3.1. Surveys and Measures of Subjective Well-Being
World Values Survey (Sample Size: c. 1,000–c. 
2,000). Life satisfaction: All things considered, 
how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days? Please use this card to help with 
your answer. 1 (dissatisfied) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(satisfied)
Gallup1 (Sample Size: c. 3,500). Life satisfac-
tion: Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are 
you with the way things are going in your life 
today? Would you say you are 4, very satisfied; 3, 
somewhat satisfied; 2, somewhat dissatisfied; 
or 1, very dissatisfied?
Gallup2 1999, 2004 (Sample Size: c. 4,000). 
Ladder of life: Please imagine a ladder with steps 
numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. 
Suppose we say that the top of the ladder rep-
resents the best possible life for you, and the bot-
tom of the ladder represents the worst possible 
life for you. On which step of the ladder would 
you say you personally stand at this time?
Gallup2: Gallup World Poll 2006-2015 (Sample 
Size: c. 4,000, except 2012 c. 9,000) Ladder of 
life: Please imagine a ladder with steps num-
bered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. 
Suppose we say that the top of the ladder 
represents the best possible life for you, and the 
bottom of the ladder represents the worst possi-
ble life for you. On which step of the ladder 
would you say you personally stand at this time, 
assuming that the higher the step the better you 
feel about your life, and the lower the step the 
worse you feel about it? Which step comes clos-
est to the way you feel?
Horizon 1997–1999, 2001 (Sample Size: 
c. 5,000). (In Chinese) In general, are you satis-
fied with your current life: very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? 
(Single answer). Coded 5, 4, 2, or 1.
Horizon 2000, 2002–2010 (Sample Size: 
c. 2,500–c. 5,500). (In Chinese) In general, are 
you satisfied with your current life: very satis-
fied, fairly satisfied, average, fairly dissatisfied, 
or very dissatisfied? (Single answer). Coded 5, 4, 
3, 2, or 1.
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2003, 
2005, 2006, 2008, 2010-2013 (Sample Size: 
c. 5,500-c. 12,000). (In Chinese) On the whole, 
do you feel happy with your life: very unhappy, 
unhappy, so-so, happy, or very happy? (Single 
answer). Coded 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. 
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rate goes through three cycles between 1990 
and 2012 while SWB goes through only one 
(compare Figure 3.2, left panel with Figure 3.1). 
Moreover, the growth rate of GDP is highest in 
2000-2005 when SWB is bottoming out with a 
growth rate close to zero. Also noteworthy is 
the disparate course of the rate of inflation, 
which has typically been found to have an 
inverse relation to SWB.13 In China in 2000-
2005, when SWB was at its lowest, the rate  
of inflation was also low—lower than in any  
other years between 1994 and 2015 (Figure 3.2,  
right panel and Table A3.2). Neither GDP nor 
inflation has a time series pattern that might  
by itself explain the course of SWB. As will be 
seen below, the explanation of China’s SWB 
rests on different factors.
A number of Eastern European countries have 
been transitioning from a socialist to free mar-
ket economy at the same time as China, and it is 
of interest to ask how China’s transition pattern 
of life satisfaction compares with that of these 
other countries. Indeed, China’s overall trajectory 
of SWB is quite similar. For those European 
countries whose SWB data extend back into  
the socialist period, SWB invariably follows a 
U- or V-shaped pattern in the transition.14 Unlike 
China, however, where GDP grows at an unprec-
edented rate, in the European countries GDP 
collapses and recovers in a pattern much like 
that of SWB, a difference between China and 
Europe to be discussed subsequently. 
Determinants of the SWB Trajectory
Two factors appear to have been of critical 
importance in forming the U-shaped course of 
subjective well-being in China—unemployment 
and the social safety net. In the 1990s severe 
unemployment emerged, and the social safety 
net broke down. The “iron rice bowl” was 
smashed, giving rise to urgent new concerns 
Fig. 3.2. Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita and Price Level, 1988-2015
(3-year moving average, centered)
Sources: PWT and NBS. See Appendix, Table A3.2, cols. 3 and 6.
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about jobs, income security, family, and health. 
Although incomes rose for most of those who 
had jobs, the positive effect on well-being of 
income growth was offset by a concurrent rise 
in material aspirations. The counteracting effect 
to income growth of increasing aspirations has 
been pointed out by a number of China special-
ists. Shenggen Fan et al observe: “Happiness 
draws from relative comparisons. As income 
increases, people’s aspirations aim for a new 
target.”15 Research by John Knight and his 
collaborators further provides valuable insights 
into the effect of reference groups on happiness 
in China.16
In its survey of findings on subjective well-being, 
the high profile Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission 
states: “One aspect where all research on subjec-
tive well-being does agree concerns the high 
human costs associated with unemployment.”17 
The reason why unemployment has a major 
adverse effect on well-being is straightforward—
jobs are of critical importance for sustaining 
people’s livelihood, family, and health, and it is 
concerns with these personal circumstances that 
are foremost in shaping people’s happiness.18
The quantitative evidence on unemployment is 
consistent with the view that unemployment has 
been an important determinant of China’s SWB 
trajectory. The unemployment rate rose sharply 
from near-zero shortly before 1990 to dou-
ble-digit levels in 2000-2005, and then declined 
moderately. Although the unemployment 
estimates are somewhat rudimentary,19 this 
pattern appears consistently in unemployment 
data from several different sources (Fig. 3.3). 
Subjective well-being largely inversely mirrors 
the path of the unemployment rate. As the 
unemployment rate rises, SWB declines; as  
the rate falls, SWB increases. The 2000-2005 
trough in SWB occurs when the unemployment 
rate reaches its peak.
 The term “massive” is used repeatedly by China 
specialists in describing the precipitous upsurge 
in unemployment that began in the 1990s.20 In 
little more than a decade (1992-93 to 2004) 50 
out of 78 million lost their jobs in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and another 20 million were 
laid off in urban collectives.21 Knight and Song 
aptly describe this period as one of “draconian … 
labor shedding.”22
The impact of unemployment on SWB was not 
confined to those who lost their jobs. As has 
been demonstrated in the SWB literature,23 
increased unemployment also reduces the 
well-being of those who remain employed as 
they fear for their own jobs as layoffs increase. 
An indication of the widespread anxiety associated 
with a high level of unemployment in China is 
the answer to a nationally representative survey 
question that asked, “Now thinking about our 
economic situation, how would you describe the 
current economic situation in China: is it very 
good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very 
bad?” In 2002 when unemployment was at 
two-digit levels, almost half of respondents (48 
per cent) answered somewhat or very bad; by 
2014, when the unemployment rate had mark-
edly improved, only six per cent fell in these two 
categories.24 The survey responses demonstrate 
that employment is what matters for SWB, not 
growth of GDP. The growth rate of GDP was 
considerably higher in 2002 than in 2014 (Table 
A3.2), but respondents assessed the state of the 
economy as much worse in 2002. 
Along with the upsurge in unemployment,  
the social safety net (with employer-provided  
benefits) broke down, aggravating the decline in 
SWB. As workers lost jobs, their benefits disap-
peared, though for a modest fraction temporary 
support was provided through an urban layoff 
program. Those who found jobs in private firms 
no longer enjoyed the benefits that they previously 
had in the public sector. Even for those who 
retained public jobs, new government policies 
abolished guaranteed employment and life-time 
benefits. This positive relationship between the 
social safety net and SWB has been demonstrated 
by both economists and political scientists.25
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The unemployment rate is itself an indicator  
of safety net coverage because benefits were 
employment-dependent. Survey data on pension 
and health care coverage provide additional 
quantitative evidence of the course of safety net 
benefits (Figure 3.4). Note that the pattern in 
these safety net indicators tends to be U-shaped, 
and the trough in coverage occurs in 2000-2005 
when unemployment peaks and SWB reaches 
its lowest point.
The emergence of extensive unemployment and 
dissolution of the social safety net were due to 
the government-initiated comprehensive policy 
of restructuring SOEs, many of which were 
inefficient and unprofitable. Although the new 
policy was successful in stimulating economic 
growth, it marked an abrupt end to the era of 
“reform without losers.” As Naughton points 
out, urban SOE workers “bore the brunt of 
reform-related costs.”26 According to a World 
Bank report, “by all measures, SOE restructur-
ing had a profound effect on … the welfare of 
millions of urban workers.”27 The quantitative 
unemployment, safety net, and SWB patterns 
here are consistent with these statements.
Faced with massive and rising urban unemploy-
ment, government policy shifted gears.  
Beginning in 2004 the rate at which SOEs were 
down-sized diminished sharply. Between 1995 
and 2003, reduced employment in SOEs far 
exceeded increased employment elsewhere in 
the urban sector; thereafter, the situation was 
reversed, and the unemployment rate improved 
(Figure 3.3).28 The safety net, as indexed by 
healthcare and pension coverage, also started  
to improve (Figure 3.4). The result was a turn-
around and gradual recovery of SWB.
In 2000-2005 the growth rate of GDP was 
approaching its highest level at the same time 
that unemployment was peaking. How could 
output be growing, and so rapidly, when employ-
ment was falling? China’s restructuring policy 
involved greatly expanded support for a relatively 
Fig. 3.3. Urban Unemployment Rate,  
Four Series, 1988-2015
(percent of labor force)
Fig. 3.4. Safety Net Indicators:  
Pension and Healthcare Coverage, 1988-2013
(urban households)
Source: Appendix, Table A3.3.
Source: CHIP. See Appendix, Table A3.4.
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small proportion of large, capital-intensive,  
and high productivity SOEs at the expense  
of numerous small, labor-intensive, and low 
productivity SOEs, a policy officially labeled 
“Grasping the big and letting go of the small.” 
As described by Huang:29 
“Grasping the big” meant restructuring, 
consolidating, and strengthening China’s 
largest SOEs…. “Letting go of the small” 
meant that the government supported 
privatization of individually small but nu-
merically numerous SOEs. These are la-
bor-intensive firms and singling them out 
for privatization, with no established social 
protection in place, led to massive unem-
ployment, social instability, and wrenching 
human costs…. Instead of managing tens of 
thousands of small firms scattered around 
the country, the Chinese state could now 
focus on only a few thousand firms [which 
benefitted from] a massive reallocation of 
financial, human, and managerial resources 
away from the small SOEs to a handful of 
the largest SOEs.
This redistribution of resources from low pro-
ductivity small SOEs to high productivity large 
SOEs resulted in a strong upsurge in output at 
the same time that small SOEs shed labor, 
creating a large pool of unemployed. As Huang 
points out, “…GDP growth in the 1990s increas-
ingly was disconnected from the welfare of 
Chinese citizens.”30 The survey responses 
reported above on the state of the economy in 
2002 and 2014 provide concrete evidence of the 
continuation of this disconnect. The economy 
was viewed by the public as much worse in 
2002, even though the GDP growth rate was 
considerably higher than in 2014.
As previously noted, China’s GDP in transition 
has grown at an unprecedented rate while that 
of European transition countries collapsed and 
recovered in a pattern similar to SWB. The 
difference between China’s GDP trajectory and 
that of the European countries appears to be due 
to the difference in restructuring policies.  
In both cases restructuring led to massive 
unemployment. While the European transition 
countries abandoned the entire public sector  
to privatization and experienced a major GDP 
collapse, however, China invested heavily in the 
most productive SOEs and was rewarded with 
significant output growth.
Other Social and Economic Factors 
Is China’s SWB trajectory also a reflection of 
societal conditions such as social capital, income 
inequality, or environmental pollution? What 
about the “predictors” of SWB differences 
among countries identified in previous World 
Happiness Reports—material, social, and 
institutional supports for a good life—do they 
explain the time series course of SWB in  
China?31 To answer these questions, this section 
examines whether changes over time in these 
variables conform as expected to the movement 
in SWB since 1990. This is the same procedure 
as that followed in the previous section on 
unemployment and the social safety net. 
The measures of social capital examined here—
trust in others and civic cooperation—are those 
used in a recent article that seeks to explain the 
change in China’s life satisfaction from 1990  
to 2007, one of the rare articles addressing 
change over time.32 The specific questions and 
responses are given in Technical Box 2. The two 
indicators of social capital are treated separately 
in what follows.
Trust has an overall trajectory fairly similar to 
SWB, falling at the beginning of the period and 
rising at the end (Figure 3.5). It is plausible that 
in the 1990s, as restructuring led to the emer-
gence and growth of unemployment and job 
competition, a decline in interpersonal trust 
occurred. Correspondingly, the upswing in 
employment during the 2000s recovery may 
have helped restore trust. The decline and 
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Technical Box 3.2. Measures of Social Capital and Freedom of Choice
World Values Survey 1990, 1995, 2001 (Sample Size: ~1,000–1,500). Trust: General speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 1, most 
people can be trusted; 2, can’t be too careful. Recoded 1 or 0.
World Values Survey 2007, 2012 (Sample Size: ~2000). Trust: General speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 1, most people 
can be trusted; 2, need to be very careful. Recoded 1 or 0.
World Values Survey (Sample Size: ~1,000–2000). Civic cooperation: Please tell me for each  
of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between, using this card. 
A) Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to 
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always
B) Avoiding a fare on public transport 
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always
C) Cheating on tax if you have the chance 
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always
D) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 
Never 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 Always 
Recoded 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 for each item.
World Values Survey (Sample Size: ~1,000–2000). Freedom of choice: Some people feel they have 
completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real 
effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control you feel you have over the way your life turns out. None at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A great deal
recovery of interpersonal trust may, in turn, 
 have reinforced the U-shaped trajectory of SWB. 
The biggest difference between trust and SWB 
centers on the value in the 2000-2005 period. 
Trust is slightly higher, but not much different 
from that in adjacent years, while SWB is lower. 
As noted previously, the lower value of SWB in 
the 2000-2005 period is credible because it is 
found in four different surveys conducted 
independently of each other.
Another measure of social capital is civic cooper-
ation, a term reflecting disapproval of cheating or 
bribery in circumstances such as paying taxes or 
claiming government benefits (see Technical Box 
2). The composite measure presented here is the 
Fig. 3.5. Measures of Social Capital, 1990-2012
Source: WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.5.
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average of four components, each of which has 
“a pattern fairly similar to that in the summary 
measure (Technical Box 3.2 and Table A3.5). In 
each interval from 1990 to 2007, the summary 
measure of civic cooperation moves in the same 
direction as trust, though the movements in civic 
cooperation through 2001 are slight. After 2001, 
however, trust and civic cooperation begin to 
diverge noticeably and, from 2007 on, in seem-
ingly contradictory directions—a rise in trust 
being accompanied by a decline in civic coopera-
tion, i.e., increased acceptance of cheating and 
bribery. Unlike trust, the overall pattern of 
change in civic cooperation consequently differs 
considerably from that in SWB, and casts doubt 
on any causal connection between the two.
The results in the general literature on the 
relation between income inequality and happi-
ness are mixed—some studies report no  
relationship, while others find that an increase 
in inequality reduces happiness.33 In China, 
income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient has trended upward since the early 
1980s, increasing when SWB is both falling and 
rising (Figure 3.6, panel A).34 It is hard to see 
how the course of income inequality could 
solely explain the U-shaped movement of SWB. 
Indeed, as will be seen subsequently, since the 
beginning of the millennium the life satisfac-
tion difference between the lowest and highest 
income groups has diminished despite an 
increase in income inequality. 
Figure 3.6. Indicators of Trends in Income Inequality, Environmental Pollution, and Housing Prices 
Sources: Panel A, reproduced from Xie and Zhou (2014); panels B and C, NBS. See Appendix, Table A3.6.
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One might expect that the widely-publicized 
environmental pollution problem in China 
would have had an adverse impact on happiness. 
A recent study based on cross sectional data, 
however, finds no relation between pollution and 
overall life satisfaction, although there is a 
shorter-term effect on day-to-day moods.35 The 
time series finding in the present analysis turns 
out to be much like the nil cross section finding. 
If the trend in coal consumption is taken as a 
measure of the course of environmental pollu-
tion, one finds that coal consumption trends 
upward throughout most of the period, rising 
after 2005 at close to its highest rate, while life 
satisfaction also rises, rather than falls (Figure 
3.6, panel B). 
Housing prices are also sometimes mentioned as 
a determinant of life satisfaction. The housing 
price data only start in 2000, not long after a 
housing market becomes widely established in 
China.36 Housing prices trend steadily upward 
from 2000 onward (Figure 3.6, panel C), a 
development that might be expected to reduce life 
satisfaction; in fact, life satisfaction rises, not falls.
There are six “predictors” of the annual national 
evaluations of SWB presented in the World 
Happiness Reports—GDP per capita (in log 
form), healthy life expectancy, freedom to  
control one’s life, corruption, social support, and 
giving to charity. Of these it is possible to obtain 
time series measures for China that span the 
Figure 3.7. Predictors of SWB in World Happiness Reports, 1990-2012
Sources: PWT, WB, and WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.7.
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period covered here for the first four. (In the 
2016 World Happiness Report the time series 
course of healthy life expectancy is based on that 
in life expectancy at birth, and the latter is 
consequently used in the present analysis.)37 
None of these “predictors” has a time series 
pattern suggestive of a causal relation to SWB. 
GDP and life expectancy, themselves highly 
correlated, both trend upward throughout the 
period (Figure 3.7). Freedom to choose the 
course of one’s life changes very little over time, 
and its movements do not conform to those in 
SWB. Corruption, approximated here by the 
acceptability of bribery, increases somewhat after 
2001, but remains at a very low level. The two 
measures with the greatest changes—GDP and 
life expectancy—reach their highest values at the 
end of the period, but SWB does not. 
The 2016 World Happiness Report presents a 
pooled time series and cross section regression 
equation based on data for 156 countries in the 
period 2006-2015, in which the six predictors 
are found to fit national ladder-of-life evaluations 
with an R-squared of 0.74.38 Another way of 
examining the predictors here is to ask how 
accurately this equation predicts China’s actual 
ladder-of-life values from 2006 to 2015. The 
answer is, not very well. If China’s values for the 
independent variables are entered into the 
equation, the predicted values are uniformly 
higher, often by a substantial amount (Figure 
Figure 3.8. Actual and Predicted Mean Ladder of Life, 2006-2015
Source: GWP. See Appendix, Table A3.8.
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3.8). Moreover, if one leaves aside the year 2006 
(for which values for China are available for  
only three of the six independent variables) the 
predicted values in SWB exhibit a nil trend, 
while the actual trend is upward.
As pointed out in the 2016 World Happiness 
Report, the choice of “predictors” is constrained 
by the limited availability of comparable data for 
a large number of countries worldwide, and the 
variables that are in fact chosen “may be taking 
credit properly due to other better variables.”39 
The advantage of a country study, like the  
present one, is that it is not inhibited by the 
requirement of comparable international data. 
This makes it possible to explore the possible 
role in determining SWB of a wider range of 
variables and consequently develop a deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms at work. 
Indeed, an analysis of selected countries in the 
2016 report moves in the direction of the pres-
ent study. In evaluating the reasons for a decline 
in life satisfaction in four Eurozone countries 
hard hit by the Great Recession, the unemploy-
ment rate is added to the analysis and found to 
have an explanatory effect equal to that of all six 
of the present “predictors” combined,40 a result 
more similar to the present findings. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to include unemployment 
as a predictor in the pooled regression equation 
for all countries due to lack of comparable 
international data. 
As a brief summary of the results to this point, 
Table 3.1 presents the bivariate correlation and 
corresponding p-value between life satisfaction 
and each of the variables discussed in this and 
the preceding section. (The housing price 
variable is not included because the series spans 
only half the period). There are, at best, only five 
observations available for computing each 
correlation, which means each variable is evalu-
ated singly in a bivariate analysis. Subject to the 
qualification that a multivariate analysis might 
give a fuller picture, the pattern of results is 
generally consistent with the observations based 
on the graphs. The unemployment rate and 
safety net indicators come quite close to the 0.10 
level of significance. Trust and income inequali-
ty have the next highest correlation coefficients, 
but the p-values are above 0.30. The remaining 
variables have even worse p-values, and in some 
cases, the sign of the correlation coefficient is 
contrary to what might be expected. As a whole, 
the correlations uphold the conclusion that 
unemployment and the safety net have been the 
important forces shaping the course of China’s 
life satisfaction.
Table 3.1. Time Series Correlation with WVS Life 




Unemployment rate -0.76 0.13
Pension coverage 0.74 0.15
Healthcare coverage  0.89 0.11
Trust 0.52 0.37
Civic cooperation 0.17 0.79
Gini coefficient -0.57 0.31
Coal Consumption -0.21 0.73
Log GDP per capita -0.46 0.44
Life expectancy at birth -0.50 0.40
Freedom of choice -0.27 0.67
Bribery acceptable -0.10 0.87
n = 5, except healthcare coverage, n = 4.
Note: The basic data are given in the Online Appendix Table 
A3.1, col.1; Table A3.3, col. 3; Table A3.4 rows 1, 6; Table A3.5, 
rows 1, 2; and Table A3.6a, cols. 1-4. 
Why are unemployment and the social safety net 
so important? These two factors bear most 
directly on the concerns foremost in shaping 
personal happiness—income security, family 
life, and the health of oneself and one’s family.  
It is these concerns that are typically cited by 
people worldwide when asked an open-ended 
question as to what is important for their happi-
ness.41 In contrast, broad societal matters such 
as inequality, pollution, political and civil liber-
ties, international relations, and the like, which 
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most individuals have little ability to influence, 
are rarely mentioned. Abrupt changes in these 
conditions may affect happiness, but for the 
most part, such circumstances are taken as 
given. The things that matter most are those that 
take up most people’s time day after day, and 
which they think they have, or should have, 
some ability to control.
Differences by Socio-Economic Status 
Although China’s well-being declined on aver-
age and then somewhat recovered, there were 
significant differences among various groups in 
the population. Perhaps most striking was the 
severe impact of restructuring on those of lower 
socio-economic status (SES). In 1990 the differ-
ence in life satisfaction between the third of the 
population with the lowest incomes and that 
with the highest was quite small (Figure 3.9). 
Subsequently life satisfaction of the lowest third 
plunged markedly, while that of the highest 
actually improved slightly. The result was the 
emergence of a marked disparity in life satisfaction 
by socio-economic status. Toward the end of the 
Fig. 3.9. Mean Life Satisfaction, Top and Bottom 
Income Terciles, and Standard Deviation of Life 
Satisfaction, 1990 – 2012
Source: WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.9.
period, life satisfaction of the lowest stratum 
somewhat recovered, and by 2012 the disparity 
in life satisfaction, though still sizeable, had 
shrunk considerably.42 The standard deviation of 
life satisfaction, a measure reflecting all sources 
of life satisfaction differences, not just SES, 
follows the SES pattern of rising and decreasing 
inequality in life satisfaction (Figure 3.9, bottom).
The course of the life satisfaction difference by 
socio-economic status demonstrates the critical 
importance of full employment and safety net 
policies for the well-being of the most disadvan-
taged segment of the population. As these 
policies were abandoned in the 1990s, the 
lowest socio-economic group was the one that 
suffered severely. Data by level of education are 
indicative of the differential employment and 
safety net effects. The unemployment rate of 
those with a primary education or less soared to 
almost 20 per cent in 2000-2005, while that of 
the college-educated group remained at less than 
5 per cent (Figure 3.10). Similarly, pension and 
healthcare coverage of the less-educated declined 
much more than that of the more-educated 
(Figure 3.11). Consistent with these differences, 
satisfaction with finances and self-rated health 
increased for the highest income stratum and 
decreased for the lowest (Figure 3.12).43 Eventually, 
as economic policy reversed and brought  
unemployment down, and substantial efforts 
were initiated to repair the social safety net,44 
these disparities diminished. Life satisfaction  
of the lowest third of the population recovered  
as employment and the safety net improved, 
though in 2012 it was still less than in 1990 
(Figure 3.9).
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Fig. 3.10. Unemployment Rate by Level of Education,a 1988-2013
(percent of labor force)
Fig.3.11. Safety Net Indicators by Level of Education,a 1988-2013 
(urban households)
Source: CHIP. See Appendix, Table A3.10.
a. Persons with college education or more and primary school education or less.
Source: CHIP. See Appendix, Table A3.4.
a.  Persons with college education or more and primary school education or less.
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Differences by Age and Cohort
Those aged 30 and over experienced large 
declines in life satisfaction over the quarter 
century studied here; men and women were 
about equally affected. In 1990 those aged 30 
and over were already on a life course set under 
“iron rice bowl” conditions. The collapse of the 
traditional environment severely disrupted their 
lives, and substantially reduced their well-being. 
As economic restructuring took hold, the cohort 
of 1946-60, which spanned ages 30-44 in 1990, 
suffered the biggest decline in life satisfaction 
(Figure 3.13). From an initial situation in which 
virtually everyone had jobs, men and women 
alike, in 2002 fewer than 70 per cent were 
employed. Most of the remainder of the cohort, 
21 per cent, had been forced into early retire-
ment, and six per cent were unemployed.45
The next oldest cohort, that of 1936-45, also had 
a considerable initial drop in life satisfaction. 
The overall decline was somewhat cushioned, 
however, as by 2012 most of this cohort had 
reached retirement age (55 for women, 60 for 
men) and qualified for pensions, though these 
were sometimes reduced or in arrears.46
In contrast, the cohort of 1961-70, which in 
1990 was merely in its twenties, experienced 
only a mild decline in life satisfaction between 
1990 and 2002 and ended up with life satisfac-
tion about the same as initially. The members of 
this and the successor cohorts were less wedded 
to traditional ways and better able to adapt to the 
new “free market” conditions, most notably by 
acquiring a college education. Thirty-five per 
cent of the cohort of 1961-70 had completed a 
Fig. 3.12. Mean Financial Satisfaction and Mean Self-Reported Health,  
Top and Bottom Income Terciles, 1990 – 2012
Source: WVS. See Appendix, Tables A3.11 and A3.12.
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college education by the time they were in their 
thirties; for the successor cohort, that of 1971-80, 
the corresponding figure was 40 per cent. 
Among the cohorts born before the 1960s, 
however, the percentage with a college education 
was only 11 to 15 per cent.47 As seen above, those 
belonging to the higher SES group—which 
includes those with a college education—largely 
escaped the adverse impact on life satisfaction  
of economic restructuring; clearly young adults 
were among the beneficiaries. 
A comparison with the European transition 
countries is once again of interest. As has been 
seen, the trajectory of life satisfaction for the 
population as a whole is quite similar in China 
and the European countries. This similarity is 
also true of the differentials in life satisfaction 
that emerged in both areas. For both China and 
the European countries, small SES differences at 
the start of the transition were replaced by large 
disparities.48 The lowest SES group experienced 
a severe decline in life satisfaction, while the 
upper tier typically enjoyed a mild improvement. 
Those under age 30 fared better than their older 
counterparts.49 In both China and Europe 
adaptation to the new environment was greatly 
facilitated by a college education.50
Differences by Residence and  
Migration Status
Subjective well-being in China’s urban areas has 
been greater than in rural on average, a pattern 
typical of developing countries.51 The principal 
evidence for China is from three sources—the 
1995 World Values Survey, CGSS surveys done 
almost annually since 2005, and surveys con-
ducted annually since 2006 by the Gallup World 
Poll (Table A3.14).52 The urban-rural life satisfac-
tion differential in the 1995 WVS—about half a 
point (1-10 scale)—is just about the same as the 
average differential in the Gallup World Poll 
Fig. 3.13. Mean Life Satisfaction by Birth Cohort, 1990-2012
Note: In 1990 the birth cohort of 1961-70 was 20 to 29 years old; the birth cohort of 
1946-60, 30 to 44; and the birth cohort of 1936-45, 45 to 54.
Source: WVS. See Appendix, Table A3.13.
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over the period 2006-15 (0-10 scale). Starting  
in 2010, a wider range of surveys is available—
some continue to show the usual excess of 
urban over rural SWB, but in a few the urban 
and rural areas are about equal.53
Since 2005, when fairly continuous data become 
available, the trend in rural life satisfaction 
appears to have largely paralleled urban. Two 
different surveys give a highly consistent picture 
(Figure 3.14). The improvement in rural life 
satisfaction may have been partly due to new 
policies strengthening the social safety net in 
rural areas. Also, there was a change in govern-
ment policies that significantly lessened the 
burden placed on agriculture to support indus-
trialization.54 Lack of comparable data prevents 
generalization of the trend prior to 2005. 
The 1990s saw the onset of a substantial popula-
tion movement from rural to urban areas, as 
government restrictions on migration were 
increasingly relaxed. According to census data, 
between 1990 and 2010 the proportion of 
people in cities that had a rural hukou (identify-
ing the holder as a resident of a rural place) rose 
from 17 to 36 per cent. 
Rural hukou holders in urban areas were initially 
treated as second-class citizens but are gradually 
being assimilated.55 The few life satisfaction 
surveys in the early 2000s that classified the 
urban population by hukou status uniformly 
found urban hukou holders with higher SWB 
than rural migrants.56 The upward trend in life 
satisfaction since then has been fairly similar  
for the two groups (Figure 3.15). The evidence is 
mixed on whether or not the gap in urban areas 
between urban and rural hukou holders has 
closed. In several surveys the gap persists, but  
in others it has disappeared.57 A comparison 
between rural migrants and those remaining  
in rural areas is less ambiguous—initially the 
migrant group was higher, but in recent years 
there is no difference.58
Fig. 3.14. Mean Life Satisfaction by Urban-Rural 
Residence, 2003-2015
Source: Appendix, Table A3.14.
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Summary and Implications
China’s soaring GDP growth over the past 
quarter century is viewed by many analysts as 
the hallmark of a successful transition from 
socialism to capitalism. But if the welfare of the 
“common man” is taken as a criterion of suc-
cess, the picture is much less favorable and 
more like that of European transition countries. 
From 1990 to 2000-2005, life satisfaction in 
China, on average, declined. Since then it has 
turned upward, but at present it is probably less 
than a quarter century ago. China’s ranking in 
the international array of countries by SWB 
appears to have declined considerably since 
1990, although it has improved as of late. There 
is no evidence of an increase in China’s life 
satisfaction of the sizeable magnitude that would 
be expected based on the international point-of-
time bivariate relationship of happiness to GDP. 
The lower income and older segments of the 
population have suffered most, and their life 
satisfaction remains below that in 1990. The 
upper income and youngest population groups 
have, in contrast, enjoyed a fairly constant or 
modest improvement in life satisfaction. The 
rather small life satisfaction differential by 
socio-economic-status that prevailed in 1990 has 
been replaced by a considerably larger one, 
though there has been some lessening since the 
SWB trough of 2000-2005.
The evidence on subjective well-being comes 
from four surveys conducted independently by 
three different survey organizations and shows 
quite consistent results. Further support derives 
from the similarity between the course of SWB 
during China’s transition and that in the European 
transition countries. The U-shaped pattern of 
SWB is a transition phenomenon common to 
both Europe and China. 
Fig. 3.15. Mean Life Satisfaction, Urban and Rural Hukou Holders in Urban Areas, 2003-2013
Source: Appendix, Table A3.15.
Legend:  UH = Urban hukou holders in urban areas 
RH = Rural hukou holders in urban areas
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To understand the course of well-being in  
China, one must recognize that few societies 
have undergone such wrenching change in  
such a short period of time. Isabelle Attané and 
Baochang Gu succinctly convey the essence of 
this transformation:
[T]he dismantling of collective structures 
under the reform and opening-up policy … 
overturned the social organization that had 
prevailed in previous decades, producing an 
impact that extended far beyond the econo-
my alone. Previously, each individual had 
depended on the state, through his or her 
work unit, for all aspects of daily life.  
Everyone enjoyed guaranteed access to 
employment, housing, health, education of 
children, and for urban dwellers, retirement 
and social insurance. Gradually transferred 
to the private sector, these areas are now 
governed by the market, which makes  
access to them less systematic, and therefore 
increasingly unequal.59
The data on life satisfaction herein provide a 
summary indication of the overall impact of this 
social transformation on people’s lives. The 
circumstances through which SWB was most 
directly affected were labor market conditions 
and the social safety net. Briefly put, the dynam-
ics of change are as follows. In the first part of 
the transition, as economic restructuring is 
undertaken, jobs and safety net benefits shrink 
markedly for the disadvantaged members of the 
population, and their well-being suffers severely, 
especially for those who are older or in the 
lowest economic stratum. In contrast, life 
satisfaction of those who are in the highest 
economic stratum tends to improve slightly, 
while that of young adults, who are typically 
more-educated and better able to cope with the 
new economic environment, remains fairly 
constant. The difference in life satisfaction by 
socio-economic status, which initially was quite 
small, widens substantially. Eventually, as 
economic recovery takes hold, the job market 
improves. In addition, the government, in 
response to symptoms of economic distress, 
starts to mend the social safety net. The result is 
that life satisfaction, on average, turns upward, 
and the disparity in life satisfaction between the 
more and less affluent shrinks somewhat. Life 
satisfaction of the disadvantaged, however, 
remains below its 1990 level.
The evidence supporting this interpretation is 
three-fold. The first is quantitative time series on 
unemployment and the social safety net.  These 
series move as one might expect in relation to 
SWB, in terms of both average levels and differ-
ences by SES.  The second type of evidence is 
qualitative - descriptions by China specialists of 
the state of the economy and society, especially 
the job market and social protection.  These 
qualitative accounts are consistent with the time 
series pattern in the quantitative data and 
contribute to its understanding.  The third is the 
fact that the same factors explain the U-shaped 
trajectory of life satisfaction in the European 
transition countries.
Plausible causal variables other than GDP that 
fail the time series test of conformity to the SWB 
pattern are civic cooperation (one of the proxies 
for social capital), income inequality, environ-
mental pollution, housing prices, life expectancy, 
freedom to control one’s life, and corruption  
(as indexed by acceptance of bribery). Trust in 
others, another social capital proxy, is a border-
line case, moving somewhat similarly to SWB, 
but less so than unemployment and the social 
safety net. The six predictors of differences in 
SWB in the World Happiness Reports do not 
explain the time series change in China’s SWB. 
The preeminence of employment and the safety 
net in explaining SWB lies in the evidence that  
it is these circumstances that bear most immedi-
ately on the concerns that are at the heart of 
people’s personal happiness—jobs and income 
security, family life, and health. In the 1990s, 
the emergence of massive unemployment and 
dissolution of the social safety net led to growing 
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anxiety regarding these concerns and a marked 
decline in overall life satisfaction. Since the 
2000-2005 trough, employment conditions and 
the social safety net have improved, and life 
satisfaction has returned to near its 1990 level. 
There remains, however, considerable opportu-
nity for further progress. Of particular importance 
is attention to increasing the well-being of the 
disadvantaged segment of the population through 
improved employment opportunities and safety 
net policies.
Within policy circles, subjective well-being is 
receiving increasing attention as an alternative 
or complement to GDP as a measure of well-be-
ing.60 There could hardly be a better test case 
than China for comparing the two measures. As 
indexed by GDP, well-being in China has multi-
plied over five-fold; based on SWB, well-being is, 
on average, less than a quarter of a century ago. 
These disparate results reflect the different 
scope of the two measures. GDP relates to the 
economic aspect of life, and to just one dimen-
sion—the output of goods and services. SWB, in 
contrast, is a comprehensive measure of individual 
well-being, taking into account the variety  
of economic and noneconomic concerns and 
aspirations that principally determine people’s 
well-being. There is no hint in GDP of the 
enormous structural changes that impacted 
people’s lives in China. In contrast, SWB  
captures the increased anxiety and new concerns 
that emerged as a result of growing dependence 
on the labor market. If the objective of policy  
is to improve people’s well-being, then SWB  
is a more meaningful measure than GDP, as 
China’s experience attests.61
 Abbreviations Explanation
 CFPS. China Family Planning Studies.
 CGSS. Chinese General Social Survey.
 CHFS. China Household Finance Survey.
 CHIP. China Household Income Project.
 GWP. Gallup World Poll.
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 NBS. National Bureau of Statistics of China.
 OECD. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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respondent options. 
33   Layard et al. (2012), pp. 70-71.
34    Xie and Zhou (2014); we are grateful to Professors Xie 
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35   Zhang et al. (2015).
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41   Cantril (1965), p. 162, Table VIII: 6.
42    In this and subsequent figures depicting differences by 
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omitted, because the highest and lowest education groups 
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from the 1995 and 2007 surveys, one finds that the 
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those when the two education groups are included.
43    Graham et al. (2015) report an increase in mental illness 
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44    For a comprehensive overview of China’s new social 
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survey, the 2002 survey contained a special rural module 
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2017, p. 20). This question elicited valuable information 
on reference groups, but probably tended to channel 
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social comparison, precluding comparison with one’s past 
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group question before the question on happiness. In the 
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is the goal of public policy, then reaching a value of 10 
with everyone “completely satisfied” would seem to be a 
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W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
71
References
Abbott, P., Claire, W., Lin, K., & Haerpfer, C. (2016). The 
quality of society and life satisfaction in China. Social 
Indicators Research, 127(2), 653-670.
Akay, A., Bargain, O., & Zimmermann, K. (2012). Relative 
concerns of rural-to-urban migrants in China. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 81, 421-441.
Anderson, K. (2014). China’s evolving trade composition. In 
S. Fan, Kanbur, R., Wei, S-J., and Zhang, X. [Eds.], The Oxford 
Companion to the Economics of China. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 150-155.
Arrow, K. J., & Dasgupta, P. S. (2009). Conspicuous con-
sumption, inconspicuous leisure. The Economic Journal, 
119(541), F500-F513.
Attané, I. & Gu, B. (2014). Eds. Analysing China’s Population: 
Social Change in a New Demographic Era. New York: Springer.
Bartolini, S., & Sarracino, F. (2015). The dark side of Chinese 
growth: Declining social capital and well-being in times of 
economic boom. World Development, 74, 333-351.
Brandt, L., & Rawski, T. G. (Eds.) (2008). China’s great 
economic transformation. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Cai, F., & Du, Y. (2015). The social protection system in ageing 
China. Asian Economic Policy Review, 10(2), 250-270.
Cai, F., Park, A., & Zhao, Y.H. (2008). The Chinese labor 
market in the reform era. In L. Brandt & T. G. Rawki (Ed.), 
China’s Great Economic Transition (pp. 167-214). New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Cai, H. B., Chen, Y. Y., & Zhou, L. A. (2010). Income and 
consumption inequality in urban China: 1992-2003. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 58(3), 385-413.
Cantril, H. (1965). The Pattern of Human Concerns. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Carlsson, F., & Qin, P. (2010). It is better to be the head of a 
chicken than the tail of a phoenix: Concerns for the relative 
standing in rural China. Journal of Socio-Economics, 39(2), 
180-186.
Census of China 1990. 1% Random Sample, National Bureau 
of Statistics of China.
Census of China 2000. 0.1% Random Sample, National 
Bureau of Statistics of China.
Census of China 2000. Tabulation of the 2000 Population 
Census of the People’s Republic of China, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2002), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/
rkpc/5rp/index.htm.
Census of China 2005. 20% Random sample of the 1% 
National Population Sample Survey, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China.
Census of China 2010. Tabulation of the 2010 Population 
Census of the People’s Republic of China, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2012), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/
rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm.
CFPS (2010-) Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking 
University, China Family Panel Studies, http://www.isss.edu.
cn/cfps.
CGSS (2003-) National Survey Research Center at Renmin 
University of China, Chinese General Social Survey, http://
www.chinagss.org/index.php?r=index/index&hl=en.
Chen, X. (2014). Relative deprivation in China, In S. Fan, R. 
Kanbur, S. J. Wei, & X., Zhang (Eds.), The Oxford Companion 
to The Economics of China (pp. 406-410). Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Cheng, Z., Mishra, V., Nielsen, I., Smyth, R. & Wang, B. Z. 
(2016). Wellbeing in China. Social Indicators Research, 1-10.
CHFS (2011-) Survey and Research Center for China House-
hold Finance at Southwestern University of Finance and 
Economics, China Household Finance Survey, http://www.
chfsdata.org/chfs.html.
CHIP (1988-) China Institute for Income Distribution, China 
Household Income Project, http://www.ciidbnu.org/chip/
index.asp.
Davis, D. R. (2015). Continuity and Change in Mainland China’s 
Recent Marital History. Ph. D. dissertation in sociology. 
University of California, Los Angeles. 
Deaton, A. (2008). Income, health, and well-being around the 
World: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 22(2), 53-72. 
Diener, E., Ng, W., Harter, J., & Arora, R. (2010). Wealth and 
happiness across the world: Material prosperity predicts life 
evaluation, whereas psychosocial prosperity predicts positive 
feeling. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(1), 
52-61. 
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. J., & Oswald, A. J. (2001). 
Preferences over inflation and unemployment: Evidence from 
surveys of happiness. American Economic Review, 91(1), 
335-241.
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. J., & Oswald, A.J., (2003). The 
macro-economics of happiness. Review of Economics and 
Statistics. 85 (4), 809-27.
Easterlin, R. A. (2009). Lost in transition: Life satisfaction on 
the road to capitalism, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 71(2), 130-145.
Easterlin, R. A. (2012). Life satisfaction of rich and poor under 
socialism and capitalism. International Journal of Happiness 
and Development, 1(1), 112-126.
Easterlin, R. A. (2013). Happiness, growth, and public policy. 
Economic Inquiry, 51 (1), 1-15.
Easterlin, R. A. (2014). Life satisfaction in the transition from 
socialism to capitalism: Europe and China. In A. Clark & C. 
Senik (Ed.), Happiness and Economic Growth: Lessons from 
Developing Countries (pp. 6-31). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Easterlin, R. A., Angelescu-McVey, L., & Zweig, J. S. (2011). 
The Impact of Modern Economic Growth on Urban-Rural 
Differences in Subjective Well-Being. World Development, 39 
(12), 2187-2198.
Easterlin, R. A., Morgan, R., Switek, M., & Wang, F. (2012). 
China’s life satisfaction, 1990–2010. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 109(25), 9775-9780.
Fan, S., Kanbur, R., Wei, S.-J., & Zhang, X. (Ed.). (2014a). The 
Oxford companion to the economics of China. Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Fan, S., Kanbur, R., Wei, S. J., & Zhang, X. (2014b). Overview: 
The economics of China: Success and challenges. In S. Fan, 
R. Kanbur, S.-J. Wei, & X. Zhang (Ed.), The Oxford Companion 
to The Economics of China (pp. 1-27). Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Fang, H. (2014). Insurance Markets in China. In S. Fan, R. 
Kanbur, S.-J. Wei, & X. Zhang (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
The Economics of China (pp. 279-284). Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Feng, S., Hu, Y., & Moffitt, R. (2015). Long run trends in 
unemployment and labor force participation in China. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 21460.
Frazier, M. W. (2014). State Schemes or Safety Nets? China’s 
Push for Universal Coverage. Daedalus, 143(2), 69-80.
Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2002). Happiness and Economics: 
How the economy and institutions affect well-being. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.
Giles, J., Park, A., & Cai, F. (2006). How has economic 
restructuring affected China’s urban workers?. The China 
Quarterly, 185, 61-95.
Graham, C., Zhou, S., & Zhang J., (2015). Happiness and 
health in China: The paradox of progress, Global Economy & 
Development Working Paper 89.
Guriev, S., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2009). (Un)happiness in 
transition. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2), 143-168.
Gustafsson, B., & Ding, S. (2011). Unemployment and the 
rising number of non-workers in urban China: Causes and 
distributional consequences. In S. Li, H. Sato, & T. Sicular 
(Ed.), Rising Inequality in China: Challenge to a Harmonious 
Society (pp. 289-331). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gustafsson, B. A., Li, S., & Sicular, T. (2008). Inequality and 
public policy in China. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Helliwell, J. F. & H. Huang (2014). New Measures on the 
Costs of unemployment: Evidence from the subjective 
well-being of 3.3 million Americans. Economic Inquiry, 52 (4), 
1485-1502.
_____________,H. Huang, & S. Wang (2016). The Distribu-
tion of World Happiness. In J. f. Helliwell, R. Layard, and J. 
Sachs (eds.) World Happiness Report 2016 Update (Vol. 1), New 
York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network.
Helliwell, J. F., R. Layard, & J. Sachs (2012), eds. World 
Happiness Report 2012. New York: Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network. 
_______________________________ (2013), eds. World 
Happiness Report 2013. New York: Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network.
________________________________(2016), eds. World 
Happiness Report 2016, Update (Vol. 1), New York: Sustainable 
Solutions Network.
Henderson, J. V. (2014). Urbanization in China. In S. Fan, R. 
Kanbur, S.-J. Wei, & X. Zhang (Ed.),
The Oxford Companion to the Economics of China (pp.225-229). 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Horizon Research Consultancy Group (1997-2015). <www.
agmr.com/members/horizon.html>
Huang, Y. (2008). Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: 
Entrepreneurship and the State. New York: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press.
Huang, Y. (2014). Political economy of privatization in China. 
In S. Fan, R. Kanbur, S.-J. Wei, & X. Zhang (Ed.), The Oxford 
Companion to The Economics of China (pp. 291-295). Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press.
Inglehart, R. F. (2002). Globalization and postmodern values, 
The Washington Quarterly, 23(1), 215-228.
Inglehart, R., Basanez, M., & Moreno, A. (1998). Human 
values and beliefs: A cross-cultural sourcebook. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press.
Knight, J., & Gunatilaka, R. (2011). Does economic growth 
raise happiness in China? Oxford Development Studies, 39 (1), 
1-24.
_______________________(2017). Is Happiness Infectious? 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 64 (1), 1-24.
Knight, J., & Song, L. (2000). The rural-urban divide: Economic 
disparities and interactions in China. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Knight, J. & Song, L. (2005). Towards a labour market in China. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Knight, J. & Xue, J. J. (2006). How high is urban unemploy-
ment in China?. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business 
Studies, 4, 91-107.
72
W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
73
Layard, R., Clark, A. & Senik, C. (2012). The Causes of 
Happiness and Misery. In J. Helliwell, R. Layard, & J. Sachs 
(eds.) World Happiness Report. New York: The Earth Institute, 
Columbia University.
Layard, R. & O’Donnell, G. (2015). How to make policy when 
happiness is the goal. In J. F. Helliwell, R. Layard, & J. Sachs 
(eds.), World Happiness Report 2015 (pp. 76-87). New York: UN 
Sustainable Development Solutions Nework.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2013). China statistical 
yearbook 2013. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2016). Statistical 
communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2015 
national economic and social development. http://www.stats.
gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201602/t20160229_1324019.
html, Released on February 29, 2016.
Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and 
Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Naughton, B. (2008). The demographic factor in China’s 
transition. In L. Brandt & T. G. Rawki (Ed.), China’s Great 
Economic Transformation (pp. 91-135). New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
O’Connor, K. J. (2016). Happiness and Welfare State Policy 
around the World. Working Paper, University of Southern 
California Department of Economics.
OECD (2010). Economic surveys: China. Vol. 2010/6. Paris: 
OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2013). OECD guidelines for measuring subjective 
well-being. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Pacek, A. & B. Radcliff (2008). “Assessing the welfare state.” 
Perspectives on Politics, 6 (2), 267-277.
Penn World Table 9.0, (2016). http://www.rug.nl/research/
ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-9.0, Released on: June 9, 2016, DOI: 
10.15141/S5J01T.
Pew Research Center (2014). Spring 2014 Global Attitudes 
Survey. Accessed July 2016: http://www.pewglobal.
org/2014/06/05/spring-2014-survey-data/.
Radcliff, B. (2013). The political economy of human happiness: 
How voters’ choices determine the quality of life. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Ravallion, M. (2014). An emerging new form of social 
protection in 21st Century China. In S. Fan., R. Kanbur, S.-J. 
Wei, & X. Zhang (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to The Economics 
of China (pp. 441-445). Oxford and New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Steele, L. G., & Lynch, S. M. (2013). The pursuit of happiness 
in China: Individualism, collectivism, and subjective well-be-
ing during China’s economic and social transformation. Social 
Indicators Research, (114)2, 441-451.
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2008). Economic growth and 
subjective well-being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 39 (1), 1-87.
Stiglitz, J. E., Sen, A, & Fitoussi, J. P. (2008). Report of the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress. Available at www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr.
Veenhoven, R. (1991). Is happiness relative? Social Indicators 
Research, 24(1), 1-34.
Wang, S. & W. Zhou (2016). Family Structure and Home 
Ownership: Evidence from China. Working Paper, Korean 
Development Institute.
World Bank. (2007). China’s modernizing labor market: Trends 
and emerging challenges. Washington: World Bank.
Xie, Y., & Zhou, X. (2014). Income inequality in today’s China. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(19), 
6928-6933.
Xu, C. G. (2011). The fundamental institutions of China’s 
reforms and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 
49(4), 1076-1151.
Zhang, X., Zhang, X., & Chen, X. (2015). Happiness in the air. 




(EASTERLIN, WANG AND WANG, GROWTH AND HAPPINESS IN CHINA,  
1990-2015)
W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
75
Table A3.1. Mean Subjective Well-Being, Five Series, Total Population, China, 1990-2015a
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CGSS Gallup2 Horizon Horizon
 WVS Gallup1 CGSS (MAb) Gallup2 (MAb) (Cities) (MAb)
(1-10) (1-4) (1-5) (1-5) (0-10) (0-10) (1-5) (1-5)




1999 2.78 4.7c 3.44d 3.40
2000 3.27 3.33
2001 6.53 3.28d 3.29
2002 3.33 3.29
2003 3.26 3.32
2004 2.67 4.5c 3.38 3.31
2005 3.41 3.28 3.39
2006 2.76 3.46 3.52 4.56 3.52 3.38
2007 6.76 4.86 4.76 3.35 3.46
2008 3.68 3.64 4.85 4.72 3.51 3.44
2009 4.45 4.65 3.47 3.46
2010 3.77 3.77 4.65 4.71 3.41 3.47
2011 3.86 3.80 5.04 4.93 3.53 3.50
2012 6.85 3.78 3.79 5.09 5.12 3.57 3.53
2013 3.72 5.24 5.18 3.49 3.52
2014 5.20 5.25 3.51 3.61
2015 5.30
Sources: WVS (World Values Survey: www.worldvaluessurvey.org); Gallup1 and Gallup2: (www.gallup.com); Horizon Research 
Consultancy Group, series for “cities” (www.agmr.com/members/horizon.html)
a. For specific questions and response options, see text, Technical Box 1. The scale for each survey is shown above in parentheses.
b. Three-year moving average, centered.
c. 1-10 scale
d. 1-4 scale, mean computed from 5, 4, 2, 1 coding.
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Table A3.2. Real GDP per Capita and Price Level of Household Consumption, 1988-2015
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real GDP per Capita Price Level
(2011 US dollars) (US 2005 = 100)
Rate of Change (%) Rate of Change (%)
Year Annual MAc Annual MAc
1988 2408 13.3
1989 2361 -1.94 15.6 17.45
1990 2386 1.08 1.37 12.8 -18.05 -1.28
1991 2505 4.98 4.43 12.4 -3.24 -5.00
1992 2687 7.24 6.66 13.2 6.29 3.40
1993 2896 7.78 7.31 14.1 7.16 1.19
1994 3095 6.90 8.59 12.7 -9.87 6.74
1995 3439 11.09 6.82 15.6 22.95 10.32
1996 3523 2.45 6.52 18.4 17.89 15.86
1997 3735 6.00 2.56 19.7 6.74 11.63
1998 3706 -0.76 3.50 21.7 10.27 6.29
1999 3901 5.26 3.35 22.1 1.86 6.27
2000 4118 5.56 5.90 23.5 6.67 3.92
2001 4401 6.87 7.66 24.3 3.23 2.67
2002 4866 10.56 8.39 23.8 -1.90 1.87
2003 5243 7.75 9.62 24.9 4.27 2.60
2004 5796 10.56 9.58 26.2 5.41 5.51
2005 6400 10.43 10.77 28.0 6.84 5.93
2006 7126 11.33 10.68 29.6 5.54 9.47
2007 7858 10.29 7.95 34.3 16.02 15.66
2008 8034 2.23 6.97 43.0 25.43 14.54
2009 8709 8.41 6.41 44.0 2.18 12.15
2010 9456 8.58 8.30 47.8 8.85 7.68
2011 10205 7.92 7.92 53.6 12.02 9.22
2012 10945 7.25 7.27 57.2 6.81 8.35
2013 11673 6.66 6.92 60.8 6.22 5.49
2014 12473 6.85 6.63 62.9 3.45 4.23
2015 13271a 6.40 64.8b 3.03
Sources: Real GDP per capita 1988-2014 (Penn World Table 9.0, http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/), Real GDP per 
capita 2015 (NBS of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/), Price level 1988-2014 (Penn World Table 9.0, http://www.rug.nl/research/
ggdc/data/pwt/), Price level 2015 (NBS of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/). 
a. Extrapolated by the NBS series, assuming the 2015 growth rate is the same (6.4%) in both series.
b. Extrapolated by the NBS series, assuming the ratio of the NBS CPI (1978=100) to the PWT price level in 2015 is 9.5, following 
the decreasing trend of the ratio since 2011.
c. Three-year moving average, centered.
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Table A3.3. Urban Unemployment Rate, Four Series, 1988-2015
(percent of labor force)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

















2000 7.8 7.2 11.3/8.3b
2001 8.2 8.8
2002 10.4 9.7 11.6
2003 10.4 10.2
2004 9.9 10.1
2005 10.0 9.8 9.6/6.9b
2006 9.4 9.2
2007 8.1 8.9 7.9
2008 9.1 8.7
2009 8.9 8.2
2010 8.7 7.3 4.8b
2011 4.9 6.3
2012 5.3 5.0
2013 4.7 4.1 4.2
2014 2.3 4.2
2015  5.5     
Sources: NBER (urban hukou population): Feng, Hu, and Moffitt 2015; GWP (www.gallup.com);  
CHIP (urban households, http://www.ciidbnu.org/chip/index.asp); Census (random samples of  
the Census data from the NBS of China, and statistics on http://www.stats.gov.cn/).
a. Three-year moving average, centered.
b. Urban (city + town) population; other census values are for urban hukou population.
Table A3.4. Safety Net Indicators by Level of Education, 1988-2013
(urban households)
 
A. Pension Coverage 
(percent of males ages 60+ and females ages 55+)
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
1 All 99.5 99.5 79.8 84.6 83.1
2 College or more 99.2 99.7 90.9 95.4 90.3
3 Middle school or high school 99.8 99.7 88.7 90.6 86.8
4 Primary school or less 99.9 99.1 63.1 64.6 74.9
5 Row 2 - Row 4 -0.7 0.6 27.8 30.8 15.4
B. Healthcare Coverage  
(percent of population ages 15+)
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
6 All (99)a 75.4 56.4 92.1
7 College or more (99) 87.4 71.2 91.3
8 Middle school or High School (99) 74.6 52.8 91.9
9 Primary school or less (99) 61.5 43.3 94.7
10 Row 7 - Row 9 (0) 25.9 27.9 -3.4
Source: CHIP (urban households, http://www.ciidbnu.org/
chip/index.asp). Healthcare was not asked in 1988 and 2007.
a. Values for 1988 assume coverage was nearly universal, 
based on responses on self-rated health (SRH) by income and 
education in the 1990 WVS which are very close together. Cf. 
Inglehart et al. 1998, V83.
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Table A3.5. Measures of Social Capital, 1990-2012
 
1990 1995 2001 2007 2012
Most people can be trusted (% agree) 60.4 52.3 54.4 52.8 63.2
Civic cooperation (10=always; 1=never)
Wrong to falsely claim benefits 9.30 8.63 8.86 7.48 7.33
Wrong to avoid fare 9.42 9.39 9.66 8.96 8.38
Wrong to cheat on tax 9.46 9.47 9.42 9.00 8.79
Bribing not acceptable 9.66 9.79 9.65 9.28 9.03
Mean 9.46 9.34 9.41 8.67 8.36
Source: WVS. Specific questions and response options are given in Technical Box 2.



































2010 3490 4725 4726
2011 4993 5049
2012 5430 5424
2013 4244 5850 5738
2014 5933
Sources: Coal Consumption, Department of Energy Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics (2015).  
China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2014. China Statistics Press; Housing Prices, NBS of China.
a. Three-year moving average, centered.
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Table A3.7. Predictors of SWB in World Happiness Reports, 1990-2012
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)






US$ 2011 yrs. (1-10)a (1-10)b
1990 2386 69.0 7.04 1.34
1995 3439 69.9 6.80 1.21
2001 4401 72.2 7.15 1.35
2007 7858 74.3 7.29 1.72
2012 10945 75.4 7.14 1.97
a. 1 = none; 10 = a great deal.
b. 1 = never; 10 = always.
Source:  Col. (1) Table A2, col.1
 Col. (2) World Bank, World Development Indicators
 Cols. (3), (4) World Values Survey
 







2006 4.56 5.04 0.09
2007 4.86 5.49 0.08
2008 4.85 5.52 0.08
2009 4.45 5.44 0.08
2010 4.65 5.38 0.08
2011 5.04 5.46 0.08
2012 5.09 5.44 0.06
2013 5.24 5.41 0.08
2014 5.20 5.42 0.08
2015 5.30 5.37 0.08
Sources: Cols. 2 and 4, Gallup World Poll. Col. 3, based on equation  
in Helliwell et al (2016), p. 16, Table 2.1, col. 1.
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Table A3.9. Mean Life Satisfaction, Top and Bottom Income Terciles,
and Standard Deviation of Life Satisfaction, 1990-2012
(scale 1-10)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1990 1995 2007 2012
All 7.29 6.83 6.77 6.86
Top Tercile 7.30 7.77 7.53 7.47
Bottom Tercile 7.12 5.89 5.53 6.46
Top minus bottom 0.18 1.88 2.00 1.01
Life Satisfaction St. Dev. 2.10 2.42 2.43 1.98
Source: World Values Survey.
Table A3.10. Unemployment Rate, by Level of Education, 1988-2013
(per cent of labor force)
 
1988 1995 2002 2007 2013
All 0.4 3.4 11.6 7.9 4
College or more 0.0 0.8 3.8 3.6 2.8
Middle school or high school 0.5 3.7 13.8 8.8 5.2
Primary school or less 0.1 3.9 18.5 12.5 4.2
Primary minus college 0.1 3.1 14.7 8.9 1.5
Source: World Values Survey.
Table A11. Mean Financial Satisfaction, Top and Bottom Income Terciles, 1990-2012
(scale 1-10)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1990 1995 2007 2012
All 6.10 6.11 6.06 6.18
Top third 6.34 7.25 7.38 7.00
Bottom third 5.73 4.90 5.00 5.54
Top minus bottom 0.61 2.35 2.38 1.46
Source: World Values Survey.
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Table A3.12. Mean Self-Reported Health, Top and Bottom Income Terciles, 1990-2012
(scale 1-5)
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1990 1995 2007 2012
All 3.82 4.01 3.93 3.86
Top third 3.83 4.26 4.13 4.02
Bottom third 3.80 3.80 3.71 3.69
Top minus bottom 0.03 0.46 0.42 0.33
Source: World Values Survey.




Cohort 1990 2001 2012
1936-45 7.43 6.84 7.18
1946-60 7.40 6.38 6.76
1961-65 6.78 6.53 6.79
Source: World Values Survey.
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Table A3.14. Mean Subjective Well-Being by Urban-Rural Residence, 2003-2015a
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gallup (0-10) CGSS (1-5)
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Year Y MA Y MA Y MA Y MA
2003     3.28    
2004
2005 3.45 3.41 3.36
2006 4.80 4.41 3.50 3.58 3.40 3.45
2007 5.12 5.00 4.70 4.58
2008 5.09 4.97 4.64 4.56 3.79 3.70 3.58 3.56
2009 4.70 4.90 4.34 4.47
2010 4.90 5.01 4.44 4.51 3.82 3.82 3.71 3.72
2011 5.42 5.30 4.75 4.67 3.85 3.83 3.86 3.77
2012 5.58 5.51 4.81 4.86 3.81 3.79 3.73 3.77
2013 5.54 5.47 5.02 4.99 3.72 3.71
2014 5.28 5.53 5.13 5.04
2015 5.76 4.98
Legend:  Y= yearly 
MA = Three item moving average, centered
Sources: Gallup, See Table A1. CGSS (http://www.chinagss.org/index.php?r=index/index&hl=en).
a. For specific questions and response options, see Technical Box 1





Year Y MA Y MA
2003 3.28  3.19  
2004
2005 3.45 3.41 3.44
2006 3.50 3.58 3.43 3.55
2007
2008 3.79 3.70 3.79 3.67
2009
2010 3.82 3.82 3.78 3.80
2011 3.85 3.83 3.82 3.78
2012 3.81 3.79 3.74 3.75
2013 3.72 3.70
Legend:  UH = Urban hukou holders in urban areas 
RH = Rural hukou holders in urban areas 
Y= yearly 
MA = Three item moving average, centered
Source: CGSS (http://www.chinagss.org/index.php?r=index/index&hl=en).
a. For specific questions and response options, see Technical Box 1
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Introduction
Are the people in Africa really among the least 
happy in the world? And if African countries do 
have a ‘happiness deficit’, what are the prospects 
of Africa achieving happiness in the near future? 
These are questions we shall try to address in 
this chapter.
The World Happiness Report (WHR), published 
since 2012, has found that happiness is less 
evident in Africa than in other regions of the 
world. It reports Gallup World Poll (GWP) 
ratings of happiness, measured on the ‘ladder of 
life’, a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 indicating greatest 
happiness. On the map of the Geography of 
Happiness, published in an earlier World Happi-
ness Report Update 2015, the happiest countries 
in the world are shaded green, the unhappiest red. 
Africa stands out as the unhappiest continent, 
being coloured almost entirely in shades of 
glaring red (See Fig. 4.1). 
In 2017, the WHR reports that average ladder 
scores for over four in five African countries are 
below the mid-point of the scale (see Fig. 4.2). 
And only two African countries have made 
significant gains in happiness over the past 
decade2. There are also considerable inequalities 
in life evaluations in African countries, and this 
inequality in happiness has increased over the 
past years3.
In this chapter, we shall tentatively seek a number 
of explanations for the unhappiness on the 
African continent, which is home to about 16% 
of the world’s population. It will be no easy  
task to identify factors that may have shaped 
perceptions of well-being among the 1.2 billion 
African people who live in 54 nation states  
with different historical, cultural, and socio-eco-
nomic backgrounds. Nonetheless, we shall 
attempt to describe some of the positive and 
negative experiences in the lives of people in 
African countries that likely impact on personal 
Figure 4.1 Geography of Happiness
Source: Helliwell, Huang, & Wang (2015, p. 20)
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Figure 13: Ranking of Happiness in Africa: 2014-16












































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Explained by: GDP per capita Explained by: social support
Explained by: healthy life expectancy Explained by: freedom to make life choices
Explained by: generosity Explained by: perceptions of corruption
Dystopia (1.85) + residual 95% confidence interval
31
Figure 4.2: Ranking of Happiness in Africa, 2014-16
Source: Gallup World Poll
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well-being. We shall also try to identify the 
prospects for change and development that 
could spell hope for increasing the happiness of 
African people in future.
The ‘patchwork of countries that make up Africa’4
Africa includes 54 countries, the largest number 
of nation states on a single continent. Forty-sev-
en of the 166 countries in the Gallup World Poll, 
about a quarter, are African countries. South 
Sudan, which gained its independence in 2011 
following Africa’s longest civil war, is now 
included in the poll. The GWP has also collected 
data in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, in the 
small island state of Comoros, and in both 
Somalia and Somaliland, although the latter 
region is not officially recognised as an indepen-
dent state but considered a part of Somalia5. The 
2017 World Happiness Report tracks the happi-
ness of 44 African countries polled by Gallup, 
including the island states of Mauritius and 
Madagascar located off the east coast of Africa 
(see Fig. 4.36). 
At the outset, it will be important to remember 
that Africa is the continent with the longest 
history of humankind. We all have ancestors on 
the continent. Given the length of time that 
Homo sapiens have dwelt in Africa, it is also  
the continent with the greatest cultural diversity 
and a wealth of ancient civilisations. There are a 
multitude of different ethnicities and languages 
spoken in Africa. The continent extends from the 
Mediterranean Sea in the north to the meeting of 
the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the south, and 
from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Suez 
Canal and the Red Sea in the east. Climatic 
regions range from temperate coastal regions, 
deserts and semi-deserts, bushland and savannah, 
to tropical jungles over the equator. 
Africa’s turbulent history has produced an 
extremely diverse cultural and linguistic land-
scape. Centuries of slavery, colonialism and 
apartheid preceded the period of independence. 
During the turbulent years following the ‘first 
dance of freedom’7 in the 1960s, the new African 
nation states experimented briefly with various 
styles of self-rule in what has been called the 
‘third wave’ of democracy8. The expansion of the 
Arabian Islamic Caliphate into North Africa in 
the 7th century and the European ‘scramble for 
Africa’ in the late 19th century introduced several 
of the European and Arabic languages that still 
serve as lingua franca and national languages on 
the continent. Over the centuries, African people 
have adopted some of the customs, technological 
advancements and new lifestyles of their former 
colonial masters. In recent times, Africa has 
leapfrogged older technology to embrace the 
latest advancements, such as mobile phones and 
solar-powered electricity. 
This tumultuous history will have left its imprint 
on expectations and perceptions of personal 
well-being.9 Given the diversity found on the 
continent, it is natural to expect, as is shown in 
Figure 4.2, that there will be large differences 
among African countries in both life evaluations 
and likely reasons for these differences. Africa 
watchers frequently note how different the 
situations are from one African country to the 
next. Contrary to the once commonly held view 
that Africa is a single entity or ‘brand’, each 
country in fact has unique features that distin-
guish it from its neighbours.10 For this reason, 
there is likely to be a multitude of explanations 
for Africa’s ‘happiness deficit’. In this chapter 
we can only begin to search for plausible factors 
that may have undermined Africa’s potential for 
happiness and satisfaction with life.
The quality of life of African people can be 
observed from a number of different perspectives. 
There have been many frames of reference for 
the narrative of Africa since independence 
ranging from the dismissive ‘basket case’ to the 
‘structural adjustment’ imposed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund during the 1980s followed 
by debt forgiveness in the 1990s. The ‘Africa 
Rising’ narrative in the new millennium was 
followed by the global economic recession; and 
lately Africa has become part of the so-called 
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‘war on terror’. Each of these narratives homes in 
on a different set of factors that may determine 
the fortunes of Africa and its people.11
Twenty-first century Africa is no longer associated 
only with ‘endless famine, disease, and dictator-
ship’. The ‘Africa Rising’ narrative, which 
overturned earlier stereotypes, projected a 
continent with a growing urban middle class 
market with new consumer appetites.12 Africa’s 
youthfulness promised to be an asset in an 
increasingly ageing global society. The continent’s 
rich mineral wealth had not been exhausted  
and its agricultural land was still waiting to be 
exploited. In the new millennium, foreign direct 
investment in Africa eclipsed development aid 
for the first time since the colonial era.13
Figure 4.3: Map of Africa with Average Happiness Scores
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Outline of this chapter
We start our examination by first reflecting on 
the paucity of data on African happiness. We 
then discuss local reactions of disbelief to some 
other polls that have found African countries to 
be among the happiest, in contrast to the Gallup 
World Poll findings reported above. We next  
consider whether Africa’s happiness deficit since 
independence14 may in fact be a long-standing 
one, in which case, it may take more time to 
remedy. Then we examine how changes in the 
lives of African people under democratic rule 
have affected quality of life on the continent.  
In particular, we review how aspects of good 
governance have affected the well-being of 
citizens. Finally, we consider how African people 
have managed to live with their ‘happiness 
deficit’ in anticipation of the good life.  
Data for Africa
The GWP data on happiness for Africa is a 
valuable source of information on happiness in 
developing countries in Africa and serves as our 
point of departure. (See Technical Box 1: Gallup 
methodology in Africa). However, a major  
challenge for us when reflecting on Africa’s 
well-being has been sourcing further data in 
support of our arguments. Our chapter will 
focus on all countries in Africa—unlike studies 
that divide Africa into sub-Saharan Africa and 
North Africa, or the extended region of MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa). While data 
coverage for Africa has improved over the past 
decades, there is still a dearth of social indicators 
that cover the whole of the continent. In particu-
lar, there is a shortage of trend data that would 
help us track the relationship between happiness 
and the factors that we think might have influ-
enced happiness over time.15
We have opted for a practical solution. Where 
possible we draw on Africa’s home-grown data. 
A useful source for our purpose is the Afroba-
rometer, which collects subjective indicators that 
give voice to ordinary citizens on the continent.16 
Other home-grown initiatives that provided 
useful pointers for our examination are the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)17 
that covers all 54 countries on the continent 
based mainly on objective indicators, and the 
Arab Barometer, launched in 2005, which covers 
countries in North Africa and the Middle East.18
Do Gallup Happiness Ratings Ring 
True in Africa?
Before we consider what may be holding back 
African happiness, it will be important to know 
whether WHR reports on life evaluations in 
African countries ring true to people living on 
the continent. Measures of subjective well-being, 
other than Gallup World Poll ones, have, on 
occasion, ranked African countries such as 
Ghana and Nigeria among the happiest in the 
world. In these cases, it seems that local reactions 
to media reports on such high happiness rank-
ings were mixed. In the Ghanaian case, political 
leaders reportedly took credit for promoting the 
well-being in their country, while their citizens 
tended to doubt that the scores were credible,  
and debated their validity. Similarly, Nigerian 
scholars referred to a ‘Nigerian paradox’ when 
their country achieved less than credible very 
high happiness rankings in international studies. 
When Ghanaians heard that their country 
ranked among the ten happiest countries in the 
world in a news story circulating on the internet 
in 2006, there was excitement but also mainly 
disbelief. In her contribution to a handbook  
on happiness across cultures, Vivian Afi Abui 
Dzokoto recalls that the rating was received with 
mixed feelings of pride and disbelief that triggered 
debate on what ‘really mattered’ for well-being 
in Ghana. ‘Did this statistic take into consideration 
the state of life in the country: the unemploy-
ment rates, traffic, state of roads, and the price 
of gasoline? Was it because Ghana was a very 
religious country? Or was it family values  
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Technical Box 1: Gallup Methodology in Africa
Introduced in 2005, the Gallup World Poll is 
conducted in approximately 140 countries every 
year worldwide, including 40 in Africa, tracking 
attitudes toward law and order, institutions and 
infrastructure, jobs, well-being, and other topics. 
Gallup surveys approximately 1,000 residents 
per country, targeting the entire civilian, non-in-
stitutionalized population, aged 15 and older. In 
2016, face-to-face surveys were used in all of 
Sub-Saharan Africa and most of North Africa. 
In Libya, telephone survey methodology has 
been used since 2015 owing to the country’s 
high rate of mobile phone coverage and ongo-
ing instability which has made it too dangerous 
to use face-to-face interviewers. 
In countries where face-to-face surveys are con-
ducted in Africa, the first stage of sampling is 
the identification of 100 to 125 ultimate clusters 
(sampling units), consisting of clusters of 
households. Sampling units are stratified by 
population size and geography and clustering is 
achieved through one or more stages of sam-
pling. Where population information is avail-
able, sample selection is based on probabilities 
proportional to size (PPS) sampling, otherwise 
simple random sampling is used. Samples are 
drawn independent of any samples drawn for 
surveys conducted in previous years. In most 
African countries, national coverage is at or 
near 100%. However, national coverage is lower 
in countries such as Nigeria (96%), Somalia 
(68%), and South Sudan (56%) where insecurity 
makes interviewing dangerous in specific 
regions or neighbourhoods.
Data weighting is used to ensure a nationally 
representative sample for each country and is 
intended to be used for calculations within a 
country. First, base sampling weights are con-
structed to account for household size. Weight-
ing by household size (number of residents 
aged 15 and older) is used to adjust for the prob-
ability of selection, as residents in large house-
holds will have a disproportionately lower prob-
ability of being selected for the sample. Second, 
post-stratification weights are constructed. 
Population statistics are used to weight the data 
by gender, age, and, where reliable data are 
available, education. At country level in Africa, 
each survey carries a margin of sampling error 
ranging from a low of ±2.6 percentage points to 
a high of ±5.4 percentage points.
The Gallup World Poll is translated into 85 lan-
guages throughout Africa and attempts are 
made to conduct interviews in the language the 
respondent speaks most comfortably. When at 
least 5% of a national population considers a 
language to be their most comfortable language, 
a new language is added to the survey. 
Where necessary, Gallup seeks the permissions 
of national, regional, and local governments. In 
many African locations, permission from Chiefs 
and Elders must also be sought in order to gain 
access to rural areas or villages. In Somalia, 
permission is obtained not only from authorities 
in Somaliland, Puntland, and the Central 
Government in Mogadishu, but also from 
so-called “emerging states” such as Jubbaland 
Administration and South-West State.
Following 4-5 day training courses in capital 
cities, interviewers are sent across the country 
to reach ultimate clusters. While public trans-
portation is used in many cases, it is often 
necessary in some regions to rent 4x4’s owing 
to poor infrastructure and the remoteness of 
many sampling areas. In South Sudan, all 
interviewers not working in Juba must be 
flown to provincial towns immediately following 
training as road networks make travel exceed-
ingly difficult. While at least 30% of interviews 
are accompanied in-person or back-checked by 
supervisors in all countries, data is also moni-
tored remotely throughout fieldwork by quality 
control personnel utilising GPS data and inter-
viewer productivity metrics.
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or the tropical climate?’19
In the case of the Nigerian happiness ‘paradox’, 
Aaron Agbo and his colleagues, writing in the 
same handbook on cross-cultural happiness, 
thought that respondents who indicated that 
they felt happy might not have meant they were 
truly happy with their situation, but rather they 
felt that reporting otherwise ‘could only aggra-
vate the matter’. Saying you are happy might 
have been a way ‘of counter-acting everyday 
negative life experiences’, they speculated.20
Africa’s History of  
Depressed Happiness
Well-being may reflect the history of a region.21 
This may especially be the case for Africa that 
has a short history of self-rule. Low levels of 
subjective well-being are likely not to be a recent 
development in Africa. Indeed, the first interna-
tional studies of happiness already found that 
evaluations of life were less positive in African 
countries south of the Sahara than elsewhere.  
The WHR uses the ladder of life measure 
introduced by Hadley Cantril in the early 1960s 
as the yardstick for ranking countries on global 
happiness. Going back in time, Cantril’s classic 
study of The Pattern of Human Concerns in 13 
countries conducted in the early 1960s included 
two African countries: Nigeria represented an 
‘underdeveloped giant’ along with Brazil and 
India, while Egypt was among three samples 
drawn in the Middle East. It seems that the 
country evaluations reported by Cantril in the 
1960s for Egypt and Nigeria have not shifted 
much in fifty years. The highest score is 10 on 
Cantril’s 0 to 10 ladder of life scale. Egypt’s 
mean ladder score was 5.5 in Cantril’s 1960s 
study and 4.735 as recorded in this year’s WHR 
2017 (see Fig. 4.2). Nigeria’s ladder ratings in 
the two periods are 4.8 in Cantril’s 1960s study 
and 5.074 in WHR 2017 (see Fig. 4.2).22
A decade after Cantril’s study, the Gallup-Ketter-
ing study conducted in the 1970s, the largest 
global study of well-being of its time, found that 
African countries produced the lowest ladder  
of life scores, apart from India. A combined 
sample of eleven sub-Saharan African countries 
scored 4.61 in the 1970s, a ladder rating not very 
different from the most recent Gallup World Poll 
ladder ratings reported in WHR 2017 for the 
same eleven African countries that range from 
3.35 to 5.07.23
Africa’s Quest for Positive Change 
Of importance for our discussion here is that  
the Gallup-Kettering study of the 1970s also 
asked respondents if they thought they would be 
happier if things could be changed about their 
lives. The desire for change was greatest by far 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Some 90% of African 
respondents wished for change in their lives and 
the vast majority in this group wanted not a 
‘few’, but ‘many’ things to change to improve 
their lives.24
There can be no doubt that the most profound 
changes in the lives of African people were 
caused by the ‘winds of change’ that swept 
through the continent in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, bringing independence to formerly subju-
gated peoples. On gaining independence from 
colonial rule, most countries on the continent 
experimented with democratic rule that was to 
restore dignity and freedom for Africa’s people. 
Why should democracy be important for African 
well-being? One argument is that Africa’s 
approach to democracy focuses on ‘horizontal 
equality’ among diverse cultural and ethnic 
groups rather than on ‘individual’ or vertical 
rights.25 Thus, Africa’s democracy project might 
be said to be in tune with a continent that has 
always nurtured collectivist values, such as 
African humanism. It ensured societal well-be-
ing in the past and still continues to do so today.26 
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In the next sections, we shall review attitudes  
to democracy and citizen evaluations of good 
governance. Later we shall return to discuss 
threats to an inclusive African democracy, in the 
form of authoritarian leaders (Africa’s so-called 
‘Big Men’), patronage systems, and corruption, 
all of which may have negative impacts on 
well-being on the continent. 
Democracy, Good Governance, and 
the Promise of Prosperity 
Africa is said to have embraced democracy ‘in 
fits and starts’ since the winds of change blew 
through the continent in the 1960s. Although 
the newly independent states adopted the West-
ern liberal democratic systems of their former 
colonial masters, in due course authoritarian 
rule became the order of the day. By the end of 
the 1980s, only Botswana, The Gambia and 
Mauritius still had democratic systems. Democracy 
was generally restored in the 1990s, and today, 
the vast majority of Africa’s countries are multi-
party democracies, at least in name if not in 
practice. The African Union’s Vision 2063 
envisages a prosperous and peaceful Africa that 
promotes democratic governance. Free and fair 
elections are seen as a test of the strength of 
Africa’s democracies and more than a third of 
states on the continent were due to hold elections 
in 2016.27
Africa’s ‘Third Liberation’. Now that Africa has 
liberated itself from both colonial and authori-
tarian rule, African countries are advised to 
achieve the so-called ‘third liberation’, that is, to 
free themselves from poor governance in order 
to accelerate development and prosperity.28 
International evidence suggests there is a strong 
link between good governance and well-being. 
Societies that have high levels of well-being tend 
to be economically developed, to have effective 
governments with low levels of corruption, to 
have high levels of trust, and to be able to meet 
citizens’ basic needs for food and health.29
Supply and demand for democracy in Africa. 
Afrobarometer surveys have found that the  
most common meaning of democracy in Africa 
relates to civil liberties, especially freedom of 
speech.30 And successive waves of the Afroba-
rometer show that Africans consider democracy 
to be preferable to any other form of govern-
ment, disapproving of authoritarian options 
including one-party, military and one-man rule 
(see Fig. 4.4A left). However, this demand for 
democracy is not matched by supply over the 
course of fifteen years. The African countries 
that favour democratic rule outweigh those that 
are satisfied with democracy and regard their 
country as a democracy (see Fig. 4.4B right). 
Importantly, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that 
satisfaction with democracy is weakly positively 
associated with happiness, while a ‘democratic 
deficit’—the gap between preference for democ-
racy and satisfaction with its functioning— 
depresses levels of happiness. Looking back over 
the past decade, Figure 4.7 indicates that gains 
and losses in satisfaction with democracy relate 
to corresponding changes in happiness.  
The material underpinnings of democracy and 
African well-being
It is important to note that African citizens 
expect much more of their democracies than just 
civil liberties such as free and fair elections. They 
are just as likely to associate democracy with 
better living conditions—with basic services such 
as clean water, electricity, and housing—as with 
regular elections, competing political parties, and 
freedom to criticise government.31
Given the continent’s history of colonialism, 
there was hope that democracy would restore 
dignity to African people and improve their life 
circumstances. Africa’s independence from 
colonial rule promised material benefits—the 
decent standard of living that provides dignity. It 
is telling that an improved or decent standard of 
living was the greatest hope expressed by Nigeri-
ans participating in Cantril’s 1960s study. Before 
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Figure 4.4: Trends in the Demand for and Supply of Democracy, 12 African Countries, 1999-2015
Figure 4.5: Satisfaction with Democracy and Happiness, 34 African Countries, 2013-2015
Source: Afrobarometer Rounds 1-6, Online Appendix, Table A4.1.
Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.2.
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Figure 4.6: Democratic Deficits and Happiness, 34 African Countries, 2013-2015a
Figure 4.7: Changes in Satisfaction with Democracy and Happiness, 15 African Countries, 2005-
2015a
Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.2. 
a. The democratic deficit is the percentage point difference between the share stating that democracy is preferable and those that 
report satisfaction with democratic functioning. The larger the score, the greater the deficit.
Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3 and 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.3.
a. Changes refer to absolute changes in levels of satisfaction with democracy and happiness between the two periods. The results 
are confined to those countries with available Afrobarometer and Gallup data in both time periods. 
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giving their life evaluations, 69% of Nigerian 
respondents stated they aspired to a better 
standard of living, while 60% worried that they 
might not achieve a decent standard of living.32
Waiting for the ‘end of poverty’33. The Afroba-
rometer uses the Lived Poverty Index34 to measure 
freedom from the experience of deprivations in 
everyday life. Respondents are asked whether 
they have gone without six basic necessities in 
the past year, ranging from food and water to 
electricity in the home. There is a strong nega-
tive association between happiness and lived 
poverty. African countries that have experienced 
less lived poverty report higher levels of happiness 
in the Gallup World Poll (see Fig. 4.8). Burundi, 
one of the world’s poorest nations, that is strug-
gling to emerge from a 12-year ethnic-based civil 
war, scores highest on Afrobarometer’s lived 
poverty and lowest on happiness. In contrast, 
Algeria, a leading North African oil-exporting 
country, and Mauritius, a strongly democratic 
island state, have low lived poverty and are the 
two happiest countries on the continent in the 
GWP. Other North African countries follow  
close behind Algeria and Mauritius in their lived 
poverty and happiness ratings. 
Figure 4.9 indicates that changes in lived poverty 
and happiness over time are associated. For 
example, Zimbabwe, formerly a breadbasket in 
southern African and now often regarded as a 
failed state where unemployment and poverty are 
endemic and political strife and repression are 
commonplace, has experienced some poverty 
relief in daily life over the past decade. The drop 
in Zimbabwe’s lived poverty score of 0.61 points 
in Figure 4.9 is matched by a corresponding 
increase of 0.64 points in its happiness score. 
Figure 4.8: Happiness and Lived Poverty in 34 African Countries, 2013-15
Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.4.
Note: In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015 
period, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead. In the case of Morocco, there was no lived poverty data 
for the 2014-2015 period, so we relied on Afrobarometer round 5 data for 2011-2013 in this case.
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Infrastructure development and happiness. 
Developing the continent’s infrastructure is a 
major challenge that has not kept pace with 
population growth. The Programme for Infra-
structure Development in Africa estimates that 
the continent would need to invest up to $93 
billion a year until 2020 for capital investment 
and maintenance.35 Africa’s huge backlog of 
infrastructure may play a more important role in 
determining personal well-being in Africa than 
in the more developed countries of the West, 
whose higher levels of happiness are indicated 
in shades of green in the Geography of Happi-
ness map (see Fig. 4.1 above). 
Afrobarometer reports that on average across 35 
African countries, only about two-thirds of the 
people live in communities with an electric grid 
(65%) and/or piped water infrastructure (63%), 
and less than one in three have access to sewage 
(30%), while more than three times as many 
have access to cellular phone service (93%). Only 
about half (54%) live in zones with tarred or 
paved roads. Regional comparisons show that 
North Africa has the best availability of all five 
services36, which may be reflected in their higher 
than average happiness ratings on the continent 
(see Figs. 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 above). 
It is telling that in 1994 the government of 
South Africa, the last country on the continent to 
gain its independence, promised a ‘better life’ to 
meet its newly enfranchised black citizens’ 
aspirations for housing, running water, and 
electricity. Some twenty years later, there is still  
a marked difference between what determines 
happiness among black and white South Africans. 
Economists report that better access to infra-
structure and public goods increases happiness 
among black South Africans, while determinants 
Figure 4.9: Changes in Happiness and Lived Poverty in 15 African Countries, 2005-15a
Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3 and 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.5.
a. Changes refer to absolute changes in levels of lived poverty and happiness between the two periods. The results are confined 
to those countries with available Afrobarometer and Gallup data in both time periods.
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of the happiness among mainly wealthier white 
South Africans mirrors those typically found in 
Western developed research settings.37
Afrobarometer surveys highlight the importance 
of infrastructure development for the African 
experience of everyday well-being throughout 
the continent. The latest round of surveys found 
that the lived poverty index had declined in 
two-thirds of the 36 countries surveyed by 
Afrobarometer. Countries that had made prog-
ress in developing basic infrastructure were 
more likely to have experienced declines in lived 
poverty.38 Figure 4.10 shows that satisfaction 
with the state’s development of infrastructure  
in African countries is also positively associated 
with happiness. 
Infrastructure and democracy. While poor 
infrastructure and lack of service delivery may 
contribute to lived poverty and depressed happi-
ness, it may also undermine Africa’s democracy 
project. A case in point is South Africa’s relatively 
new democracy. The latest Afrobarometer survey 
conducted there suggests that South African 
citizens might be willing to give up their demo-
cratic rights in favour of their living conditions 
being improved. While almost two-thirds (64%) 
of South African respondents thought that 
democracy was preferable to any other kind of 
government, a similarly high percentage (62%) 
stated they would be ‘very willing’ or ‘willing’  
to give up regular elections to live under a 
non-elected government capable of ensuring law 
and order and service delivery.39 A growing 
global trend towards authoritarianism could lead 
to a resurgence of such regimes in Africa.40
Figure 4.10: Satisfaction with State Provided Infrastructural Services and Happiness in  
34 African Countries, 2013-15a
Sources: Afrobarometer Round 6 and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.6.
a. In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015 
period, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead. The index is simple average of the percent that the 
government is doing very or fairly well in handling four infrastructural services, namely: roads and bridges, electricity, water and 
sanitation, and basic health.
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Africa’s ‘Big Men’, Authoritarian  
Regimes, and Discontent
Three decades after its restoration in the 1990s, 
Africa’s democratic process is still very fragile. 
Although the era of military coups, dictatorships 
and authoritarianism may be over, there are still 
a number of African leaders who resort to 
manipulating electoral and constitutional mech-
anisms and intimidating citizens in order to 
prolong their stay in power.41 The Ibrahim Prize 
for good governance in Africa, instituted by the 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2006, goes to former 
African leaders who have honoured their country’s 
constitutionally mandated term limits, and have 
dedicated their rule to improving people’s lives. 
Only five winners have been selected in the ten 
years since 2007.42
Africa’s longest-ruling leaders are to be found 
across the continent. Fifteen leaders of 48 
African countries that hold regular elections 
have served more than two terms or indicated 
their intention to do so in 2016. Africa’s ‘Big 
Men’, who personalise power, often have poor 
human rights records and use repression to 
hang on to power.43 They gain support through 
Africa’s widespread patronage system.44 A 
number of Africa’s authoritarian regimes have 
survived because they have provided political 
stability or support for the ‘war on terror’, thus 
attracting the foreign aid and investment needed 
for development.45
An example of a country valued for its political 
stability after years of conflict is business-friend-
ly Rwanda. The country was chosen to host the 
2016 World Economic Forum on Africa in its 
capital city Kigali in recognition of its role as a 
model for regional development.46 Rwanda’s 
President Paul Kagame, a leader in Rwanda’s 
post-genocide government since 1994, gained 
approval by referendum in 2015 to stand for an 
unprecedented third term in 2017. The contro-
versial vote on the country’s constitution means 
that Kagame could be in power until 2034 in a 
country with unusually low life evaluations 
relative to its economic success (see Fig. 4.2). 
President Kagame is said to have remarked that 
African countries that change their leaders too 
often have not fared as well as his country. He 
may not be alone in claiming that authoritarian 
rule is a more efficient form of democracy in 
less developed parts of the world.47
Citizens in a number of African countries 
appear to share President Kagame’s view that 
strong leadership is in the interest of political 
stability and economic development. The latest 
Afrobarometer surveys show that views are 
divided on governance issues, such as one-man 
rule and term limits (see Table 4.1, top). On 
average, one-man rule is rejected by four out of 
five citizens, while only 11% are in favour, and 
three-quarters support two-term limits for their 
president. However, the differences between 
highest and lowest values of support and rejec-
tion are striking. Over 90% in Benin, Gabon, 
and Burkina Faso were in favour of constitution-
al two-term limits. In Mozambique, a country 
still suffering from the effects of a 16-year civil 
war that ended in 1994, near-equal proportions 
were against (35%) and in favour (30%) of 
one-man rule and only 50% supported a term 
limit. Noteworthy is that all four countries have 
experience of longer-term leadership.48
Trust and Corruption
Perceptions of the trustworthiness and honesty 
attributed to Africa’s leaders and civil servants 
vary across the continent (see Table 4.1, middle). 
Highest and lowest values differ by at least 50 
percentage points between countries. Within 
countries, trust in the president is consistently 
greater than trust in other members of the 
ruling party (Malawi and South Africa are 
exceptions). Similarly, government officials are 
consistently seen to be more corrupt than those 
in the office of the president (Gabon is an 
exception49). Nigeria was voted among the most 
corrupt countries on all three indicators recorded 
in Table 4.1.  
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On average, 58% of respondents across all 
Afrobarometer countries surveyed thought 
corruption had increased in their country in  
the past year, while less than one in three 
approved of their government’s efforts to fight 
corruption (see Table 4.1 bottom). Exceptionally, 
54% in Botswana, considered to be a stable 
democracy, thought the government was doing 
well in fighting corruption. Noteworthy is that 
corruption might be easier to contain in smaller 
island states, such as Cape Verde, Mauritius, 
and Sao Tome & Principe, where Afrobarometer 
respondents indicated there was less corruption 
or approved of their governments’ fight  
against corruption. 
Our examination of the relationship between 
happiness and corruption (not shown here) 
suggests that it is not a recent increase or  
decrease in perception of corruption that counts, 
but rather longer-term changes. Over the past 
decade, happiness improved markedly in a 
number of countries where citizens saw a reduc-
tion in corruption at the top level of leadership 
(see Fig. 4.11) and stronger government perfor-
mance in fighting corruption (see Fig. 4.12).  
‘Africa Uprising’50
The question is how long African citizens will 
support their strongmen and long-serving 
leaders. Five years ago, the so-called Arab Spring 
of 2011 saw regime change in North African 
countries that may have caused a ripple effect on 
Table 4.1: Support for Authoritarian Rule in Africa, Political Trust, and Perceived Corruption, Aver-
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Source: Afrobarometer Round 6, Online Appendix, Table A4.7.
Note: ALG=Algeria; BEN=Benin; BFA=Burkina Faso; BWA=Botswana; BDI=Burundi; CPV=Cape Verde; EGY=Egypt; GAB=Ga-
bon; GHA=Ghana; LSO=Lesotho; LBR=Liberia; MDG=Madagascar; MWI=Malawi; MUS=Mauritius; MOR=Morocco; MOZ=Mo-
zambique; NAM=Namibia; NER=Niger; NGA=Nigeria; RSA=South Africa; SLE=Sierra Leone; SEN=Senegal; STP=Sao Tome & 
Principe; SDN=Sudan; SWZ=Swaziland; TZA=Tanzania; TUN=Tunisia; ZWE=Zimbabwe
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Figure 4.11: Changes in Happiness and Perceived Corruption in the Office of the President in  
15 African Countries, 2005-15a
Figure 4.12: Changes in Happiness and Perceived Government Performance in Fighting Corruption 
in 15 African Countries, 2005-15a
Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3 
and 6 and Gallup World Poll lad-
der-of-life data, Online Appendix, 
Table A4.8.
a. Changes refer to absolute 
changes in levels of perceived 
corruption in the Office of the 
President and happiness between 
the two periods. The results are 
confined to those countries with 
available Afrobarometer and Gal-
lup data in both time periods.
Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 3 
and 6 and Gallup World Poll lad-
der-of-life data, Online Appendix, 
Table A4.8.
a. Changes refer to absolute 
changes in the shares perceiving 
government performed very / 
fairly well in fighting corruption 
and levels happiness between 
the two periods. The results are 
confined to those countries with 
available Afrobarometer and Gal-
lup data in both time periods.
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the continent. When Burkina Faso’s dictator of 
27 years, Blaise Compaoré, was toppled in 
November 2014, an Africa watcher foresaw that 
a season of protest might have hitched a ride on 
the Sahara’s Harmattan, a wind that blows south 
every November.51 Interestingly, the Gallup 
World Poll conducted a year prior to the coup in 
Burkina Faso found awareness of the Arab 
Spring was greater in Burkina Faso than in other 
sub-Saharan countries.52
It may be significant that a further long-term 
president was almost ousted in 2016. Yahya 
Jammeh had boasted he would rule The Gambia 
for a billion years.53 In December, his 22-year 
authoritarian rule was set to end by a shock  
election result. The event was initially heralded as 
a triumph for African democracy until Jammeh 
later disputed the election outcome. He was 
finally forced to step down in early 2017.54
Youth have always been in the forefront of 
protest. In the past two years, youth and student 
protests have swept through many countries 
south of the Sahara, including in Ethiopia where 
a state of emergency was imposed in mid-2016.55 
It is significant that the student protests there 
and in South Africa have been interpreted as a 
clash between generations.56
In 2016, Afrobarometer reported that their latest 
round of surveys found 11% of youth reported 
having been involved in at least one protest 
action in the past year.57
The disconnect: Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ and 
ageing leaders 
A problem for Africans who yearn for change 
and greater life chances is that there is a dramatic 
disconnect between Africa’s longest serving 
leaders and the continent’s youth.58 The age 
Figure 4.13: Trends in Mobile Cellular Telephone Subscriptions and Individual Internet Usage  
per 100 Inhabitants in Africa, 2005-16a
Sources: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database, Online Appendix, Table A4.9.
a. The dashed lines represent the World average on the two ICT indicators. 
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difference between leaders and the youth is 
striking. While the average age of Africa’s 
presidents is estimated to be about 70 years, 
some 70% of African citizens are younger than 
30 years. Most of Africa’s leaders will have been 
born before the age of television and mobile 
phones and before the end of the colonial era. 
Given this generation gap, there is likely to be  
a mismatch between youth’s expectations of 
democracy, and the reality that confronts them.59
Social media played an important role in the Arab 
Spring and has continued to do so in more recent 
youth protests across Africa. Figure 4.13 shows 
that mobile phones have captured the imagination 
of the people on the continent. Africa’s mo-
bile-cellular telephone and internet usage is fast 
catching up with the rest of the world. 
Youth voting with their feet
At the heart of the Arab Spring were disgrun-
tled youth seeking democratic representation 
and economic participation. Political analysts 
have warned that responses to Africa’s current 
youth revolts may not necessarily meet protes-
tors’ demands for greater access to education 
and to skills that will lead to employment.60  
An important question, therefore, is what will 
happen to Africa’s youth who do not find jobs  
in their countries of birth by their mid- to late 
twenties. Will they despair, join extremist 
groups, or emigrate?
Africa’s increasingly IT-connected youth will 
have expectations of a higher standard of living 
than their parents. Not all rural youth are con-
tent to till the soil as past generations have done 
and will try to find greener pastures in urban 
areas or, in some cases, even overseas. African 
people have always been on the move.61
Consider that South Africa’s migrant labour 
system, introduced during the colonial era, 
forced rural men to work on faraway mines to 
earn the cash to pay a hut tax. In the twentieth 
century, labour circulation became a way of life 
and working on the mines became a rite of 
passage for young Xhosa men. Working under-
ground, they earned both prestige and the money 
to pay bride wealth in order to get married.62
Fast forward to 2016. Young men in a rural 
village in The Gambia, where President Jammeh’s 
authoritarian rule was challenged in the December 
elections, see the need to risk a perilous 4,800 
km journey across the Sahara and the Mediter-
ranean in search of work in Europe. They hope 
to earn money in order to be able to marry a 
local young woman and gain respect in their 
community. As many as 600 of the approxi-
mately 4,000 villagers have risked this so-called 
‘Back Way’.63
Youth working overseas earn not only to benefit 
themselves but also to support their families in 
Africa. The remittances sent home by nearly 140 
million Africans living abroad currently surpass 
Western foreign aid.64 Africans fleeing conflict 
in their countries or seeking a better life have 
overwhelmed Europe in the past year. Since 
2014, an estimated 80,000 of the passengers on 
the Mediterranean people-smuggling boats have 
come from sub-Saharan Africa. 
‘Asinamali’ 65—we have no money!
Africa will need to provide jobs for its youth if it 
is to meet their aspirations for the good life. In 
2010 there were roughly 200 million Africans 
between 15 and 24 years of age and this number 
could rise to over 450 million by 2050. Accord-
ing to an African Development Bank report, 
young people aged 15 to 24 constitute 37% of 
Africa’s labour force but make up 60% of the 
continent’s total.66 It is estimated that 18 million 
jobs will need to be created every year just to 
accommodate Africa’s current jobseekers.67
The latest Afrobarometer identified unemploy-
ment as a top concern in African countries (see 
Fig. 4.14). Some Africa watchers argue that the 
continent is already falling behind in providing 
education and employment for its youth. The 
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African Development Bank has pointed out that 
in 2012 only a quarter of young African men 
and just 10% of young African women managed 
to get jobs in the formal economy before they 
reached the age of 30.68
One hopeful future scenario sees the African 
continent diversifying from extractive industries 
to investing in its youth. If business friendly 
policies were introduced, some analysts predict 
that production in China could shift to Africa69 
and Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ could be ‘put to work’. 
However, there are also fears of ‘Chinese neo-co-
lonialism’ that might jeopardise Africa’s future.  
Drought and commodity prices as risk factors 
for ‘Africa Uprising’ 
It might be worth considering that economic 
recessions following periods of drought have 
played a critical role in fueling the continent’s 
discontent, as in the cases of the Arab Spring 
and the Ethiopian protests. Drought may well 
spark further uprisings. Africa has a long history 
of extreme weather patterns70, which is likely to 
be aggravated by climate change in the 21st 
century.71 In 2016, countries in east and southern 
Africa experienced severe drought conditions 
that have negatively affected food production 
and increased food prices. It was anticipated that 
the drought would be followed by severe flood-
ing in the region.72
A further risk factor for discontent and unrest is 
the combination of lower demand for commodi-
ties and lower commodity prices, which will  
call for belt-tightening in Africa’s oil-producing 
countries. The latest International Monetary Fund 
outlook for sub-Saharan Africa predicts a growth 
of only 1.4%. A number of African countries have 
already had to turn to the IMF and the World 
Bank for bailouts. Sub-Saharan countries, includ-
ing Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe have asked for financial 
assistance or are in talks to do so.73
Demography and Well-Being 
Although major investment in Africa’s youth  
is needed to address barriers to youth employ-
ment, there may not be time to make sufficient 
investment to avert a population ‘time bomb’. 
The international Children’s Worlds survey 
suggests that Africa is lagging behind other 
countries in investing in its youth. (See Technical 
Box 2: African children’s well-being in interna-
tional context). Noteworthy is that some of 
Africa’s smaller nations, particularly island 
states such as Mauritius, are among the happiest 
(see Figure 4.2 above), a finding that suggests it 
may be easier for the state to provide services for 
a smaller number of people.  
Figure 4.14: The Most Important Problem Fac-
ing African Countries, 2013-15 (%)a
Source: Afrobarometer (2016) Highlights of Round 6 survey 
findings from 36 African countries, p.2, Online Appendix, 
Table A4.10.
a. Respondents were asked: In your opinion, what are the 
most important problems facing this country that government 
should address? Respondents were allowed to provide up to 
three responses. The bars in the figure show the percentage 
of respondents who mentioned each problem among their top 
three challenges.
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Technical box 2: African Children’s Well-being in an International Context
African countries are aware that investing in 
children will contribute to a better future for 
their nations and their people. Over the past de-
cade, Africa has seen significant changes that 
affect child well-being, including a reduction in 
infant and child mortality, and improved access 
to basic health services. However, there are still 
many factors that hold back the advancement of 
young children, such as malnutrition and stunt-
ing, on-going conflict in some countries, and 
unequal education for girls. 
Research on the well-being of African children is 
still in its infancy. Children’s Worlds, the Interna-
tional Survey of Children’s Well-Being, is so far 
the largest international comparative research on 
children’s own views of their lives and well-be-
ing. Children’s Worlds aims to create awareness 
of the state of child well-being among children, 
their parents and their communities, and to in-
form policy makers and the general public. The 
2013-14 wave tracked just over 53,000 children 
aged about 8, 10, and 12 years in 15 countries 
across four continents. Country samples typically 
include approximately 1,000 children attending 
mainstream schools in each age group. 
The survey is based solely on children’s own eval-
uations, perceptions and aspirations. Children 
are asked to evaluate their lives relating to some 
dozen domains, including their living situation, 
home and family relationships, money and eco-
nomic circumstances, friends and other relation-
ships, the local area, school, time use, the self, 
children’s rights, and subjective well-being.  
The survey uses a number of response formats 
for its questionnaire items: Life circumstances 
are captured by agreement with statements on 5 
or 10-point response scales from ‘I do not agree’ 
to ‘I totally agree’. Responses to frequency 
items, mainly time-use ones, are recorded on a 
4-point scale from ‘rarely or never’ to ‘every day 
or almost every day’. Domain and life satisfac-
tions are rated on a 0 to 10-point scale from ‘not 
at all satisfied’ to ‘totally satisfied’. For interna-
tional comparative purposes, country standing 
is variously reported as the country’s mean 
score on a survey item, the standard deviation of 
the mean country score to indicate dispersal of 
responses, and the rank order of the country’s 
score among the 15 countries. 
Three African countries are included in the 
Children’s Worlds 2013-14 survey: Algeria, Ethi-
opia, and South Africa. The samples of children 
drawn are representative of the whole country 
in the case of Ethiopia, the Western Cape Prov-
ince in South Africa, and the Western Region of 
Algeria. These three countries differ markedly 
according to their objective socio-economic in-
dicators. For example, Gross Domestic Product 
per capita in Algeria and South Africa is approx-
imately ten times higher than in Ethiopia, the 
poorest country in the Children’s Worlds survey 
apart from Nepal. Ethiopia ranks 173 out of 187 
on the Human Development Index, the lowest 
ranking among the 15 countries, compared to 
somewhat higher HDI rankings for Algeria (93) 
and South Africa (118) in 2013. South Africa is 
the most unequal country in the survey, with a 
very high Gini coefficient of 63 (100 indicates 
highest inequality).  
Select findings from the Children’s Worlds 
2013-14 survey among approximately 36,000 
children aged 10 to 12 years provide glimpses of 
how African children view and evaluate their 
lives compared to age peers in Colombia, Esto-
nia, Germany, Israel, Nepal, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom. 
Home and family life: Children in all 15 coun-
tries generally viewed their home and family 
life fairly positively. Algeria’s evaluations of this 
domain ranked among the most favourable 
while Ethiopia’s were often the least favourable. 
Algerian children achieved high rankings for 
satisfaction with ‘my family life’ and endorse-
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ment that parents listened to them and treated 
them fairly. In contrast, children in all three Af-
rican countries were among the most dissatis-
fied with ‘the house or flat where you live’, and 
Ethiopian and South African children were 
most likely not to ‘feel safe at home’ and not to 
‘have a quiet place to study at home’. 
Local area. The African countries rated the ‘area 
you live in in general’ and opportunities for ‘do-
ing things away from home’ less favourably 
than others, and were less likely to say they have 
places to play and feel safe in the area where 
they live. 
Material well-being. The Children’s Worlds in-
dex of material deprivation asked children if 
they had or lacked nine items including good 
clothes for school, a computer at home, internet 
access, a mobile phone, own room, books to 
read for fun, a family car, ‘own stuff’ to listen to 
music, and a television in the home. Pooled 
world data indicated that, on average, children 
lacked only 1.9 items. Norway’s children suf-
fered the least material deprivation; they lacked 
only 0.2 items on average. Ethiopia was the 
most materially deprived of all countries, with 
6.3 lacked items. There was less material depri-
vation in the other African countries: Algeria 
lacked 3.6 items, South Africa 2.3, but the distri-
bution of deprivation was particularly uneven in 
the two countries. African children were also 
among the least satisfied with ‘the things you 
have’ compared to other countries.  
School life. Children in all 15 countries were 
mainly positive about school life. African chil-
dren were no exception. For example, endorse-
ment of ‘I like going to school’ by Ethiopian and 
Algerian children was higher than in other 
countries. Children in Algeria were also among 
the most satisfied with ‘my life as a student’, 
‘my school experience’, and ‘the things I learn 
at school’. Unusually, Ethiopian children’s eval-
uation of school life was generally more positive 
than home life, although they did not feel very 
safe at school.     
Time use. Homework was one of the most com-
mon after-school activities in all countries. African 
children also looked after siblings and other fami-
ly members and helped with household chores. 
Participation in organized spare-time activities, 
such as reading for fun and sports were less com-
mon, particularly in Ethiopia and Algeria. 
Safety. Satisfaction with personal safety, a topic ex-
plored across the domains of home, school, local 
area, and the self, attracted lower scores in South 
Africa and Ethiopia than in many other countries. 
Subjective well-being. Three indicators mea-
sured children’s overall subjective well-being: a 
satisfaction item (with ‘life as a whole’), a fre-
quency item (‘how happy were you in the past 
two weeks’), and an agreement item (‘I feel pos-
itive about the future’). Country scores on all 
three measures were highly skewed towards the 
positive end of the 0 to 10 point scale. In the 
12-years survey, scores on the three measures 
were contained in a narrow band from 9.0-9.5 
in Romania down to 7.5-7.6 in South Korea. 
Scores on subjective well-being varied across 
the African countries with Algeria leading, 
South Africa in an intermediate position, and 
Ethiopia lagging behind. Algeria ranked among 
the four countries with the highest scores on 
life satisfaction (9.1) and happiness (8.9) for 12 
year olds. South Africa’s distribution of life sat-
isfaction scores for 10 and 12 year olds were the 
most extreme: low scores (below 5) and high 
scores (10) were split 7.4% to 63%. Ethiopia 
ranked second-lowest, after South Korea, on life 
satisfaction among 10 to 12 year olds. Only ev-
ery second Ethiopian child rated life satisfaction 
with a score of 10 compared to over 7 in 10 in 
the four top-ranking countries. 
In contrast to these widely varying present life 
evaluations, African children were consistently 
positive about the future. All three countries 
gave a future rating of 8.7 out of 10, a score only 
0.3 points lower than top-ranking Romania’s 
score of 9. 
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For centuries Africa was underpopulated. The 
continent only started to reach its potential for 
population growth toward the end of the 20th 
century.74 Now Africa’s exploding population is 
expected to double by 2050. Population growth, 
together with migration to Africa’s urban areas 
has put severe pressure on the state’s capacity  
to provide education, health services, and infra-
structure. Further population growth may 
undermine progress in human development 
achieved so far. It is predicted that by 2050, 
Africa could have 35 cities with over 5 million 
inhabitants with Kinshasa and Lagos each 
exceeding 30 million.75
Africa’s population challenge. Demographers 
Jean-Pierre Guengant and John May describe  
the scale of the continent’s new population 
challenge. In the early 1960s, they report, 
African countries had fertility rates of between 
5.5 and 7.5, comparable with other developing 
economies at that time. Whereas Asian and 
Latin American nations saw their fertility rates 
decline at a fairly steady rate over the next fifty 
years, African countries’ fertility stayed high 
until the 1980s, before it fell sharply. As a result, 
they predict that Africa’s overall population will 
rise sharply, its big cities will grow alarmingly, 
and although its labour force will also expand, 
its ‘youth bulge’ will be ‘hard to manage’.76
Currently, some 78% of Africa’s people live in 
countries that have not passed the demographic 
transition to low fertility and low mortality; only 
the countries in the far north and south of the 
continent are exceptions with lower fertility 
rates. Countries with the top ten fertility rates in 
the world are found in sub-Saharan Africa, with 
nearly all above six children per woman. Fertility 
rates are particularly high among Africa’s  
landlocked countries and ones with low rates  
of urbanisation. Niger, a land-locked country  
in the Sahel is a case in point. It has the world’s  
highest fertility rate of 7.6. The rate of contra-
ception use among child-bearing age women  
in sub-Saharan Africa is lower than in other 
regions of the world.77
Our examination of demographic factors  
(see Figs. 4.15 and 4.16) suggests that African 
countries with higher fertility rates and a large 
youth population may find it harder to provide 
quality of life for their citizens.  
Final Comments. The select findings from the 
2013-14 Children’s World survey previewed here 
expose some of the disadvantages many African 
children face in early life. The most glaring hard-
ship may be doing without the resources that 
children in more developed countries take for 
granted. Obviously, much needs to be done to 
improve African children’s life circumstances. 
Meanwhile Africa’s children, like all children 
around the world, try to enjoy everyday life. Im-
portantly, they express confidence in their future.
Further information: See the report on the 
Children’s Worlds Survey, 2013-14, in 15 
countries (Rees & Main 2015), and African 
country reports on Children’s Worlds surveys 
in Algeria (Tiliouine 2015b), Ethiopia 
(Mekonen & Dejene 2015), and South Africa 
(Savahl et al. 2015), available on the project 
website: www.isciweb.org
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Figure 4.15: Fertility Rates and Happiness in 34 African Countries, 2013-15a
Figure 4.16: Youth Share (under 15 years) and Happiness in 34 African Countries, 2013-15a
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.11.
a. In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015 peri-
od, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead. 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.11.
a. In three instances (Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland), there was no available happiness data point in the 2013-2015 peri-
od, so we instead utilized the data for the 2009-2011 period instead.
108
The Unfinished Story:  
African Resilience and Hope  
for the Future 
African resilience
Given the development challenges that Africa 
currently faces, it may take a while before people 
in Africa join the happiest people on the globe. 
Meanwhile, Africa’s relative happiness deficit is 
buoyed by its astonishing resilience. The West 
African scholars, cited in the introduction to this 
chapter, referred to African people’s coping 
skills when discussing how improbable it was 
for their countries to be assigned high happiness 
rankings in international studies. In the case of 
Nigeria, Aaron Agbo and his colleagues reason 
that the country’s happiness ‘paradox’ serves as 
an ‘adaptive mechanism’.78 Similarly, Vivian 
Dzokoto reproduces a typical ‘emblematic’ 
conversation between a foreign visitor and a 
local to illustrate how Ghanaians cope in every-
day life. The visitor to Africa is perplexed to find 
there is no running water when turning on the 
tap, and asks successive questions to seek a 
plausible explanation. In response, the Ghanaian, 
who takes such things for granted, simply 
shrugs and says: ‘My friend, this is Ghana. 
Sometimes, the water runs, sometimes, it 
doesn’t. That is how it is. Here, take this bucket. 
There is water in the tank around the corner.’79
African optimism
Optimism that ‘many things’ will change for the 
better, to paraphrase the Gallup-Kettering ques-
tion put to African respondents in its 1970s 
global survey, is a further coping skill perfected 
by African people. People living on the continent 
have developed this skill over time, possibly over 
centuries, to make daily hassles and hardships 
tolerable.80 A series of studies of democracy and 
happiness in the authoritarian states of Chad 
and Zimbabwe, and in South Africa’s new 
democracy, suggest that even when the demand 
for democracy in Africa is not matched by 
satisfaction with living conditions, discontent is 
tempered by optimism for the future.81
The majority of African countries rate life at 
present below the mid-point of the Cantril 
ladder scale in the latest available Gallup World 
Poll. This is not the case for average future 
ratings. Projected ladder ratings in five years’ 
time are uniformly higher than present evalua-
tions across all countries on the continent. In 
fact, the percentage increase in future expecta-
tions of life is often higher among some of the 
least contented nations. 
Nigeria’s track record of such positive expecta-
tions is well documented. Cantril’s 1960s study 
already reported a difference of 2.6 points 
between the country’s average present (4.8) and 
future (7.4) ladder ratings.82 Similarly, in 2016, 
there is a difference of 2.9 points between 
Nigeria’s present (5.3) and future (8.2) ratings in 
the Gallup World Poll. An international study of 
comparative ladder ratings in ten countries with 
large populations, including China, India and 
the United States, found Nigeria’s 2.6 point 
difference between present and future ratings to 
be by far the largest.83 Nigeria’s spirit of optimism 
may be exceptional by world standards, but not 
in Africa.  
On average in African countries, future life 
evaluations are much higher than present ones. 
Optimism, the gap between present and future 
ladder ratings, is greatest for Africa’s youth and 
decreases with age (see Fig. 4.17). In almost all 
African countries, youthful optimism is above 
the national average (see Fig. 4.18). It is likely 
that this belief that things may change for the 
better helps African people to manage their lives 
in difficult circumstances. African children may 
grow up with such a sense of optimism (see 
Technical Box 2 above).   
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Sources: Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.12.
a. The data are ranked from highest to lowest difference in ladder scores based on national averages.
Sources: Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.12.
Figure 4.17: Average Cantril Present and Future Ladder Evaluations by Age Group,  
37 African Countries, 2015-16
Figure 4.18: Comparison of Differences Between Future and Present Ladder Scores Between Youth  
(15-24 years) and the National Average, 37 African Countries, 2015-16a
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Drying tears84—African religiosity
African people also tend to turn to religion to 
find fellowship, comfort, and a sense of hope in 
the future.85 A recent Pew study of religiosity86 
across 30 countries found that the importance  
of religion is higher, on average, in Africa than 
elsewhere (see Fig. 4.19). The relationship 
between religiosity and happiness among these 
countries lends support to the idea that faith might 
assuage Africa’s unhappiness (see Fig. 4.20). 
Conclusions
In this chapter we have attempted to explore the 
reasons why African countries lag behind other 
countries in the world in their evaluation of life. 
We took as our starting point the aspirations 
expressed by the Nigerian respondents in the 
1970 Gallup-Kettering study who were about to 
embark on their first experience of freedom 
from colonialism. Nigerians stated that many 
changes, not just a few, were needed to improve 
their lives and those of their families. Fifty years 
on, judging by the social indicators we have 
presented in this chapter, people in many African 
countries are still waiting for changes to improve 
their lives and to make them happy. In short, 
African people’s expectations that they and their 
countries would flourish under self-rule and 
democracy appear not to have been met.
Africa’s lower levels of happiness compared to 
other countries in the world might be attributed 
to this disappointment with different aspects of 
development under democracy. Although most 
citizens still believe that democracy is the best 
political system, they are critical of good gover-
nance in their countries. While there has been 
significant improvement in meeting basic needs 
according to the Afrobarometer index of ‘lived 
poverty’, population pressure may have stymied 
infrastructure and youth development.
Sources: Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database, Online Appendix, Table A4.13.
a. The data are ranked from highest to lowest within each country cluster based on the percentage saying that religion is ‘very 
important’ in life.
Figure 4.19: Importance of Religion in Life, 9 African and 21 Other Countries, 2013a
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Sources: Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database and Gallup World Poll ladder-of-life data, Online Appendix, Table A4.14. 
a. The religiosity data are based on the percentage saying that religion is ‘very important’ in life. The 2007 values for Morocco 
and the Netherlands are based on 2005 data, while it is based on 2009 data for Hungary. The 2013 values are based on 2011 data 
in the cases of Lithuania, Sweden and Ukraine, and 2012 data in India and the United States.
Figure 4.20: Happiness and the Importance of Religion in Life, 9 African and 21 Other Countries, 
2013-15a
Most countries in the world project that life 
circumstances will improve in future.87  
However, Africa’s optimism may be exceptional.  
African people demonstrate ingenuity that 
makes life bearable even under less than perfect  
circumstances. Coping with poor infrastructure, 
as illustrated in the case of Ghana referred to in 
this chapter, is just one example of the remark-
able resilience that African people have perfect-
ed. African people are essentially optimistic, 
most of all the youth who have their lives ahead 
of them. This optimism might serve as a self-ful-
filling prophecy for the continent. 
What if Africa looks to its youth to realise the 
continent’s dreams of prosperity? What if the 
African youth’s confidence in their future and 
their entrepreneurial spirit were to be matched 
by substantial investment in their develop-
ment? Then, no doubt, African countries would 
join the ranks of the world’s prosperous and 
happy nations.
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1    ‘Waiting for Happiness’ is the title of Abderrahmane 
Sissako’s 2002 film that depicts the daily lives of people 
living in northwest Africa’s Mauritania. See Niemiec & 
Wedding (2014, p. 329).   
2    Equal numbers of African countries gained or lost 
happiness over the periods 2005-2007 to 2014-2016 as set 
out in Chapter 2 of this report. However, only two African 
countries out of 126 worldwide made significant gains of 
0.5 point increases or more in their ladder scores. Sierra 
Leone – one of the three West African countries affected by 
the outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014 – gained 1.1 points, 
Cameroon 0.59 points. In contrast, six countries’ ladder 
scores dropped significantly by 0.6 points or more over the 
two periods. (see WHR 2017, Chapter 2). 
3    In 2014-16, the average standard deviation in happiness 
ratings was 2.301 for 44 African countries, ranging from 
1.588 for Senegal to 3.287 for Sierra Leone (See Fig. 14 in 
the Statistical Appendix WHR 2017). Average standard 
deviation in happiness ratings for 39 African countries 
increased from 2.132 to 2.265 over the periods 2012-15 to 
2014-16. 
4    Dianna Games (2015) at Business Advisory Africa at Work 
(www.africaat-work.co.za) refers to the ‘patchwork of 
countries that make up Africa’. Responsible for this 
patchwork is the 19th century ‘scramble for Africa’ that cre-
ated borders that cut across ethnicities and ancient polities 
(see Meredith 2011). In the interest of political stability on 
the continent, the African Union, formed in 2002 with the 
objectives of promoting peace and democracy on the 
continent, supports the maintenance of country borders 
dating back to independence. South Sudan, which gained 
its independence from Sudan in 2011, is an exception. 
5    The 2016 WHR reported ladder scores for both Somaliland 
and Somali in the global distribution of happiness (see 
Helliwell, Huang & Wang, 2016, Figure 2.2, pp. 20–22). 
Ladder scores for two small African countries of Comoros 
and Djibouti were included in earlier WHRs: Comoros in 
the WHR Updates 2013 to 2016 and Djibouti in WHR 
2015. 
6    There were no ladder scores available for the 2014–16 
period for Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Somaliland, 
so we used the latest available data reported in earlier 
WHRs instead. The map shows a 2012–14 ladder score for 
Djibouti (4.369) (see Helliwell et al. 2015, Fig. 2.2, p. 28), 
and 2013–15 ladder scores for Comoros (3.956), Mauritania 
(4.201) and Somaliland (5.057) (see Helliwell et al. 2016, 
Fig. 2.2, p. 21–2).
7    The title of a chapter in Meredith’s (2011, p. 162) history of 
Africa. 
8    See Huntington (1991), Diamond (2008), and Diamond & 
Plattner (2010).
9    For reports on Africa’s quality of life and well-being from 
an historical perspective, see Tiliouine (2015a) and 
Tiliouine & Meziane (2017) on North Africa, and Roberts 
et al. (2015) and Møller & Roberts (2017) on sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
10    See Furlonger (2016) commenting on access to African 
markets in a South African business daily.
11    See veteran Africa journalist and University of Kent 
professor Keith Somerville’s (2013) views on the different 
lenses through which we can observe and evaluate Africa’s 
performance. 
12    See, for example, Roger Southall’s (2016) portrait of South 
Africa’s emergent black middle class.
13    See the article on ‘Africa Rising’ by Aryn Baker (2015), 
Time Magazine’s Africa correspondent. 
14    In this chapter we limit our examination of happiness to 
Africa’s post-independence period, which coincides with 
the emergence of the 1960s social indicators movement 
that applied the first rigorous measures of quality of life 
and well-being. It is possible that Africa’s people, or at 
least those of standing, flourished in earlier times, e.g. 
when the pharaohs ruled in the Nile valley (van Wyk 
Smith 2009), during Islam’s golden age in Africa 
(Renima, Tiliouine & Estes 2016), and at the height of the 
ancient kingdoms and civilisations in West and East 
Africa (see Møller & Roberts 2017). Going further back in 
time, Africa’s more egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies 
(Reader 1997), whose expectations of life will have been 
more modest than present-day ones, might have been 
more contented than contemporary African citizens.   
15    Richard Easterlin (2010) argues that it is important to 
examine time-series as opposed to point-of-time evidence 
on happiness. 
16    The Afrobarometer is an African-led series of public 
attitude surveys on democracy and governance, whose 
coverage of African countries has increased from 12 in 
Round 1 (1999–2001) to 36 in Round 6 (2014–2015). 
Afrobarometer’s Round 6 interviews with about 54 000 
citizens in 36 countries represent the views of more than 
three-fourths of the continent’s population.
17    The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) covers 
all 54 countries on the continent. The tenth iteration of 
the IIAG 2016 incorporates Afrobarometer public attitude 
survey data for the first time. This addition means that 
just over 17% of IIAG’s 95 indicators are now provided by 
African sources (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2016, p. 9). See 
www.afrobarometer.org and Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
(2016). 
18   See http://www.arabbarometer.org/
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19    See Vivian Afi Abui Dzokoto’s (2012, p. 311) chapter on 
happiness in Ghana, which she contributed to a handbook 
on happiness across cultures. An Associate Professor of 
African America Studies at Virginia Commonwealth 
University in the USA, Dzokoto was raised in Germany 
and Ghana.
20    See the chapter on happiness in Nigeria, which Universi-
ty of Nigeria researchers Aaron A. Agbo, Thaddeus C. 
Nzeadibe, and Chukwuedozie K. Ajaero (2012, p. 303) 
contributed to a handbook on happiness across cultures. 
Lead author Aaron Agbo is based in the Department of 
Psychology; his colleagues Nzeadibe and Ajaero in the 
Department of Geography at the University of Nigeria, 
Nsukka. 
21    Inglehart and Klingemann (2000, cited in Tov & Diener 
2009, p.22) suggest that, apart from economic develop-
ment, national levels of well-being might also reflect 
historical factors. Their research found that the number of 
years living under communist rule negatively predicted 
national well-being in former communist states of Eastern 
Europe and the USSR. One might consider that Africa’s 
history of colonial rule may have played a similar role in 
shaping life evaluations on the continent. In South Africa, 
we were only able to rule out the possibility that cultural 
factors rather than miserable living conditions and lack of 
opportunities in life might be responsible for the very low 
happiness ratings of black South Africans under apart-
heid. Eight years into democracy, there was a sufficiently 
large subsample of black respondents of economic 
standing to test the notion. A 2002 study found that the 
higher happiness ratings of South Africa’s emergent black 
economic elites matched their better standard of living 
under democracy (Møller 2004).
22    Hadley Cantril’s (1965) classic study for the 1960s reports 
the mean present ladder ratings of 4.8 for Nigeria (p.78) 
and 5.5 for Egypt (p. 118). Nigeria’s ladder rating of 4.875 
in the WHR 2016 (Helliwell et al. 2016, pp. 20–21, Figure 
2.2) is almost identical to its 1960 rating of 4.8.
23    See the Gallup-Kettering global survey (1976). The range 
of Gallup World Poll ladder ratings 2014-16 for the 11 
countries is taken from Figure 4.2 above.   
24    Of the 90% in the sub-Saharan sample who wished for 
change in their lives, 67% wanted ‘many things’ to 
change, 22% ‘just a few’ things. The question on the 
‘extent of change necessary for a happier life’ read: 
‘Thinking about how your life is going now, do you think 
you would be happier if things could be changed about 
your life? (If yes) Would you like many things about your 
life changed or just a few things? See Table VI in the 
Gallup-Kettering Global Survey (1976) summary volume’s 
reprint of: Human Needs and Satisfactions, Mankind: 
The Global Survey and the Third World, Blue Supplement 
to the “Monthly Public Opinion Surveys” of the Indian 
Institute of Public Opinion, Vol. XXI, Nos. 9 & 10. http://
worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/hap_bib/freetexts/~Gal-
lup_Kettering_1976k.pdf
25    Noting that Africans live on the world’s ‘most ethnically 
diverse and fractious continent’, John Stremlau (2016) 
argues that Africa’s democracies need to cater to the 
needs of multiple groups in society.  
26   See Møller & Roberts (2017).  
27   See Akokpari (2004) and Mtimkulu (2015).
28    Greg Mills and Jeffrey Herbst (2012) contend that Africa 
has already undergone two liberations, first from 
colonialism and then from the autocratic rulers that often 
followed on colonial rule. Africa is now awaiting its third 
liberation from bad governance so that it can accelerate 
its development towards more jobs and less poverty. 
29    Here we refer to observations on the importance of good 
governance for citizen well-being in Helliwell and Huang 
(2008) and the volume on well-being for public policy 
edited by Ed Diener, Richard Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack & 
John Helliwell (2009, p. 60) and an OECD working 
paper that traces the linkages between good governance 
and national well-being (Helliwell et al. 2014). Similarly, 
an Institute for Security Studies African Futures scenario 
links gains in effective governance with poverty reduction 
on the continent (Aucoin & Donnenfeld 2016).  
30   See Afrobarometer (2002).
31    The briefing paper on the first round of Afrobarometer 
surveys conducted in 12 countries in 2001 reports that the 
democracy concept is understood mainly as civil liberties, 
such as freedom of speech. In practice, people want 
democracy to deliver basic necessities of life such as food, 
water, shelter and education, even more strongly than they 
insist on regular elections, majority rule, competing 
political parties, and freedom to criticise the government. 
See Afrobarometer (2002). 
32   See Cantril (1965, p. 75).
33    Referring to development economist Jeffrey Sach’s (2005) 
book by that title.   
34    Afrobarometer’s Lived Poverty Index is an experiential 
measure that is based on a series of survey questions 
about how frequently people actually go without six basic 
necessities during the course of a year. Respondents 
report how often (just once or twice, several times, many 
times, always) they or a member of their family have gone 
without enough food, clean water for home use, medi-
cines or medical treatment, cooking fuel, cash income, 
and electricity in the home. See Mattes (2008) and www.
afrobarometer.org
35   See Gernetzky (2016).  
36    See Afrobarometer (2016) on highlights from Round 6 
survey findings from 36 African countries and Afroba-
rometer Dispatch No. 69 by Mitullah, Samson, Wambua, 
& Balongo (2016) on infrastructure development 
challenges in Africa. 
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37    Bookwalter (2012) reports that studies conducted by 
economists found factors such as rising levels of income 
and access to consumption goods were more likely to 
boost happiness among white South Africans.  
38    Robert Mattes, Boniface Dulani and E. Gyimah-Boadi 
(2016) report on the drop in lived poverty in African 
countries in their January 2016 Afrobarometer policy 
paper.   
39    See Afrobarometer (2015, p. 22) for results relating to 
conditional support for democracy in South Africa amid 
rising discontent, and Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 71 by 
Lekalake (2016).   
40    See Robert Stefan Foa and Yacha Mounk (2017) on the 
global rise in citizens wishing for a strong leader in their 
paper on signs of democratic deconsolidation. 
41   See Maphunye (2016).
42    Since being launched in 2006, the Ibrahim Prize has 
been awarded to President Joaquim Chissano of Mozam-
bique (2007), President Festus Mogae of Botswana 
(2008), President Pedro Pires of Cabo Verde (2011), and 
President Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia (2014). 
President Nelson Mandela of South Africa was the 




43   See Cohen & Doya (2016).
44    Many scholars have written about the clientelism, 
cronyism, nepotism, and rent-seeking practices that have 
kept Africa’s leaders in power and retarded economic 
growth and advances in democracy. See among others, 
Cheeseman (2015), Meredith (2011; 2014), Mills (2014), 
Mills & Herbst (2012), Ndulu & O’Connell (1999), van de 
Walle (2003), and Wrong’s (2010) account of Kenya’s 
whistle-blowers. Regarding corruption, Historian Martin 
Meredith, visiting South Africa for the launch of his new 
book on Africa (Meredith 2014), was asked why Asian 
economies grew faster than African ones in spite of 
corruption. He replied that Asia’s wealth was reinvested 
in Asia, whereas Africa’s wealth left the continent 
(Interview with Meredith on the South African Broadcast-
ing Corporation’s After Eight morning programme, 26 
November 2014, own notes). 
45   See Somerville (2016)
46    See Joffe’s (2016) report on the World Economic Forum 
on Africa.
47    See Serge Schmemann’s (2016) overview of the challeng-
es facing democratic principles in an unstable world that 
include authoritarian rule and the attraction of the ‘big 
man’.  
48    Benin’s Mathieu Kérékou, in and out of power over a 
thirty year period since 1972, was barred from running 
for a third term as president in 2016 on constitutional 
and age grounds. Gabon’s current President Ali Bongo, 
sworn in for a second seven-year term in 2016, took over 
from his late father who ruled the country for 41 years 
until his death in 2009. In Burkina Faso, meaning ‘land 
of honest men’, President Blaise Compaoré was in power 
for 27 years before he was toppled in the 2014 popular 
uprising. Mozambique’s Joachim Chissano, installed as 
president in 1986 after President Samora Machel was 
killed in a plane crash, stepped down in 2004 after 18 
years in office. He was awarded the Mo Ibrahim prize for 
good governance. 
49    Ali Bongo was sworn in for a second seven-year term in 
September 2016, after Gabon’s constitutional court 
upheld his narrow victory in a bitterly disputed election.
50    The title is taken from a book by Adam Branch and 
Zachariah Mampilly (2015) on the new wave of popular 
protest in Africa. 
51   See Adebajo (2014). 
52   See Loschky (2013). 
53    See BBC’s The Gambia country profile. http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-13376517, Accessed 2 December 
2016. 
54    See Kiwuwa’s (2016) report on Jammeh’s quick accep-
tance of defeat that astounded the world until it was 
overturned. Postscript: Mr Jammeh finally left office in 
January 2017 after mediation by neighbouring countries 
and the threat of armed intervention. See Pilling (2017) 
on the significance of the turn of events in The Gambia 
for democracy in Africa. 
55    Mark Swilling (2016) sees the protests in South Africa and 
Ethiopia as part of a wave of protests sweeping through 
the continent known as ‘Africa Uprising’. In Kenya, 
Elizabeth Cooper (2014; 2016) interprets high school 
students’ torching of boarding schools as political protest 
action. 
56    African studies professor Jonny Steinberg (2016) 
describes South Africa’s student protests as ‘a war against 
the fathers’ and ‘inter-generational loathing’. Writing on 
Ethiopia’s protests, Jeffry Gettleman (2016) cites a 
university lecturer in central Ethiopia saying that: ‘If you 
suffocate people and they don’t have any other options but 
to protest, it breaks out. ..the whole youth.. a whole 
generation is protesting’.   
57   Afrobarometer (2016, p. 11). 
58    See Greg Mills (2014, p. 571) on the disconnect between 
the expectations of youth and their ruling parties in 
authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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59    See Gopaldas (2015) and Population Reference Bureau 
(2016) on the age gap.
60    Already in 2002, a special issue of the African Studies 
Review 45(2) was devoted to the role of Africa’s universi-
ties in promoting democratic culture in Africa. Amutabi 
(2002) examined the case of Kenya’s universities. 
Nshimbi (2016) reviews the Nigerian experience of 
clashes between students and government in the past 
that led to repressive measures.
61    Africa has seen migration on the continent and beyond 
for millions of years (see Reader 1997).
62    See Francis Wilson (1972) on South Africa’s migrant 
labour system. 
63   See The Daily Telegraph (2015). 
64    Bodomo (2013) reports that money sent home by Africans 
surpassed foreign aid by 2013. Remittances benefit 
households directly as they go towards paying school fees, 
building new homes and growing businesses.  
65    Zulu for ‘we have no money’, the title of a play by 
Mbongeni Ngema in the Athol Fugard tradition that 
expresses the rage of young black men in South Africa 
during the apartheid era. 
66   African Development Bank (2011, p. 2)
67    See OECD (2016) for a report on youth unemployment in 
North Africa.  
68    See The Economist (2014), the Population Reference 
Bureau (2016), and Baker (2015).  
69   See Davies (2015).
70   See Reader’s (1997) biography of the African continent.  
71   See Vink (2016).
72   See Chagutah (2016).  
73   See Khor (2016).
74   See Reader (1997).
75    See Baker (2015), The Economist (2014) and Guengant & 
May (2013).   
76    See Guengant & May (2013) and The Economist’s (2014) 
report on their study of African demography. 
77    See Guengant & May (2013) and The Economist’s (2014) 
report on their study of African demography. The data we 
sourced gave Niger a fertility rate of 7.6, which is higher 
than the 7.5 rate reported by Guengant and May in 2013. 
This might indicate that Niger’s fertility has increased 
since 2013. 
78   See Agbo, Nzeadibe & Ajaero (2012, p. 303).
79   See Dzokoto (2012, p. 319).
80    Veenhoven (2005) reports that happiness in hardship is 
possible if people rise to the challenge of coping with 
difficulties in life. 
81    The 2005 study conducted in Zimbabwe classified 45% of 
respondents as very democratic and a further 36% as 
democratic. Only 11% of Zimbabweans were satisfied with 
life at present, but twice as many (22%) thought they 
would feel satisfied with life in ten years’ time (Dickow 
2007, pp. 111, 121–2). The 2004 study conducted in four 
main cities in Chad found 60% of respondents supported 
democratic principles. Only 14 percent were very happy 
with their life at present, but more than twice as many 
(35%) thought they would be very happy with life in future 
(Dickow 2005, pp. 112, 128–9). In the 2002 South Africa 
study, 51% of black and 74% of white South Africans 
supported democratic values and were classified as either 
very democratic or democratic. Black respondents 
reported the lowest levels of current life satisfaction (37%) 
and happiness (38%) in the country, but 45% projected 
life satisfaction to increase in future (Møller & Hanf 2007, 
p.99 ff.). 
82   See Cantril (1965, p. 78).
83   See Gulyas (2015).
84    With reference to a South African evangelical church’s 
promise of salvation and prosperity: ‘We are open seven 
days a week and seven services a day. The God of the 
Bible will dry away your tears and you will have the result 
you need in your life’ (See Van Wyk 2014, p.160)
85    For example, see Pokimica, Addai & Takyi (2012) on the 
relationship between religion and subjective well-being in 
Ghana. Helga Dickow (2012) reports on religion, personal 
well-being, and attitudes to democracy among South 
Africans. 
86    See Pew Global Attitudes and Trends question database, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/?qid=408&cn-
tIDs=&stdIDs=
87   See Cantril (1965) and Gulyas (2015).
References
Adebajo, A. (2014). From ‘Arab Spring’ to ‘African Harmat-
tan’, Business Day, Johannesburg, 17 November, p. 9.  
African Development Bank (2011). Enhancing Capacity of 
Youth Employment in Africa. Africa Capacity Development 2(1), 
1–5. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Docu-
ments/Publications/Africa%20Capacity%20Dev%20Brief_Af-
rica%20Capacity%20Dev%20Brief.pdf (Accessed 8 November 
2016). 
Afrobarometer (2002). What do Africans think about democracy 
and development? Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 1. www.
afrobarometer.org
Afrobarometer (2015). Summary of Results, Afrobarometer 
Round 6 Survey in South Africa, 2015. Compiled by: Plus 94 
Research. http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/
publications/Summary%20of%20results/saf-r6-sor.pd-
f#page=1&zoom=auto,-13,653  (Accessed 4 November 2016)
Afrobarometer (2016). Highlights of Round 6 survey findings 
from 36 African countries. http://afrobarometer.org/sites/
default/files/summary_results/ab_R6_afrobarometer_glob-
al_release_highlights3.pdf  (Accessed 31 October 2016)
Agbo, A.A., Nzeadibe, T.C. & Ajaero, C.K. (2012). Happiness 
in Nigeria: A Socio-Cultural Analysis. In: H. Selin & G. Davey 
(Eds.), Happiness Across Cultures (pp. 293–310). Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
Akokpari, J.K. (2004). The AU, NEPAD and the promotion of 
good governance in Africa. Nordic Journal of African Studies 
13(3), 243–263.
Amutabi, M.N. (2002). Crisis and student protest in universi-
ties in Kenya: Examining the role of students in national 
leadership and the democratization process. African Studies 
Review 45(2), Special Issue: African universities in crisis and 
the promotion of a democratic culture, 157–177.
Aucoin, D. & Donnenfeld, Z. (2016). Unlocking Africa’s 
potential: The relationship between effective governance and 
poverty. Institute for Security Studies, African Futures Paper 
21. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/af21.pdf
Baker, A. (2015). Let’s prepare for Africa’s population surge 
now – or face the consequences. Time Magazine, 11 June. 
http://time.com/3918006/lets-prepare-for-africas-population-
surge-now-or-face-the-consequences/
Bodomo, A. (2013). Sending money back home beats foreign 
aid. Africa in Fact 10, April, 33–35. www.gga.org
Bookwalter, J.T. (2012). Living the good life: An economic 
view of happiness in South Africa. In: H. Selin, G. Davey 
(Eds.), Happiness Across Cultures (pp. 329–344). Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
Branch, A. & Mampilly, Z.C. (2015). Africa Uprising: Popular 
protest and political change.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cantril, H. (1965). The Pattern of Human Concerns. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Chagutah, T. (2016). Region must urgently plan for La Niña. 
Business Day, Johannesburg. 31 October, p. 13. 
Cheeseman, N. (2015). Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, 
and the struggle for political reform. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cohen, M. & Doya, D.M. (2016). Power-drunk leaders block 
Africa’s dawn. Business Day, Johannesburg, 8 February, p. 13.
Cooper, E. (2014). Students, arson, and protest politics in 
Kenya: School fires as political action. African Affairs 113(453), 
583–600. doi: 10.1093/afraf/adu059. 
Cooper, E. (2016). A burning question: why are Kenyan 




Davies, M. (2015). Why Africa must adapt or die – sustained 
investment in people key for continent’s development. 
Business Times, Johannesburg, 18 January, p. 8.
Diamond, L.J. (2008). The Spirit of Democracy: The struggle to 
build free societies throughout the world. New York: Times Books. 
Diamond, L.J. & Plattner, M.F. (2010). Democratization in 
Africa: Progress and retreat. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Dickow, H. (2005). Democrats without democracy? Attitudes and 
opinions on society, religion and politics in Chad. Letters from 
Byblos No. 10, International Centre for Human Sciences, 
Byblos, Lebanon. 
Dickow, H. (2007). Before a change? Attitudes and opinions 
on society, religion and politics in Zimbabwe. In: H. Dickow, 
E. Masunungure & B. Schlee (Eds.) Zimbabwe, a Case of 
Resilient Authoritarianism, (pp. 51–124). Letters from Byblos 
No. 15, International Centre for Human Sciences, Byblos, 
Lebanon. 
Dickow, H. (2012). Religion and Attitudes towards Life in South 
Africa: Pentecostals, Charismatics and Reborns. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos.
Diener, E., Lucas, R.E., Schimmack, U. & Helliwell, J.F. 
(2009). Well-Being for Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Dzokoto,V.A.A. (2012). Ghanaian happiness: global, cultural, 
and phenomenological perspectives. In: H. Selin & G. Davey 
(Eds.), Happiness Across Cultures (pp. 311–327). Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
116
W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
117
Easterlin, R. (2010). Happiness and growth the world over: 
Time series evidence on the happiness-income paradox. In: H. 
Hinte & K.F. Zimmermann (Eds.), Richard Easterlin: Happi-
ness, Growth and the Life Cycle (pp. 111–129). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Foa, R.S. & Mounk, Y. (2017). The signs of deconsolidation. 
Journal of Democracy 28(1). http://www.journalofdemocracy.
org/sites/default/files/Foa%26Mounk%20-%20JoD%20
28.1%20-%20PRE-PRINT%20VERSION.pdf
Furlonger, D. (2016). Global brands learn Africa is not a 
country. Business Day, Johannesburg, 16 March, p. 13. 
Gallup-Kettering Global Survey (1976). Human needs and 
satisfactions in sub-Saharan Africa, Summary volume.  
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/hap_bib/freetexts/~-
Gallup_Kettering_1976k.pdf
Games, D. (2015). Hold your hats – next year will be a rocky 
ride for Africa. Business Day, Johannesburg, 7 December, p.11. 
Gernetzky, K. (2016). SA manufacturers urged to take on 
African rail projects. Business Day, Johannesburg, 10 October, 
p. 2.
Gettleman, J. (2016). Protests destabilize Ethiopia, a steady 
U.S. ally. International New York Times, 13-14 August, p. 3. 
Gopaldas, R. (2015). Ageing leaders need to bridge generation 
chasm. Business Day, Johannesburg, 4 February, p. 7. 
Guengant, J-P. & May, J.F. (2013). African demography. Global 
Journal of Emerging Market Economies 5(3), 215–267.
Gulyas, J. (2015). Hopes and Fears – Future Views of Quality 
of Life. In: W. Glatzer, and V. Møller, L. Camfield, & M. Rojas 
(Eds.), The Global Handbook of Wellbeing and Quality of Life 
(pp. 869–894). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Helliwell, J.F. & Huang, H. (2008). How’s your government? 
International evidence linking good government and well-
being. British Journal of Political Science 38, 595–619. 
Helliwell, J., Huang, H., Grover, S. & Wang, S. (2014). Good 
Governance and National Well-being: What Are the Linkages?, 
OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 25, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxv9f651hvj-en
Helliwell, J.F., Huang, H., & Wang, S. (2015). The geography 
of world happiness. In: J. F. Helliwell, R. Layard, & J. Sachs 
(Eds.), World Happiness Report 2015, (pp. 12–41), New York: 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network. 
Helliwell, J.F., Huang, H. & Wang, S. (2016). The distribution 
of world happiness. In: J.F. Helliwell, R. Layard & J. Sachs 
(Eds.), World Happiness Report 2016, Update (Volume 1), (pp. 
8–48), New York: Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network.  
Huntington, S.P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in 
the late twentieth century. Norman, Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press. 
Inglehart, R., & Klingemann, H-D. (2000). Genes, culture, 
democracy, and happiness. In: E. Diener & E. M. Suh (Eds.), 
Culture and Subjective Well-Being (pp. 185–218). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.   
Joffe. H. (2016). Risky Africa slips down investors’ priority 
list. Business Day, Johannesburg, 12 May, p. 2. 
Khor, M. (2016). New debt crises threaten global stability. 
Southviews No. 133, 19 October. www.southcentre.int
Kiwuwa, D.E. (2016). The Gambia keeps dream of deepening 
democracy in Africa alive. The Conversation, 6 December. 
https://theconversation.com/the-gambia-keeps-dream-of-
deepening-democracy-in-africa-alive-69899?utm_
Lekalake, R. (2016). Support for democracy in South Africa 
declines amid rising discontent with implementation. Afrobarom-
eter Dispatch No. 71. http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/
files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno71_south_af-
rica_perceptions_of_democracy.pdf
Loschky, J. (2013). Arab Spring largely ignored in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Gallup World Poll. http://www.gallup.com/
poll/172079/arab-spring-largely-ignored-sub-saharan-africa.
aspx. (Accessed 9 January 2017)
Maphunye, K.J. (2016). Africa’s 2015 election experiences 
present dilemmas for 2016 polls. The Conversation, 27 January. 
https://theconversation.com/africas-2015-election-experienc-
es-present-dilemmas-for-2016-polls-53312
Mattes, R. (2008). The material and political bases of lived 
poverty in Africa: Insights from the Afrobarometer. In: V. 
Møller, D. Huschka, & A. C. Michalos (Eds.), Barometers of 
Quality of Life Around the Globe: How are we doing? (pp. 
161–185), Social Indicators Research Series 33, Dordrecht: 
Springer.
Mattes, R., Dulani, B. & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2016). Africa’s 
growth dividend? Lived poverty drops across much of the continent. 
Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 29. www.afrobarometer.org
Mekonen, Y. & Dejene, N. (2015). Children’s Worlds National 
Report: Ethiopia. Children’s Worlds Project. www.isciweb.org
Meredith, M. (2011). The State of Africa: A history of the 
continent since independence. London: Simon & Schuster.
Meredith, M. (2014). The Fortunes of Africa: A 5,000-year 
history of wealth, greed and endeavour. London: Simon & 
Schuster with Johannesburg/Cape Town: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers.
Mills, G. (2014). Why States Recover: Changing walking societies 
into winning nations, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. Johannes-
burg: Picador Africa.
Mills, G. & Herbst, J.I. (2012). Africa’s Third Liberation: The 
new search for prosperity and jobs. London: Penguin. 
118
Mitullah, W.V., Samson, R., Wambua, P.M. & Balongo, S. 
(2016). Building on progress: Infrastructure development still a 
major challenge in Africa. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 69: 
http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad69-building-prog-
ress-infrastructure-development-still-major-challenge-africa.
Mtimkulu, P. (2015). Democracy in Africa: the ebbs and flows 
over six decades. The Conversation, 12 June. https://theconver-
sation.com/democracy-in-africa-the-ebbs-and-flows-over-six-
decades-42011
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016). A Decade of African Govern-
ance 2006 – 2016: 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
Index Report. http://s.mo.ibrahim.
foundation/u/2016/10/01184917/2016-Index-Report.pdf?_g 
(Accessed 31 October 2016)
Møller, V. (2004). Peaceful Co-Existence in South Africa in the 
Millennium: A review of social indicators in the 2002 democracy 
study. Letters from Byblos No. 4, International Centre for 
Human Sciences. Byblos: Lebanon. http://hdl.handle.
net/10962/d1010768
Møller, V. and Hanf, Th. (2007). South Africa’s new democrats: 
a 2002 profile of democracy in the making. Lettres de Byblos/
Letters from Byblos No. 21, Centre International des Sciences 
de l’Homme/International Centre for Human Sciences, 
Byblos, Lebanon. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1010768
Møller, V. & Roberts, B. (2017). New beginnings in an ancient 
region: Well-being in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: R.J. Estes & M.J. 
Sirgy (Eds.), The Pursuit of Well-Being: The Untold Global 
History, (pp. 161–215), International Handbooks of Quality-of-
Life Research. Springer International Publishing Switzerland.
Ndulu, B., & O’Connell, S. (1999). Governance and growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(3), 
41–66.
Niemiec, R.M. & Wedding, D. (2014, 2nd Edition). Positive 
Psychology at the Movies: Using films to build character strengths 
and well-being. Boston: Hogrefe Publishing. 
Nshimbi, C.C. (2016). When politics and academia collide, 
quality suffers. Just ask Nigeria . The Conversation, 25 October.
https://theconversation.com/when-politics-and-academia-col-
lide-quality-suffers-just-ask-nigeria-67313?utm 
OECD (2016). Youth in the MENA Region: How to bring them 
in. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://www.keepeek.com/
Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/youth-in-the-
mena-region_9789264265721-en#page1
Pilling, D. (2017). Democrats in Africa take fight to its 
dictators. Business Day (Johannesburg), 26 January, p.4. 
Pokimica, J., Addai, I., & Takyi, B.K. (2012). Religion and 
Subjective Well-Being in Ghana. Social Indicators Research 106, 
61–79. 
Population Reference Bureau (2016). World Population Data 
Sheet 2016. http://www.prb.org/pdf16/prb-wpds2016-
web-2016.pdf (Accessed 1 November 2016)
Reader, J. (1997). Africa: A biography of the continent. London: 
Hamish Hamilton.
Rees, G. & Main, G. (Eds.) (2015). Children’s Views on their 
Lives and Well-Being in 15 Countries: An initial report on the 
Children’s Worlds survey, 2013-14. York, UK: Children’s Worlds 
Project. www.isciweb.org
Renima, A., Tiliouine, H. & Estes, R.J. (2016). The Islamic 
Golden Age: A Story of the Triumph of the Islamic Civiliza-
tion. In: H. Tiliouine & R.J. Estes (Eds.). The State of Social 
Progress of Islamic Societies (Chapter 2). Dordrecht: Springer.
Roberts, B. J., Gordon, S. L., Struwig, J., & Møller, V. (2015). 
Shadow of the sun: The distribution of wellbeing in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. In: W. Glatzer, and V. Møller, L. Camfield, & M. 
Rojas (Eds.), Global Handbook of Quality of Life: Exploration of 
well-being of nations and continents (pp. 531–568). Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
Sachs, J.D. (2005). The End of Poverty: Economic possibilities for 
our time. New York: Penguin.
Savahl, S., Adams, S., Isaacs,S., Hendricks, G., Matzdorff, A., 
Wagenaar, C., Abrahams, L. & September, R. (2015). Children’s 
Worlds National Report : South Africa. Children’s Worlds 
Project www.isciweb.org
Schmemann, S. (2016). Rough sailing for liberal values: 
Democratic principles face critical challenges in an unstable 
world. International New York Times supplement: Democracy 
2016, a perfect storm of international crises, 14 September, p. 
S1. 
Somerville, K. (2013). Framing news in Africa – how journal-
ists approach stories and reinforce stereotypes. The Conversa-




Somerville, K. (2016). How Africa’s 1990s ‘poster boys’ use 
security fears to roll back democracy. The Conversation, 27 
June. https://theconversation.com/how-africas-1990s-poster-
boys-use-security-fears-to-roll-back-democracy-61307
Southall, R. (2016). The New Black Middle Class in South 
Africa. Auckland Park: Jacana & Dunkeld. 
Steinberg, J. (2016). The war against the fathers of freedom. 
Business Day, 28 October, p. 9.
Stremlau, J.J. (2016). The US election: what’s at stake for 
Africa’s quest to deepen democracy? The Conversation, 17 
August. https://theconversation.com/the-us-election-whats-at-
stake-for-africas-quest-to-deepen-democracy-63777
W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
119
Swilling, M. (2016). The death knell of Zuma’s rule echoes 
transitions elsewhere in Africa. The Conversation, 3 November. 
https://theconversation.com/the-death-knell-of-zumas-rule-
echoes-transitions-elsewhere-in-africa-68084 
The Daily Telegraph (2015). Gambia loses its youth to ‘Back 
Way’. 11 November. http://www.timeslive.co.za/the-
times/2015/11/11/Gambia-loses-its-youth-to-Back-Way
The Economist (2014). The dividend is delayed – hopes that 
Africa’s dramatic population bulge may create prosperity 
seem to have been overdone. 8 March. http://www.economist.
com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21598646-hopes-africas-
dramatic-population-bulge-may-create-prosperity-seem-have 
(Accessed 26 January 2016). 
Tiliouine, H. (2015a). Quality of life and wellbeing in North 
Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. In: W. 
Glatzer, and V. Møller, L. Camfield, & M. Rojas (Eds.), Global 
Handbook of Quality of Life: Exploration of well-being of nations 
and continents (pp. 507–530). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Tiliouine, H. (2015b). Children’s Worlds National Report: 
Algeria. Children’s Worlds Project (ISCWeB) .
Tiliouine, H. & Meziane, M. (2017). The history of well-being 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In: R.J. Estes & 
M.J. Sirgy (Eds.), The Pursuit of Well-Being: The Untold Global 
History (pp. 523–563), International Handbooks of Quali-
ty-of-Life Research. Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland.  
Tov, W. & Diener, E. (2009). Culture and subjective well-be-
ing. In: E. Diener (Ed.), Culture and Well-Being, (pp. 9–41), 
Social Indicators Research Series 38. Dordrecht: Springer.
Turianskyi, Y. (2016). There is good as well as bad news about 
the state of governance in Africa. The Conversation, 5 October.
https://theconversation.com/there-is-good-as-well-as-bad-
news-about-the-state-of-governance-in-africa-66520
Van de Walle, N. (2003). Presidentialism and clientelism in 
Africa’s emerging party systems. The Journal of Modern African 
Studies (41)2, pp. 297–321.
Van Wyk, I. (2014) A Church of Strangers: The Universal Church 
of the Kingdom of God in South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Van Wyk Smith, M. (2009). The First Ethiopians. Johannes-
burg: Wits University Press. 
Vink, D. (2016). Innovative use of water can turn crisis into 
opportunity. Business Day, Johannesburg, 14 April 2016, 
Infrastructure supplement, p.7
Veenhoven, R. (2005). Happiness in hardship. In: L. Bruni & 
P. L. Porta (Eds.), Economics and happiness: Framing the 
analysis (pp. 243–266). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, F. (1972). Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 
1911-1969. Cambridge University Press.  
Wrong, M. (2010). It’s Our Turn to Eat. London: Fourth Estate. 
ONLINE APPENDIX




W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
121
122
ANDREW E. CLARK, SARAH FLÈCHE, RICHARD LAYARD,  
NATTAVUDH POWDTHAVEE AND GEORGE WARD
Chapter 5
THE KEY DETERMINANTS OF 
HAPPINESS AND MISERY
Andrew E. Clark, CNRS Research Professor, Paris School of Economics and Professorial Research 
Fellow, Well-Being Programme, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and 
Political Science
Sarah Flèche, Research Economist, Well-Being Programme, Centre for Economic Performance,  
London School of Economics and Political Science
Richard Layard, Well-Being Programme, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics 
and Political Science
Nattavudh Powdthavee, Professor of Behavioural Science at Warwick Business School and Associate 
of the Well-Being Programme, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and 
Political Science
George Ward, PhD Student, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Associate Research Economist 
of the Well-Being Programme, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and 
Political Science
This paper draws heavily on the December 2016 draft of The Origins of Happiness: The Science of Well-being over the  
Life-Course by Clark et al., to be published by Princeton University Press. See also Layard et al. (2014). Support from the US 
National Institute on Aging (Grant R01AG040640), the John Templeton Foundation and the What Works Centre for Well-be-
ing is gratefully acknowledged, as is the contribution of all the survey organisations and their survey participants.
W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
123
This chapter is directed at policy-makers of all 
kinds—both in government and in NGOs. We 
assume, like Thomas Jefferson, that “the care of 
human life and happiness … is the only legiti-
mate object of good government.”1 And we 
assume that NGOs would have similar objectives. 
In other words, all policy-makers want to create 
the conditions for the greatest possible happi-
ness in the population and, especially, the least 
possible misery.
For this purpose they need to know the causes  
of happiness and misery. Happiness is caused by 
many factors, such as income, employment, 
health and family life and we need to ask, How 
much does a difference in each of these factors 
change the happiness of the person affected?
There is also a prior and related question that 
tries to explain the huge variation in levels of 
happiness within any country. The question is 
How far does the variation in each of the factors 
(e.g. income inequality) explain the overall 
variation of happiness? 
In this chapter we concentrate mainly on the 
latter question.2 We begin by looking at the  
role of current circumstances, and then (in the 
second part of the chapter) examine the influence 
of earlier childhood experience. 
To be useful to policy-makers, any analysis of the 
causes of happiness and misery should satisfy  
at least three criteria, which have not generally 
been satisfied in the literature.
1.  It must use a consistent measure of happiness 
throughout.
2.  It must look at the effect of all the factors 
affecting happiness simultaneously, not one 
by one.
3.  It must check whether the factors have the 
same effect on misery as they do on happiness 
further up the scale. This is important if, as 
many believe, it is more important to reduce 
misery than to increase happiness by an equal 
amount further up the scale.
We have identified five major surveys of adults 
that make possible such analyses and also include 
meaningful measures of mental health. They 
cover the USA, Australia, Britain (two surveys) 
and Indonesia. We would like to have covered 
more countries, but the data are not yet there.
Life Satisfaction
The measure of happiness that we use is life 
satisfaction. The typical question is “Overall how 
satisfied are you with your life these days?” 
measured on a scale of 0 to 10 (from ‘extremely 
dissatisfied’ to ‘extremely satisfied’).
This is a democratic criterion—we do not rely on 
researchers or policy-makers to give their own 
weights to enjoyment, meaning, anxiety, depres-
sion, and the like. Instead we leave it to individuals 
to evaluate their own well-being. 
Moreover, policy-makers like the concept—and so 
they should. Our work shows that in European 
elections since 1970, the life satisfaction of  
the people is the best predictor of whether the 
government is re-elected—much more import-
ant than economic growth, unemployment or 
inflation (see Table 5.1).
The task is thus to explain how all the different 
factors affect our life satisfaction, entering them 
all simultaneously in the same equation. 
124
The Life-Course
In explaining our current life satisfaction, there 
are of course immediate influences (our current 
situation) but also more distant ones going back to 
our childhood, schooling and family background. 
This diagram gives a stylised version of how our 
life satisfaction as an adult is determined.
Figure 5.1. Determinants of Adult Life Satisfac-
tion
Table 5.1. Factors Explaining the Existing  
Government’s Vote Share
(Partial correlation coefficients)3
Source: Ward (2015). 
Notes: Eurobarometer data on life satisfaction and standard 
election data for most European countries since the 1970s. The 
regressors include the government’s vote share in the previous 
election. Life-satisfaction is from the latest survey before the 





When we are adults, our happiness depends 
significantly on our adult situation—our eco-
nomic situation (our income, education and 
employment), our social situation (whether we 
have a partner and whether we are involved  
in crime), and our personal health (physical  
and mental). These in turn depend partly on  
our development as children (intellectual, 
behavioural and emotional), which in turn 
depend on family and schooling. As our results 
show, there is scope for policy to affect a  
person’s development at every age.
The Effects of the Current Situation
We begin with the impact on adult happiness of 
the person’s current situation, using the follow-
ing data:4
USA: Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) (sample aged 25+)
Australia: Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey (sample 
aged 25+)
Britain: British Cohort Study (BCS) (surveyed at 
ages 34 and 42)
Britain: British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
(sample aged 25+)
Indonesia: Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 
(sample aged 25+)
The factors we examine are
•  Income: log household income per  
equivalised adult
•  Education: years, except Indonesia  
(higher education versus none)
•  Unemployment: measured as ‘not unemployed’
• Partnership: married, or living as married
•  Physical health: USA, Britain and Indonesia: 
number of illnesses; Australia: SF36, lagged 
one year
•  Mental health: USA and Australia: has ever 
been diagnosed for depression or an anxiety 
disorder; Britain (BCS): has seen a doctor in 
the last year for emotional problems; Britain 
(BHPS): GHQ-12, lagged one year; Indonesia: 
replies to 8 questions.
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Table 5.2. How Adult Life Satisfaction is Predicted by Adult Outcomes
(Partial correlation coefficients)
Most earlier analyses of life satisfaction have 
not included mental health as a factor explain-
ing life satisfaction. The reason is that both life 
satisfaction and mental health are subjective 
states, and there is therefore a danger that the 
two concepts are, at least in part, measuring 
the same thing. To omit mental health as a 
factor in the equation, however, is to leave out 
one of the most potent sources of misery, in 
addition to standard external causes like 
poverty, unemployment, and physical illness. 
The solution is, whenever possible, to record 
only mental illness that has been diagnosed or 
has led to treatment. That is our approach and 
it shows clearly that mental illness not caused 
by poverty, unemployment or ill health is a 
potent influence on life satisfaction.
How far does each factor explain the variation in 
life satisfaction within the population? Table 5.2 
shows the results of regressing life satisfaction 
on all the factors simultaneously. The coeffi-
cients given are partial correlation coefficients, 
which show how far the independent variation 
of each factor explains the overall variation.5
Sources: USA (BRFSS); Australia (HILDA); Britain (BCS); Britain (BHPS); Indonesia (IFLS).
Notes: See Appendix C. * Lagged one year.
USA Australia Britain BCS Britain BHPS Indonesia
Income (log) 0.16 (.00) 0.09 (.01) 0.08 (.01) 0.09 (.01) 0.18 (.03)
Years of education 0.05 (.01) -0.03 (.01) 0.03 (.01) 0.02 (.00) 0.05 (.01)
Not unemployed 0.05 (.00) 0.04 (.01) 0.03 (.01) 0.06 (.00) 0.02 (.01)
Partnered 0.34 (.01) 0.14 (.01) 0.21 (.01) 0.11 (.00) 0.04 (.01)
Physical illness -0.05 (.00) -0.17 (.01)* -0.06 (.01) -0.11 (.00) -0.07 (.01)
Mental illness -0.21 (.00) -0.18 (.01) -0.11 (.01) -0.32 (.00)* -0.07 (.01)
Female 0.08 (.00) 0.08 (.01) 0.11 (.02) 0.05 (.00) 0.07 (.01)
N 268,300 16,001 17,812 139,507 31,437
In all three Western countries, diagnosed mental 
illness emerges as more important than income, 
employment or physical illness. In Indonesia as 
well, mental health is important, though less so 
than income. In every country physical health is 
of course also important, but in no country is it 
more important than mental health.
Having a partner is also a crucial factor in 
Western countries, while in Indonesia it is less 
so, perhaps reflecting the greater importance of 
the extended family. Education has a positive 
effect in all countries (except Australia), yet it is 
nowhere near the most powerful explanatory 
factor on its own.6 In every country, income is 
more important than education as such. 
At this point a natural question is Do different 
variables impact differently on life-satisfaction at 
different points on the scale? For example, how 
well does Table 5.2 explain whether a person is 
really unhappy? To answer this we identify in 
each country people in the lowest levels of 
happiness, which we call “In Misery.” Because 
happiness is measured in discrete units, the 
percentage identified as ‘In Misery’ varies from 
5.6% in the USA to 13.9% in Indonesia. 
We then run a standardised linear regression of 
the dummy variable ‘In Misery’ on the same 
explanatory variables as before.7 The results are 
shown in Table 5.3, where they are compared 
with our previous results in Table 5.2 for the full 
range of life-satisfaction. The two sets of coeffi-
cients are remarkably similar. There is thus no 
evidence that income, mental health, or any 
other variable is any more important lower down 
the well-being scale than it is higher up.
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Table 5.3. Explaining the Variation of Life Satisfaction and of Misery Among Adults
(Partial correlation coefficients)
USA Australia Britain BCS Britain BHPS Indonesia
Life Sat Misery Life Sat Misery Life Sat Misery Life Sat Misery Life Sat Misery
Income (log) 0.16 -0.12 0.09 -0.09 0.08 -0.05 0.09 -0.07 0.18 -0.17
Years of education 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.06
Not unemployed 0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.03
Partnered 0.34 -0.19 0.14 -0.10 0.21 -0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.04 -0.04
Physical illness -0.05 0.05 -0.17 * 0.16* -0.06 0.05 -0.11 0.09 -0.07 0.07
Mental illness -0.21 0.19 -0.18 0.14 -0.11 0.09 -0.32 * 0.26* -0.07 0.08
Female 0.08 -0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.06
Sources: USA (BRFSS); Australia (HILDA); Britain (BCS); Britain (BHPS); Indonesia (IFLS)
Notes: See Appendix C. * Lagged one year.
In many ways a more vivid way of analysing 
misery is to make all the right hand variables into 
discrete variables, such as poor/non-poor or sick/
non-sick. This enables us to give an exact answer 
to the question If we could eliminate each  
problem, how much could we reduce misery?
The different risk factors are now as follows:
Poor: below 60% of the median household 
income 
Uneducated: USA and Indonesia: no higher 
education; Australia and Britain (BHPS): less 




Physical illness: below the current 20th percen-
tile of physical health 
Depression/anxiety: diagnosed/treated except 
Britain (BHPS) and Indonesia (below the 20th 
percentile).
We then estimate an equation of the form
Is miserable (1,0) = a1 Is poor (1,0) +  
 a2 Is uneducated (1,0) + etc.                     (1)
The results are given in Table 5.4, column (1). 
This shows that in the USA, for example, a 
person who is poor is 5.5 percentage points more 
likely than otherwise to be miserable. By contrast 
someone with depression or anxiety is 10.7 
percentage points more likely to be miserable.
So how much could we reduce the prevalence  
of misery in the USA if we could miraculously 
abolish depression and anxiety disorders 
without changing anything else? Well, around 
22% of the population have this diagnosis.  
If they were all cured, we could reduce the 
percentage of the population in misery by 0.107 
times 22%. This is 2.35% of the whole population 
(see column 3). That is large portion of the total 
5.6% who are in misery. 
By contrast, eliminating poverty in the USA 
reduces misery by 1.7% points, unemployment 
by 0.3% and physical illness by 0.5% out of the 
total 5.6% in misery. Taken together, those three 
factors barely make as much difference as 
mental illness on its own.
The pattern in Australia is very similar, but 
with more problems coming from physical 
illness. In Britain the role of poverty is less 
than it is in the USA, but the role of mental 
health as large or larger. 
Finally in Indonesia, eliminating mental illness 
again reduces misery by more than reducing 
poverty does. Further, increased education would 
also greatly help. In all countries there would be 
much less misery if fewer people were living on 
their own.
This set of results is repeated, for effect, in 
Figure 5.3.
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Table 5.4. How Would the Percentage in Misery Fall if Each Problem Could be Eliminated on its 
Own?
 
α-coefficient × Prevalence 
(%) 
= α × Prevalence Total in misery 
(% points)
USA
Poverty (below 60% of median income) 0.055 × 31 = 1.71
Uneducated (no higher education) 0.012 × 11 = 0.13
Unemployed 0.079 × 4.0 = 0.32 5.6
Not partnered 0.034 × 43 = 1.46
Physical illness (bottom 20%) 0.027 × 20 = 0.54
Depression or anxiety, diagnosed 0.107 × 22 = 2.35
Australia
Poverty (below 60% of median income) 0.044 × 30 = 1.32
Uneducated (below 10 years of educ.) 0.017 × 13 = 0.22
Unemployed 0.096 × 3.0 = 0.29 7.0
Not partnered 0.047 × 37 = 1.74
Physical illness lagged (bottom 20%) 0.097 × 20 = 1.94
Depression or anxiety, diagnosed 0.098 × 21 = 2.06
Britain (BCS)
Poverty  
(below 60% of median income)
0.025 × 30 = 0.75
Uneducated (no qualification) 0.009 × 19 = 0.17
Unemployed 0.059 × 2.2 = 0.13 8.0
Not partnered 0.049 × 47 = 2.30
Physical illness (bottom 20%) 0.017 × 20 = 0.34
Has seen a doctor for emotional health 
problems in last year
0.155 × 14 = 2.17
Britain (BHPS)
Poverty (below 60% of median income) 0.028 × 29 = 0.81
Uneducated (below 10 years of educ.) 0.026 × 10 = 0.26
Unemployed 0.152 × 3.8 = 0.41 9.9
Not partnered 0.053 × 36 = 1.90
Physical illness (bottom 20%) 0.057 × 20 = 1.14
Emotional health symptoms lagged 
(bottom 20%)
0.205 X 20 = 4.10
Indonesia
Poverty (bottom 20%) 0.063 X 20 = 1.26
Uneducated (no qualification) 0.055 X 27 = 1.48
Unemployed 0.152 X 01 = 0.15 13.9
Not partnered 0.044 X 30 = 1.32
Physical illness (bottom 10%) 0.071 X 10 = 0.71
Emotional health symptoms (bottom 20%) 0.078 X 20 = 1.56
Sources: USA (BRFSS); Australia (HILDA); Britain (BCS); Britain (BHPS); Indonesia (IFLS). 
Notes: People aged 25+, except for Britain (BCS) where people aged 34 and 42. The first column consists of regression coeffi-
cients in equation (1). For Indonesia the bottom quintile of the number of physical illnesses had much less explanatory power 
than the composite variable used for Indonesia throughout this chapter—see Online Annex. See also Appendix C.
From Figure 5.3 we can see how much misery 
could be reduced if we eliminated each of the 
risk factors, one at a time. But clearly none of 
them can be totally eliminated. Moreover the cost 
of reducing them is also relevant. So a natural 
question to ask in each country is If we wanted to 
have one less person in misery, what is the cost 
of achieving this by different means? We attempt 
a very rough calculation of this for Britain in 
Table 5.5. As Table 5.5 shows, it costs money to 
reduce misery, but the cheapest of the policies is 
treating depression and anxiety disorders.
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Figure 5.3. How Would the Percentage in Misery Fall if each Problem Could be Eliminated on its 
Own?
Table 5.5. Average Cost of Reducing the Num-
bers in Misery, by One Person. Britain









Reducing unemployment  
by active labour market policy
30
Physical health.  
Raising more people from the  
worst 20% of present-day illness
100
Mental health.  
Treating more people for  
depression and anxiety
10
Sources available from authors.
The Effects of Childhood
Importantly, many of the problems of adulthood 
can of course be traced back to childhood and 
adolescence. So which aspects of child develop-
ment best predict whether an adult is satisfied 
with life? Answering this question requires 
cohort data which are available for many fewer 
countries. Since Britain is rich in such data, we 
shall from now on use data on Britain only. We 
first use data from the British Cohort Study, 
which has followed children born in 1970 right 
up to today. 
Three key dimensions of child development are at 
work. One is intellectual development, which we 
measure by the highest qualification that the 
individual achieved. This is turned into a single 
variable using weights derived by regressing 
wages on highest qualification. A second dimen-
sion is behavioural, measured in the Rutter 
behaviour questionnaire by 17 questions answered 
by the mother. The third dimension is emotional 
health based on a malaise inventory (22 questions 
answered by the child and 8 by the mother). 
We now regress adult life-satisfaction on these 
three variables, as well as on family background. 
As Figure 5.4 shows, the strongest predictor of a 
satisfying adult life is not qualifications but a 
combination of the child’s emotional health and 
behaviour.8 These findings have direct relevance 
to policy. 
But what, in turn, determines child development? 
To study this we use a very detailed survey of  
all children born in the English County of Avon 
in 1991/2 who have been followed intensively  
up until today. Our aim is to explain the three 
measures of child development. Intellectual 
development is now measured by GCSE scores. 
The emotional health of the child, however, has 
particular significance, since it is also the best 
measure we have of the child’s own quality of 
life—it is a final product as well as an input into 
the resulting adult. 
Clearly both parents and schools affect a child’s 
development. How, first, do parents affect their 
children’s development? We have a mass of 
information about parents, and in Table 5.6 we 
show the family variables that have the main 
effects. As is well known, family income has a 
substantial effect on a child’s academic perfor-
mance, but a much smaller effect on the child’s 
emotional health and behaviour. Father’s unem-
ployment has adverse effects, but is not that 
common. What is the effect if the mother goes 
out to work? If this happens in the first year, 
there are on average very small negative effects. 
If the mother works in subsequent years, howev-
er, it is positively beneficial for academic perfor-
mance and further does no measured harm to 
the child’s emotional health.
As regards “parenting style,” parental engage-
ment and involvement with their children (e.g. 
in reading and play) is immensely valuable, 
while aggressive parenting (hitting or shouting) 
only exacerbates bad behaviour. Conflict between 
parents is especially disadvantageous for the 
behaviour of the children. The worst thing of all 
for children’s emotional health and behaviour is 
a mother who is mentally ill. Indeed, the survey 
suggests strongly that the mother’s mental 
health matters more than the father’s.9
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Figure 5.4. How Adults’ Life Satisfaction  
is Affected by Different Aspects of their  
Development as Children: Britain.
(Partial correlation coefficients)
Sources: Britain (BCS)
Notes: Qualifications is the highest qualification that the per-
son achieved. Behaviour at 16 is reported by the mother, and 
emotional health at 16 is reported by mother and child.
Clearly, family matters. What about the effect of 
schools? In the 1960s, the Coleman Report in 
the US told us that parents mattered more than 
schools.10 Since then the tide of opinion has 
turned. Our data strongly confirm the importance 
of the individual school and the individual 
teacher. This applies equally to the academic per-
formance of the pupils and to their happiness. 
In Figure 5.5, we look at child outcomes at 16 and 
show how they are explained. The top bar shows 
the combined effect of all observed family factors 
(treated as a single weighted variable). The next 
bar shows the enduring effect of the primary 
school a child went to (again a single aggregate of 
dummy variables), and the last is the effect of the 
secondary school.11 These are big effects.
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Figure 5.5. How Child Outcomes at 16 are 
Affected by Family and Schooling: Britain.
(Partial correlation coefficients)
Table 5.6. How Child Outcomes at 16 are Affected by Different Factors: Britain.
(Partial correlation coefficients)
Emotional Behavioural Intellectual
Family income 0.07 (.02) 0.08 (.02) 0.14 (.01)
Father’s unemployment -0.04 (.03) -0.00 (.02) -0.03 (.01)
Mother worked in 1st year -0.02 (.02) -0.01 (.02) -0.02 (.01)
Mother worked thereafter -0.01 (.02) -0.05 (.02) 0.04 (.01)
Parents’ involvement 0.04 (.02) 0.05 (.02) 0.02 (.01)
Aggressive parenting -0.03 (.02) -0.12 (.02) -0.01 (.01)
Family conflict -0.04 (.02) -0.14 (.02) -0.01 (.01)
Father’s mental health 0.04 (.02) -0.00 (.02) -0.00 (.01)
Mother’s mental health 0.16 (.02) 0.17 (.02) 0.03 (.01)
Source: Britain (ALSPAC)
Note: See Appendix C.
Source: Flèche (2016). ALSPAC data.
Notes: See Appendix C. 
Behaviour and Crime
We have so far focussed exclusively on the 
happiness of the individual person being studied. 
But each of us also has a marked impact on the 
happiness of other people. This social impact 
has been given insufficient weight in much of 
the literature on happiness, although it is well 
known that how others behave is a major influ-
ence on our own happiness.
So we must modify Figure 5.1 to take this into 
account (see Figure 5.6). Unfortunately, however, 
we have only limited ability to study this import-
ant determinant of the well-being of human 
populations. One route is by inter-country 
comparisons of the type developed in Chapter 2 
of this report. The other is by studying the 
effects of crime on individual happiness, and 
then investigating the determinants of criminality.
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Figure 5.6. The New Element: Behaviour
Table 5.7. How the Number of Crimes Commit-
ted by an Individual up to Age 34 is Affected by 
Child Development: Britain. 
 
Qualifications (1 SD improvement) -0.87
Behaviour (1 SD improvement) -0.25
Emotional health (1 SD improvement) -0.04
Source: Britain (BCS).
Notes: Controls for family background, gender and age dummies. 
Using data on local crime rates from police 
records, together with the corresponding local 
happiness data from the British Household 
Panel Survey, we can infer that each crime on 
average reduces the aggregate life-satisfaction of 
the local population by the equivalent of 1 
point-year for one person. 
If we then look at how child development affects 
crime, we find that the number of crimes a 
person commits is affected by child development, 
as shown in Table 5.7. Thus more education has 
a major benefit through the resulting reduction 
of crime. From one standard deviation of qualifi-
cations comes a one-off benefit to the rest of the 
population of just under 1 point-year of life-satis-
faction (1 x 0.87). This can be compared to the 
gain to the educated individual of 0.10 point-
year in every year of their life, as discussed 
earlier. Thus the crime-reducing effect of educa-
tion adds proportionately little to the total social 
returns to education.
Social Comparisons
There remains the elephant in the room—social 
comparisons. People are constantly amazed that 
aggregate happiness has not risen in the USA 
and many other countries, when incomes and 
educational levels have risen so much and  
when income and education are associated with 
greater individual happiness. This is the Easter-
lin paradox.
It is really no mystery, however.12 There is much 
evidence that people compare their income with 
other people and, if others become richer, they 
feel less happy at any given level of income.13 
This is confirmed in the present study. Table 5.8 
shows the effect of the average of log income in 
one’s region, age-group and gender upon one’s 
own happiness. In all three countries the nega-
tive effect of others’ income is large, and any rise 
in overall income has little effect on overall life 
satisfaction. The same is true for education. 
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Table 5.8. How Life Satisfaction (0-10) is Affected by Own Income, Comparator Income, Own Years 
of Education and Comparator Years of Education
(Partial correlation coefficients)
Britain (BHPS) Germany Australia
Own income (log) 0.16 (.01) 0.26 (.01) 0.16 (.01)
Comparator income -0.15 (.07) -0.34 (.05) -0.13 (.06)
Years of education 0.03 (.00) 0.05 (.00) -0.01 (.00)
Comparator education -0.09 (.02) -0.05 (.01) -0.03 (.01)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls for self-employed, employed part time, unemployed, not in labour force, 
partnered, separated, widowed, parent, physical health, emotional health, female, age, age-squared, comparator unemployment, 
comparator partnership, year and region dummies. 
Conclusion
Policy-makers need to know the causes of happi-
ness and misery. Some of these are factors that 
affect everyone in a society (see Chapter 2), while 
other vital factors differ across individuals. For the 
latter, policy-makers need to know what factors 
account for the huge variation across individuals 
in their happiness and misery (both of these being 
measured in terms of life-satisfaction). 
Key factors include economic factors (such as 
income and employment), social factors (such as 
education and family life), and health (mental 
and physical). We use surveys from the USA, 
Australia, Britain and Indonesia to cast light on 
the relative importance of these various factors.
In all three Western societies, diagnosed mental 
illness emerges as more important than income, 
employment or physical illness. In Indonesia as 
well, mental health is important, though less so 
than income. In every country, physical health is 
also of course important. Yet in no country is it 
more important than mental health.
Having a partner is also a crucial factor in 
Western countries, while in Indonesia it is less 
so, perhaps reflecting the greater importance of 
the extended family. Education has a positive 
effect in all countries (except Australia) but it is 
nowhere near the most powerful explanatory 
factor on its own. In every country, income is 
more important than education as such.
Even so, household income per head explains 
under 2% of the variance of happiness in any 
country. Moreover it is largely relative income 
that matters, so as countries have become richer, 
many have failed to experience any increase in 
their average happiness. A similar problem 
relates to education—people care largely about 
their education relative to that of others.
What about the causes of misery? Do the same 
factors affect misery as affect life-satisfaction 
across the whole range? The answer is yes, and 
the factors have the same ranking in explaining 
misery as in explaining life-satisfaction. In Table 
5.4 we show a novel decomposition which 
illustrates how much misery could in principle 
be eliminated by eliminating either poverty, low 
education, unemployment, living alone, physical 
illness or mental illness. In all countries the 
most powerful effect would come from the 
elimination of depression and anxiety disorders, 
which are the main form of mental illness. This 
would also be the least costly way of reducing 
misery (Table 5.5).
While much could be done to improve human 
life by policies directed at adults, as much or 
more could be done by focussing on children. 
We examine this issue using British cohort data. 
We ask, Which factors in child development best 
predict whether the resulting adult will have a 
satisfying life? We find that academic qualifica-
tions are a worse predictor than the emotional 
health and behaviour of the child. 
What in turn affects the emotional health and 
behaviour of the child? Parental income is a 
good predictor of a child’s academic qualifications 
(as is well known), but it is a much weaker 
predictor of the child’s emotional health and 
behaviour. The best predictor of these is the 
mental health of the child’s mother. 
Schools are also crucially important. Remark-
ably, which school a child went to (both primary 
and secondary) predicts as much of how the 
child develops as all the characteristics we can 
measure of the mother and father. This is true of 
what determines the child’s emotional health, 
their behaviour and their academic achievement.
To conclude, within any country, mental health 
explains more of the variance of happiness  
in Western countries than income does. In 
Indonesia mental illness also matters, but less 
than income. Nowhere is physical illness a 
bigger source of misery than mental illness. 
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Equally, if we go back to childhood, the key 
factors for the future adult are the mental 
health of the mother and the social ambiance 
of primary and secondary school. The implica-
tions for policy are momentous.
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1   Jefferson (1809).
2    The relation between these two questions is shown in 
Appendix A, which provides data from which the answers 
to the previous question can be calculated.
3    The partial correlation coefficients are sometimes called the 
standardised regression coefficients. They are the   s in a 
regression where all variables are divided by their standard 
deviation. The overall explanatory power of the equation is 
given by 
4    Details are in Appendix B and an online Annex at https://
tinyurl.com/WHR2017Ch5Annex
5   See Note 3.
6    The total effect of education includes of course its effect via 
income and other channels. If income is excluded from the 
regression, the coefficient on education becomes USA 
0.08, Australia 0.03, Britain BHPS 0.06, and Indonesia 
0.06.
7    We thus estimate a linear probability model. Almost 
identical results are obtained from logit analysis.
8    The coefficient for the combination of the child’s emotion-
al health and behaviour is 0.101 (s.e. = 0.009), which 
compares with 0.068 (s.e. 0.008) for qualifications—a 
significant difference (p = 0.010).
9    Presumably since she is more present. However the 
mother’s mental health is measured 8 times up to when 
the child is 11, while the father’s is only measured 3 times 
until the child is 2. To see if this matters, we also focused 
on explaining the child’s emotional health at 5, using three 
observations on both parents’ mental health. The differ-
ence between the effect of mother and father remained as 
large as it is in Table 5.6. The same occurred if we focussed 
on explaining the child’s emotional health at 16, using only 
the first three observations on each parent’s mental health. 
 
The mother’s mental health was measured using the 
Edinburgh Post Natal Depression Scale (EDPS), and the 
father’s was tested using the Crown-Crisp Experiential 
Index.
10   Coleman et al. (1966).
11    The dependent variable is regressed on two sets of dummy 
variables, one for each primary school and one for each 
secondary school. The set of primary school variables is 
then turned into one composite variable using the 
coefficients on each dummy variable. The same is done 
for secondary schools.
12    For an earlier discussion of the Easterlin paradox, see 
WHR 2012, Chapter 3.
13   Clark et al. (2008); Layard et al. (2010).
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Appendix A: Calculating The Absolute Impact of A Factor
The equations presented in this chapter are of 
the form 
where    measures the standard deviation of the 
variable. For cost-effectiveness analysis a policy- 
maker needs the coefficients      in the equation
Thus
The tables in the text provide the   s. The follow-
ing tables provide the   s and the means.
Standard deviations for Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8
 
USA Australia Britain BCS Britain BHPS Indonesia
Life satisfaction 0.62 1.49 1.90 2.36 0.80
Misery 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.35 0.35
Income (log) 0.82 0.88 0.74 1.22 7.86
Education 1.11 2.58 1.57 2.51 0.43
Not unemployed 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.08
Partnered 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.35
Physical illness 1.06 4.95 1.32 1.10 0.83
Mental illness 0.42 2.59 0.18 5.54 4.97
Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Comparator income 0.40 1.07
Comparator education 1.17 0.97
Means for Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.8
 
USA Australia Britain BCS Britain BHPS Indonesia
Life satisfaction 3.40 7.90 7.39 6.97 3.32
Misery 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.14
Income (log) 9.99 7.51 9.55 6.42 15.75
Education 4.78 12.08 3.37 12.35 0.26
Not unemployed 0.96 0.67 0.97 0.96 0.99
Partnered 0.57 0.63 0.53 0.64 0.70
Physical illness 1.38 22.68 2.01 0.73 0.48
Mental illness 0.22 0.21 0.14 23.11 18.83
Female 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.51
Comparator income 7.64 6.22
Comparator education 12.07 12.19
Appendix B: The Surveys Used
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USA (BRFSS) Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) 
Cross-sectional survey which includes a life-satisfaction question since 2005.
In 2006, 2008, 2010, 2013, respondents were asked whether they have ever been diagnosed with 
depression or anxiety. 
Sample size = 270,000
Australia Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey 
Household-based panel study which began in 2001. The panel members are followed over time and 
interviewed every year. Life-satisfaction is measured throughout.
In 2007, 2009, 2013, respondents were asked whether they have ever been diagnosed with depression or 
anxiety.
Sample size = 16,000
Britain British Cohort Study (BCS) 
British cohort data which began in 1970. The children are followed over time and interviewed at ages 5, 
10, 16, 26, 30, 34, 38 and 42. A life satisfaction question has been included in the study from age 26. 
At ages 34 and 42, respondents were asked whether they have any physical health problems. 
Sample size = 18,000
Britain British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
Household-based panel study which began in 1991. The panel members are followed over time and 
interviewed every year. A life satisfaction question has been included in the study from 1996.
Sample size = 140,000
Britain Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) 
Near census English cohort study. The study recruited over 14,000 pregnant women residing in the Avon 
area in the UK with expected delivery dates between April 1991 and December 1992. The children have 
been followed almost every year since then. 
The study contains various measures of the family environment, schooling environment as well as 
indicators of the development of child well-being and skills over time. 
Sample size = 8,000
Indonesia 
(IFLS)
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 
Longitudinal survey in Indonesia. 
The fifth wave (ILFS-5) in 2014 includes a question on life satisfaction, emotional health and number of 
health conditions diagnosed by a doctor. 
Observations: 32, 000
https://tinyurl.com/WHR2017Ch5Annex
Appendix C: Notes on Tables and Figures
Table 2: How Adult Life-satisfaction is Predicted 
by Adult Outcomes
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Controls for age, age-squared, region and year 
dummies. Australia and Britain (BHPS) also 
include comparison income, education, unem-
ployment and partnership. Britain (BCS) also 
includes non-criminality, child outcomes at 16 
and family background. Cross-section regres-
sions using information from BCS respondents 
at ages 34 and 42. BHPS, HILDA, IFLS and 
BRFSS respondents at age 25+. 
Table 3. Explaining the Variation of Life-Satisfac-
tion and of Misery Among Adults
Controls for age, age-squared, region and year 
dummies. Australia and Britain (BHPS), also 
include comparison income, education, unem-
ployment and partnership. Britain (BCS) also 
includes non-criminality, child outcomes at 16 
and family background. Cross-section regres-
sions using information from BCS respondents 
at ages 34 and 42. BHPS, HILDA and BRFSS 
respondents at age 25+. Those included in 
misery are USA 1-2 (on scale 1-4); Australia 0-5 
(on scale 0-10); Britain (BCS) 0-4 (on scale 
0-10); Britain (BHPS) 1-3 (on scale 1-7); and 
Indonesia (IFLS) 1-2 (on scale 1-5).
Table 6. How Child Outcomes at 16 are Affected 
by Different Factors: Britain.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Controls for parental separation, parents’ educa-
tion, mother’s age at birth, parents’ marital 
status at birth, female child, ethnicity, first born 
child, number of siblings, low birth weight, 
premature baby, and primary school and second-
ary school fixed effects. 
Figure 5. How Child Outcomes at 16 are Affect-
ed by Family and Schooling: Britain.
Family background include family income, 
proportion of time mother worked in first year, 
proportion of time mother worked thereafter, 
father’s unemployment, mother’s mental health, 
father’s mental health, involvement, aggression, 
family conflict, parental separation, parents’ 
education, mother’s age at birth, and parents’ 
marital status at birth. Controls for female child, 
ethnicity, first born child, number of siblings, 
low birth weight, and premature baby.
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Introduction 
Happiness is typically defined by how people 
experience and evaluate their lives as a whole.1 
Since the majority of people spend much of 
their lives at work, it is critically important to 
gain a solid understanding of the role that 
employment and the workplace play in shaping 
happiness for individuals and communities 
around the world. 
In this chapter, we focus largely on the role of 
work and employment in shaping people’s 
happiness, and investigate how employment 
status, job type, and workplace characteristics 
relate to measures of subjective wellbeing. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note from the 
onset that the relationship between happiness 
and employment is a complex and dynamic 
interaction that runs in both directions. Recent 
research shows that work and employment are 
not only drivers of happiness, but that happiness 
can also itself help to shape job market out-
comes, productivity, and even firm performance.2 
The overwhelming importance of having a job 
for happiness is evident throughout the analy-
sis, and holds across all of the world’s regions. 
When considering the world’s population as a 
whole, people with a job evaluate the quality  
of their lives much more favorably than those 
who are unemployed. The importance of having 
a job extends far beyond the salary attached to  
it, with non-pecuniary aspects of employment 
such as social status, social relations, daily 
structure, and goals all exerting a strong influ-
ence on people’s happiness. 
The importance of employment for people’s 
subjective wellbeing shines a spotlight on the 
misery and unhappiness associated with being 
unemployed. In this chapter, we delve into 
unemployment and build on the existing research 
literature to show empirically that individuals do 
not adapt over time to becoming unemployed 
and that unemployment can even have a 
“scarring” effect after regaining employment. 
The data also show that high unemployment has 
spillover effects, and negatively affects every-
one—even those who are employed. These 
results are obtained at the individual level but 
they also come through at the macroeconomic 
level, with national unemployment levels  
correlating negatively with average national 
wellbeing across the world. 
We also consider how happiness relates to the 
types of job that people do. The overarching 
finding on job type is that data from around  
the globe reveal an important difference in  
how blue-collar and white-collar jobs are related 
to happiness. Even when accounting for any 
relevant covariates between these two broad 
categories of job type, we find that blue-collar 
labor is systematically correlated with lower 
levels of happiness, and that this is true of all 
labor-intensive industries such as construction, 
mining, manufacturing, transport, farming, 
fishing, and forestry.
In addition to considering happiness differentials 
between broad categories of job type, we also 
study job quality by focusing on more specific 
workplace characteristics and how they relate to 
employees’ happiness. As might be expected, we 
find that those in well-paying jobs are happier 
and more satisfied with their lives and their jobs, 
but a number of further aspects of people’s jobs 
are strongly predictive of varied measures of. 
Work-life balance emerges as a particularly 
strong predictor of people’s happiness. Further 
factors include job variety and the need to learn 
new things, as well the level of individual autono-
my enjoyed by the employee. Moreover, job 
security and social capital (as measured through 
the support one receives from fellow workers) 
are also positively correlated with happiness, 
while jobs that involve risks to health and safety 
are generally associated with lower levels of 
subjective wellbeing. 
The data used in this chapter are drawn mainly 
from the Gallup World Poll, which covers over 
150 countries worldwide and is representative of 
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98% of the world’s population. Nationally 
representative samples of people for these 
countries have been surveyed for most years 
beginning in 2006. These surveying efforts 
allow the analyses reported in this chapter to 
incorporate hundreds of thousands of individual 
responses that enable us to investigate how 
employment status and job type measures relate 
to the wellbeing of respondents. The Gallup 
World Poll is complemented by the European 
Social Survey for the analysis of how more 
specific workplace characteristics relate to 
happiness, and the German Socio-Economic 
Panel is used to illustrate dynamics surrounding 
unemployment and happiness over time.
For the sake of ease, we use the terms happiness 
and wellbeing interchangeably. However, im-
portant differences exist between the different 
elements that make up subjective wellbeing, and 
how these relate to employment characteristics. 
Such differences are captured in this chapter by 
systematically using a number of measures: life 
evaluation (by way of the Cantril “ladder of 
life”3), positive4 and negative5 affect to measure 
respondents’ experienced positive and negative 
wellbeing, as well as the more domain-specific 
items of job satisfaction6 and employee engage-
ment7. We find that these diverse measures of 
subjective wellbeing correlate strongly with each 
other, but that there are nevertheless important 
differences in how they relate to aspects of work 
and employment. For example, we find that 
being self-employed is associated with higher 
overall life evaluation in most developed nations, 
but that self-employment is also associated with 
the heightened experience of negative emotions 
such as stress and worry.
We conclude the chapter by emphasizing the 
main results and by suggesting a number of 
possible subsequent avenues for researchers and 
policy-makers to consider. Given the importance 
of employment for happiness, it is evident that 
even more weight ought to be given to fostering 
employment, as well as protecting people 
against the damaging effects of joblessness. 
Moreover, policies that promote high quality 
jobs could be stimulated by, for example, incen-
tivizing employers who provide jobs with work-
ing conditions that are conducive to people’s 
wellbeing. The results reported in this chapter 
provide new empirical evidence for such policies 
in a global context. 
Employment Status and Subjective 
Wellbeing Around the World
In Figure 6.1 we present differences in the 
self-reported wellbeing of individuals around 
the world according to whether or not they are 
employed. The bars measure the subjective 
wellbeing of individuals of working age8 who 
are employed (either for an employer or for 
themselves regardless of whether they work 
full-time or part-time) and those who are  
currently unemployed. In all cases where we 
present either global or regional averages such 
as these, we weight the averages by national 
population.9 As can be seen, the difference in 
average subjective wellbeing between having 
and not having a job is very large indeed. This  
is the case regardless of whether one considers 
wellbeing measures that gauge life evaluation  
or positive and negative affective states. In fact, 
the employed evaluate the quality of their lives 
around 0.6 points higher on average as com-
pared to the unemployed on a scale from 0 to 
10. Equally noteworthy is that individuals who 
are unemployed report approximately 30 percent 
more negative affective experiences as compared 
to individuals that are employed. The notion 
that employment matters greatly for the wellbe-
ing of individuals is one of the most robust 
results to have come out of the economic study 
of human happiness.10 
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Figure 6.1 presents simply the raw wellbeing 
differentials between those in and out of work. 
These descriptive statistics are corroborated in 
the regression analyses, which break employment 
status into finer categories and consider men 
and women as well as different regions sepa-
rately. Here we are able to control for a number 
of additional variables in a multivariate regres-
sion analysis that may be related to both labor 
market outcomes as well as subjective wellbe-
ing. These are gender, age (and its squared 
term), level of education, (the natural logarithm 
of) income, marital status, and household 
composition. These variables are included in 
order to avoid so-called ‘omitted variable bias,’ in 
case these demographic variables might be 
driving both employment and happiness and 
thus lead us to false conclusions on the relation-
ship between work and wellbeing. Moreover, 
these regressions incorporate country and year 
fixed-effects in order to account for the many 
political, economic, and cultural differences 
between countries as well as year-to-year  
variation that would otherwise cloud our  
interpretation of the relationship between 
employment and happiness.
In all of our regression analyses throughout the 
chapter, we standardize the various outcome 
variables such that they each have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1 in the whole 
sample. This enables us to more easily compare 
the magnitude of the coefficients across the 
different outcomes. The coefficients on each of 
the employment status indicator variables in 
Table 6.1 estimate the difference in standard 
Figure 6.1: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status
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deviation units of each of the three outcome 
variables (life evaluation, positive affect, and 
negative affect) associated with holding that 
status, as compared to being employed full-time 
for an employer, controlling for income as well 
the other demographic variables noted above. 
As can be seen, the unemployed evaluate the 
overall state of their lives less highly on the 
Cantril ladder, and experience more negative 
emotions in their day-to-day lives as well as 
fewer positive ones. These are among the most 
widely accepted and replicated findings in the 
science of happiness.11 Here, income is being 
held constant along with a number of other 
relevant covariates, showing that these unem-
ployment effects go well beyond the income loss 
associated with losing one’s job.12 
While we are able to control for a number of 
confounding variables in this analysis, one 
further important methodological concern is the 
possibility of so-called ‘reverse causality.’ Indeed, 
there is some evidence that the relationship 
between employment and happiness is dynamic 
in nature and may run in both directions. That 
is to say that happier individuals may be some-
what more likely to obtain employment in the 
first place or that unhappy people may be more 
likely to lose their jobs.13 This means that the 
cross-sectional results reported in this chapter—
and much of the related literature—cannot be 
interpreted causally and require this important 
caveat. Nevertheless, while this important 
methodological proviso needs to be noted, a 
number of studies have shown that the damaging 
effects of unemployment remain large in with-
in-person longitudinal analyses, which hold 
constant an individual fixed effect,14 while others 
have leveraged external employment shocks—
namely plant closures—to further demonstrate 
the causal effects of unemployment on subjective 
wellbeing.15 
If unemployment is so bad, what about part-time 
work? As one might expect, much depends here 
on whether one actually wants to work any more 
hours. If the respondent is underemployed—
that is, is seeking to work more hours than they 
currently do—then, in line with intuition, there 
remains some scope for happiness gains 
through increasing their employment. This is 
not the case for individuals who report actually 
preferring to be part-time employed. In fact, 
part-time employed individuals who do not seek 
more hours of work report greater happiness 
and less negative experiences (such as stress  
and worry) as compared to full-time employed 
people, controlling for income and other 
confounding variables. As will be noted later, 
this particular finding applies mostly to women 
rather than men. 
Being self-employed has a complex relationship 
to wellbeing.16 While the global data indicate that 
self-employment is generally associated with 
lower levels of happiness as compared to being  
a full-time employee, the follow-up analyses 
reported later in this chapter show that this very 
much depends on the region of the world that is 
being considered as well as which measure of 
subjective wellbeing is under consideration.
In Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2 we investigate 
whether the relationship between employment 
and wellbeing varies by gender. Being of working 
age and out of the labor force has a different 
effect on the subjective wellbeing of men and 
women. The data suggest that not participating 
in the labor market (for example by being a 
stay-at-home parent, being out of the labor force 
through disability, or being retired) is worse for 
the happiness of men than it is for women. Both 
men and women of working age who are out of 
the labor force evaluate their lives more negatively 
than those in full-time work, but the effect is 
much stronger for men. Moreover, while men 
 in this situation experience higher negative and 
lower positive affect, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the daily emotional 
experiences of women who are out of the labor 
force and those who are full-time employees.
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Table 6.1: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status
(1) (2) (3)
Life Evaluation Positive Affect Negative Affect
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed Full-Time for Self -0.018*** 0.008 0.018***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Employed Part-Time (does not want more hours) 0.048*** 0.017*** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Employed Part-Time (would like more hours) -0.096*** -0.016*** 0.089***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)







Household Income (ln) 0.218*** 0.124*** -0.118***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Education: Medium (vs. low) 0.159*** 0.103*** -0.080***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Education: High 0.308*** 0.215*** -0.118***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Marital Status: Married (vs. single) 0.046*** 0.016*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Marital Status: Divorced/Separated -0.091*** -0.109*** 0.121***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Marital Status: Widowed -0.089*** -0.133*** 0.148***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Female 0.082*** 0.012*** 0.072***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.019*** -0.024*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)






Country + Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 848594 817339 805839
R-squared 0.084 0.032 0.032
Countries 162 162 162
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0 
and SD=1. Sample is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6.2: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status by Gender
Life Evaluation Positive Affect Negative Affect
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed Full-Time for Self -0.024*** -0.009 0.008 0.011 0.018** 0.018**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Employed Part-Time  
(does not want more hours)
0.025*** 0.064*** 0.005 0.035*** -0.000 -0.044***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Employed Part-Time  
(would like more hours)
-0.120*** -0.072*** -0.028*** 0.002 0.094*** 0.079***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Out of Labor Force -0.092*** -0.027*** -0.069*** 0.003 0.078*** -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Unemployed
 
-0.281*** -0.201*** -0.145*** -0.055*** 0.217*** 0.195***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Country + Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 394629 453965 377950 439389 372192 433647
R-squared 0.084 0.084 0.033 0.033 0.026 0.032
Countries 162 162 162 162 162 162
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0 
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sam-
ple is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
Figure 6.2: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status by Gender
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In line with the existing body of research, the 
results indicate that unemployment is devastat-
ing for the wellbeing of both men and women. 
Nevertheless, the effects of joblessness tend to 
be felt more strongly by men. One further 
notable gender difference regards part-time 
work. Women who work part-time but who do 
not wish for any more hours experience fewer 
negative affective states (such as stress and 
worry) in their day-to-day lives and more positive 
ones as compared to full-time employed women, 
whereas the same is not the case for men. 
In Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3 we investigate 
whether the relationship between employment 
and wellbeing varies by world region.17 As can 
be seen in Figure 6.3, across all of the world 
regions, we find that individuals in employment 
generally report higher life evaluation and 
positive affect than those who are unemployed. 
The unemployed also report more negative 
affective experiences across all regions around 
the world. The magnitude of the regression 
coefficients on being unemployed reported in 
panel A of Table 6.3 does, however, indicate 
that the strength of the relationship to life 
evaluation is less pronounced in South Asia 
and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, panel B in 
Table 6.3 shows that for these two regions there 
does not appear to be a statistically significant 
relationship between unemployment and 
positive affective experiences, although panel C 
in Table 6.3 notes a significantly higher level of 
negative affective experiences.
Figure 6.3: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status by World Region
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Table 6.3: Subjective Wellbeing and Employment Status Around the World
 
W Europe C+E Europe CIS SE Asia S Asia E Asia LA + Carib NA+ANZ MENA SSA
Panel A: Life Evaluation
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed  
Full-Time for Self
0.019** 0.083*** 0.030* 0.018 -0.008 0.025** -0.092*** 0.022 -0.001 -0.051***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.012)
Employed 
Part-Time (does not 
want more hours)
0.066*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.063** 0.026 0.106*** 0.018 0.080*** 0.090*** -0.017




-0.174*** -0.135*** -0.014 -0.012 -0.108* -0.002 -0.148*** -0.214*** -0.108*** -0.085***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.055) (0.027) (0.016) (0.030) (0.016) (0.012)
Out of Labor Force -0.126*** -0.068*** -0.011 0.019 0.005 0.011 -0.048*** -0.171*** -0.017 -0.087***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.036) (0.014) (0.012) (0.025) (0.010) (0.014)
Unemployed -0.396*** -0.306*** -0.187*** -0.113*** -0.095* -0.180*** -0.257*** -0.434*** -0.258*** -0.156***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.021) (0.030) (0.047) (0.025) (0.018) (0.041) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 125659 78228 72053 47723 62986 52100 98357 18043 136099 156412
R-squared 0.115 0.160 0.087 0.071 0.122 0.133 0.064 0.110 0.081 0.074
Panel B: Positive Affect
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed  
Full-Time for Self
0.006 0.033* 0.006 0.023 0.017 0.061*** -0.034*** 0.038* -0.012 -0.010
(0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.013) (0.011) (0.021) (0.016) (0.010)
Employed 
Part-Time (does not 
want more hours)
0.016 0.045** 0.060*** 0.094*** -0.026 0.070** -0.007 0.048 -0.002 -0.038***




-0.058*** -0.072*** 0.006 0.082*** -0.010 0.077*** -0.043*** 0.009 -0.056*** -0.027**
(0.012) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.058) (0.017) (0.012) (0.034) (0.017) (0.012)
Out of Labor Force -0.073*** 0.027* -0.021 0.026 0.036 0.030* -0.018 -0.083*** -0.043*** -0.087***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.031) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013)
Unemployed -0.112*** -0.077*** -0.102*** 0.013 -0.076 -0.074** -0.058*** -0.124*** -0.231*** -0.078***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033) (0.051) (0.028) (0.014) (0.040) (0.020) (0.015)
Observations 113004 78759 73044 47369 63685 49783 99432 15098 120161 156067
R-squared 0.027 0.082 0.058 0.020 0.058 0.033 0.020 0.027 0.038 0.028
Panel C: Negative Affect
Employment (v. employed full-time for employer)
Employed Full-Time 
for Self
0.084*** 0.055*** 0.033** -0.043** -0.081*** 0.001 0.027** 0.100*** 0.037** -0.012
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) (0.010)
Employed 
Part-Time (does not 
want more hours)
-0.025* 0.035* 0.021 -0.091*** -0.047 -0.050*** -0.084*** -0.088** -0.051*** -0.008




0.146*** 0.136*** 0.050*** -0.007 0.047 -0.007 0.104*** 0.184*** 0.108*** 0.058***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.013) (0.034) (0.020) (0.013)
Out of Labor Force 0.147*** 0.066*** 0.057*** -0.063*** -0.111*** -0.004 -0.041*** 0.244*** -0.029** 0.011
(0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.027) (0.016) (0.012) (0.027) (0.014) (0.012)
Unemployed 0.260*** 0.241*** 0.176*** 0.163*** 0.187*** 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.377*** 0.249*** 0.111***
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.049) (0.043) (0.031) (0.018) (0.051) (0.019) (0.013)
Observations 113004 78759 73044 47369 63685 49783 99432 15098 111485 153243
R-squared 0.041 0.052 0.031 0.026 0.054 0.027 0.042 0.050 0.036 0.041
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0 
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sam-
ple is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
All models include country and year FEs.
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In terms of self-employment, the results reveal 
an interesting reversal across regions. Being 
self-employed tends to be associated with higher 
life evaluation and positive affect (as compared 
to being a full-time employee) across Europe, 
North America, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, and East 
Asia. However, individuals that are self-em-
ployed in Latin America, the Caribbean, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa tend to report lower life 
evaluation and less positive affective experience. 
Interestingly, however, although in some regions 
self-employment is associated with higher levels 
of life evaluation, most regions do converge in 
terms of showing that employing oneself and 
running one’s own business is generally associ-
ated with the experience of more negative 
emotions such as stress and worry.18 
Unemployment Dynamics  
and Spillovers
Unemployment is damaging to people’s happi-
ness, but how short-lived is the misery associat-
ed with being out of work? People tend to adapt 
to many different circumstances, and unemploy-
ment may well be one of them. If the pain is 
only fleeting and people quickly get used to 
being unemployed, then we might see jobless-
ness as less of a key public policy priority in 
terms of happiness. However, a number of 
studies have demonstrated that people do not 
adapt much, if at all, to being unemployed.19 We 
cannot show this dynamic using the Gallup 
World Poll, which provides repeated snapshots 
of countries across the world, but we can instead 
look to longitudinal data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel, which has each year 
since 1984 surveyed and re-surveyed the same 
large random sample of the German population.
We are interested in two issues here: adaptation 
and scarring. First, in Figure 6.4 we investigate 
whether people adapt to being jobless as they 
spend longer and longer out of work.20 As can 
be seen, there is a large initial shock to becom-
ing unemployed, and then as people stay unem-
ployed over time their levels of life satisfaction 
remain low. A second issue is scarring: several 
studies have shown that even once a person 
becomes re-employed, the prior experience of 
unemployment leaves a mark on his or her 
happiness. Comparing people who are both in 
work, those who have recently experienced a 
bout of unemployment are systematically less 
happy than those who have not.21 
As we have seen, being out of a job is detrimen-
tal to the subjective wellbeing of the unemployed 
themselves. What about everyone else? A further 
canonical finding in the literature on unemploy-
ment and subjective wellbeing is that there are 
so-called “spillover” effects.22 As we will see in 
more detail below when we come to examine the 
effects of specific job characteristics, job security 
is a key driver of subjective wellbeing.23 High 
levels of unemployment can have an indirect 
effect on those who remain in work, as they 
increase fear and heighten the sense of job 
insecurity. Poor labor market conditions tend to 
signal to those in work that layoffs are relatively 
commonplace and that they may well be next in 
line to lose their jobs.24
Figure 6.4: Adaptation to Spells of Unemployment
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We can investigate this by turning our attention 
back to the Gallup World Poll data. We can see 
in Table 6.4 that, controlling for one’s own 
employment status, the unemployment of  
one’s peers enters negatively into a subjective 
wellbeing equation. The unemployment rate is 
calculated here as the fraction of the labor force 
unemployed within the respondent’s gender, age 
group (20s, 30s, and so on), country, and year. 
The negative effect of peers’ joblessness can be 
seen in columns 1 and 2, with the comparison 
unemployment rate having a negative effect on 
life evaluation. An interesting new finding here, 
however, is that while the overall evaluative 
subjective wellbeing of those who are not unem-
ployed seems to be negatively affected by others’ 
unemployment, their day-to-day experience of 
life does not seem to be similarly affected in 
models 3-6 which investigate effects on positive 
and negative affect. 
Although higher unemployment rates have 
negative spillovers for those still in work, the 
third row of Table 6.4 shows the opposite may 
be true for those who are out of work. This 
so-called “social norm” effect has been widely 
shown in the literature.25 For the unemployed, 
the individual effects of unemployment are  
less strongly felt in situations where the local  
unemployment rate is higher, as in areas of high 
unemployment the social stigma of unemploy-
ment may be lessened while it may also be 
easier to find social contacts. Much of the exist-
ing evidence is focused on a handful of coun-
tries and finds significant effects only for men. 
We are able to show here in a worldwide sample 
that this social norm effect is present for both 
men and women: unemployed people evaluate 
their lives less negatively on the Cantril ladder, 
the higher the comparison unemployment rate. 
They also experience fewer negative and more 
positive emotions in their day-to-day lives. It is 
worth noting, however, that even at convention-
ally high levels of unemployment, the overall 
effect of being unemployed on the individual is 
still very much negative across all three measures 
of subjective wellbeing.
Our analyses have thus described the damaging 
effects of unemployment on the individual as 
well as the negative spillover effects on those 
around them. This raises the question of whether 
Table 6.4: Social Comparison Effects of Unemployment
Life Evaluation Positive Affect Negative Affect
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Unemployed -0.298*** -0.236*** -0.176*** -0.073*** 0.276*** 0.240***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Unemployment Rate -0.449*** -0.154*** -0.014 -0.006 0.080 -0.058
(0.066) (0.047) (0.061) (0.041) (0.062) (0.045)
Unemployed * Unemployment Rate 0.209** 0.199*** 0.219** 0.091 -0.425*** -0.218***
 (0.087) (0.060) (0.096) (0.056) (0.089) (0.057)
Country + Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 394555 453285 377876 438738 372132 433055
R-squared 0.085 0.084 0.033 0.033 0.027 0.032
Countries 162 162 162 162 162 162
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0 
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sam-
ple is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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these broadly negative effects of unemployment 
also show up in the macroeconomic data. High 
levels of unemployment have an indirect effect 
on those who remain in work because they 
heighten the sense of job insecurity, since 
generally poor labor market conditions signal to 
those in work that redundancies are relatively 
commonplace. If this is the case, we may be able 
to detect this in the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the average wellbeing 
in a society. Figure 6.5 shows a scatterplot that 
maps average wellbeing for most countries in 
the world against their unemployment rate.26 
Although any such bivariate treatment of the 
relationship between national wellbeing and 
unemployment is necessarily limited in nature, 
in line with the analyses that focus on the 
individual impact of falling unemployed we find 
a generally negative correlation between unem-
ployment rates and societal wellbeing at the 
national level. In an online appendix (Figure 
A6.8), the same cross-sectional relationship is 
reported by world region. These regional results 
mostly corroborate the generally negative rela-
tionship between national unemployment and 
subjective wellbeing, with the exceptions of 
Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
global relationship depicted in Figure 6.5 is not 
only found in most regions, but is also present 
across the entities that make up large nations. 
For example, it has analogously been shown that 
this cross-sectional relationship between unem-
ployment rates and average wellbeing is also 
found when considering the separate states that 
make up the United States of America.27 
Figure 6.5: Unemployment Rates and National Levels of Subjective Wellbeing
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Subjective Wellbeing and Job Type
In addition to investigating the importance of 
having a job, the data also allow us to ask whether 
different types of jobs are associated with higher 
or lower levels of subjective wellbeing. The 
availability of eleven different job types in the 
Gallup World Poll allows us to gain a sense for 
which types of employment are more or less 
associated with happiness across the world. The 
available categories cover many kinds of jobs, 
including being a business owner, office worker, 
or manager, and working in farming, construc-
tion, mining, or transport.
Figure 6.6 represents the descriptive data on 
how these varied broad job types relate to our 
three main measures of subjective wellbeing—
life evaluation, positive affect, and negative 
affect. The overarching finding here is that the 
global data reveal an important difference in 
how blue-collar and white-collar work are related 
to happiness (also when controlling for any 
differences in income, as shown below). We find 
that labor-intensive work is systematically 
correlated with less happiness and this is the 
case across a number of labor-intensive industries 
such as construction, mining, manufacturing, 
transport, farming, fishing, and forestry. In fact, 
people around the world who categorize them-
selves as a manager, an executive, an official,  
or a professional worker evaluate the quality of 
their lives at a little over 6 out of 10 whereas  
people working in farming, fishing, or forestry 
evaluate their lives around 4.5 out of 10 on 
average. A very similar picture is obtained when 
considering not only life evaluation but also the 
day-to-day experience of positive affective states 
such as smiling, laughing, enjoyment, or feeling 
well rested. The data also show the situation is 
similar when considering negative affective 
states such as feelings of worry, stress, sadness, 
and anger. Here we find that professionals in 
senior roles (manager, executive, or official) 
experience fewer negative affective states as 
compared to all other job types. 
It is worth noting that we are considering 
average effects in all of our analyses. While 
individuals doing some types of jobs are generally 
more or less happy on average than those doing 
another type, there will be individual heteroge-
neity in these effects that we are not able to 
investigate fully in our analysis. People differ in 
their interests and personalities, among other 
things, and a large literature for example on ‘job 
fit’ suggests there are few jobs that would be 
ideal for everyone—certain types of people are 
best suited to and more able to flourish in 
different types of jobs.28 
It is also of interest to note that classic economic 
theory would suggest that there should be little 
difference in the happiness or utility of people 
with different types of jobs, holding constant 
their skill level. This is because so-called “com-
pensating wage differentials” or “equalizing 
differences” should balance the happiness levels 
associated with the types of jobs that an individual 
chooses to take on.29 That is to say that people 
willing to take on a job that they anticipate is not 
going to make them happy should be compen-
sated monetarily to the extent that it should at 
least compensate for the unhappiness associated 
with that particular job as compared to another 
job that would have made them happier but with 
a lower pay attached to it. The empirical case for 
the existence of such compensating wage differ-
entials is mixed30, and while we do not directly 
address this point in our analysis, we do not 
appear to observe a strong presence of such 
compensating differentials in the global data 
employed here.31 
The descriptive statistics shown in Figure 6.6 
represent the raw differences in happiness 
across job types. Of course, there are likely to be 
many things that differ across people working  
in these diverse fields that could potentially be 
driving these happiness differentials. If we want 
to have a more precise view of how varied job 
types actually relate to happiness than we need 
to hold constant the confounding variables such 
as the different wages associated with different 
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Figure 6.6A: Life Evaluation and Job Type
Figure 6.6B: Positive Affect and Job Type
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job types as well as the age, gender, marital 
status, and education level of the individual.  
To account and control for these and other 
differences we also report a multiple regression 
analysis in Table 6.5. In terms of life evaluation 
and positive affect, these regressions replicate 
the broad patterns shown in the descriptive 
statistics shown above. Senior professionals 
(manager, executive, official) evaluate their lives 
higher and report more positive affective experi-
ences. The self-reported happiness of office 
workers (clerical, sales, or service) is significantly 
lower than their senior colleagues, even con-
trolling for income and other covariates. We find 
that the association of being in labor-intensive 
jobs and wellbeing is even greater still. 
In an online appendix (Figures A6.1-3), we also 
split these descriptive and statistical analyses on 
job type and happiness by gender. Although 
some small differences can be observed, these 
analyses do little to alter the interpretations from 
the general trends reported above. The same 
cannot quite be said of the relationship between 
job type and happiness, however, when we split 
the analysis by the world’s different regions. As 
shown in Figure 6.7, there are some clear differ-
ences in life evaluation across regions and job 
types, as is to be expected, but the trends are 
somewhat less streamlined as compared to the 
globally pooled data that was reported on above. 
Other things equal, senior professionals report 
the highest life evaluation across all regions (at 
the notable exception of farming/forestry/fishing 
workers in North America, Australia, and New 
Zealand who report equal or higher life evaluation 
and positive affect). Office workers and manual 
laborers report lower life evaluation, a trend most 
pronounced in the MENA, East Asia, and Latin 
American regions in particular. The figures that 
represent the relation between job type and 
positive affect and negative affect are given in  
the online appendix, along with accompanying 
multiple regression tables by region.
Figure 6.6C: Negative Affect and Job Type
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Table 6.5: Job Type and Subjective Wellbeing
(1) (2) (3)
Life Evaluation Positive Affect Negative Affect
Job Type (v. Professional)
Manager/Executive/Official 0.033*** -0.021** 0.019**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Business Owner -0.050*** -0.053*** 0.031***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Clerical or Office Worker -0.021*** -0.069*** -0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Sales Worker -0.070*** -0.121*** 0.039***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Service Worker -0.096*** -0.106*** 0.033***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Construction or Mining Worker -0.153*** -0.178*** 0.069***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Manufacturing Worker -0.128*** -0.171*** 0.052***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Transportation Worker -0.113*** -0.195*** 0.066***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Installation or Repair Worker -0.131*** -0.151*** 0.074***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Farming/Fishing/Forestry Worker -0.136*** -0.162*** 0.032***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Country + Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 338282 333927 328000
R-squared 0.080 0.029 0.018
Countries 153 153 153
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0 
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sam-
ple is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Job Satisfaction and Employee  
Engagement Around the World
The World Happiness Report is mostly concerned 
with how people experience and evaluate their 
lives as a whole, rather than domain-specific 
wellbeing outcomes. The academic literature on 
the relationship between work and wellbeing, 
however, has for a long time also considered 
other measures of wellbeing. The notion of job 
satisfaction has been widely studied in particu-
lar, and more recently the literature has begun to 
investigate other outcomes such as employee 
engagement.32 The Gallup World Poll contains 
data on both of these domain-specific wellbeing 
items, and in Table6.6 we report the correlations 
between the measures of job satisfaction and 
employee engagement and the subjective wellbe-
ing items that we have employed so far. All these 
measures correlate with each other to varying 
degrees and mostly in line with intuition. Being 
satisfied (as opposed to dissatisfied) with your 
job is strongly correlated with the Cantril ladder 
measure of life evaluation, whereas feeling 
actively engaged with your job is more strongly 
correlated with positive affect. The strongest 
relationship across all of these measures of 
general and workplace wellbeing is that feeling 
‘actively disengaged with one’s job’ is most 
strongly correlated with low job satisfaction. 
Figure 6.7: Life Evaluation and Job Type by Region
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Whereas in Table 6.6 we correlate these mea-
sures with each other using individual-level 
responses, in appendix table A6.5 we also 
examine the correlation of these variables  
when we consider the unit of analysis to be 
country-year and look at the correlation of these 
national average wellbeing measures. 
In Figure 6.8 we map average job satisfaction 
around the world. Here we color nations around 
the globe according to job satisfaction. Unlike 
the general wellbeing measures that elicit a 
broader scale of responses, the data on job 
satisfaction refers to a simpler yes/no question. 
We map the percentage of respondents in work 
by who reported to be “satisfied” (as opposed to 
“dissatisfied”) with their job.33 The resulting 
picture provides a general sense for job satisfac-
tion around the world indicating that countries 
across North and South America, Europe, and 
Australia and New Zealand typically see more 
individuals reporting satisfaction with their jobs. 
In an online appendix (Table A6.13), we provide 
more detailed information on the levels of job 
satisfaction around the world. 
In Figure 6.9 we move on to consider the global 
distribution of employee engagement. This 
survey measure in the Gallup World Poll asks 
whether individuals feel ‘actively engaged,’ ‘not 
engaged,’ or ‘actively disengaged’ in their jobs. 
The results paint a bleak picture of employee 
engagement around the world. The number of 
people noting that they are actively engaged is 
typically less than 20%, while being around 10% 
in Western Europe, and much less still in East Asia.
The difference in the global results between job 
satisfaction and employee engagement may 
partially be attributable to measurement issues, 
but it also has to do with the fact that both 
concepts measure different aspects of happiness 
at work. While job satisfaction can perhaps be 
reduced to feeling content with one’s job, the 
notion of (active) employee engagement requires 
individuals to be positively absorbed by their 
work and fully committed to advancing the 
organization’s interests. Increased employee 
engagement thus represents a more difficult 
hurdle to clear.
The generally low worldwide levels of employee 
engagement may also underlie why many people 
do not report being happy while at work. In fact, 
a recent study collected data from individuals at 
different times of the day via a smartphone 
app.34 Troublingly, the authors found that paid 
work is ranked lower than any of the other 39 
activities individuals can report engaging in, 
with the exception of being sick in bed. The 
more precise extent to which people are unhappy 
at work varies with where they work, whether 
they combine work with other activities, whether 
they are alone or with others, and the time of 
day or night that respondents are working. 










 Engaged  Disengaged 
Life Evaluation 1
Positive Affect 0.252 1
Negative Affect -0.189 -0.372 1
Satisfied with Job 0.280 0.253 -0.178 1
Actively Engaged with Job 0.105 0.168 -0.0672 0.156 1
Actively Disengaged with Job -0.188 -0.257 0.140 -0.411 -0.209 1
Note: All correlations are statistically significant at at least the 0.1% level. 
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Figure 6.8: Job Satisfaction Around the World 
Figure 6.9: Employee Engagement Around the World
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Figure 6.10: Job Satisfaction and Job Type
Figure 6.11: Employee Engagement and Job Type
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We also consider how the varied job types 
studied above are related to measures of job 
satisfaction and employee engagement. Figure 
6.10 paints a picture for the relationship between 
job type and job satisfaction that closely tracks 
the trends that were reported earlier for the  
links between job type and the more general 
measures of subjective wellbeing. Senior profes-
sionals report much greater job satisfaction as 
compared to all other job types. The relationship 
between job type and employee engagement 
reveals an interesting and important difference 
with all other wellbeing measures looked at so 
far in relation to job type. Figure 6.11 shows 
clearly that business owners report being much 
more actively engaged at work as compared to 
all other job types.
When considering job satisfaction and engage-
ment across the world’s regions in Figures 6.12 
and 13, we observe the same general trends that 
were inferred from the global data. It is worth-
while to note, however, that some regions see 
much starker differences in job satisfaction 
between job types. For example, in Central and 
Eastern Europe and in the MENA region we find 
that about 90% of senior professionals report 
being satisfied with their job whereas this 
number drops to little over 60% for workers in 
the farming, fishing, or forestry industries. No 
such large differentials in job satisfaction are 
found in Western Europe or North America, 
Australia, and New Zealand. In terms of job 
engagement statistics, Figure 6.13 indicates that 
the outlier remains being a business owner 
across most regions with the exception of South 
and Southeast Asia.
Figure 6.12: Job Satisfaction and Job Type by Region
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Figure 6.13: Employee Engagement and Job Type by Region
FPO
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Tables 7 and 8 report regression results of the 
relationships between job types and job satisfac-
tion and engagement by region, controlling for 
the usual set of income, demographic variables, 
as well as country and year fixed effects. Not-
withstanding the introduction of the control 
variables, we find that the results largely mirror 
the descriptive statistics, the main exception 
being that the correlation between being a 
business owner and being actively engaged is 
now only statistically significant for Western 
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. In an 
online appendix (Figures A6.4-5) we also split 
these descriptive statistics on job type and job 
satisfaction and engagement by gender. The 
separate findings for men and women do not 
lead us to largely different interpretations from 
the general trends reported above.
Table 6.7: Job Satisfaction and Job Type by Region 
W Europe C+E Europe CIS SE Asia S Asia E Asia LA + Carib NA + ANZ MENA SSA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Job Type (v. Professional)
Manager/Executive/
Official
-0.017 -0.061* 0.044 -0.051 0.022 -0.025 -0.083 -0.048 0.006 -0.030
(0.012) (0.033) (0.038) (0.030) (0.036) (0.067) (0.057) (0.043) (0.034) (0.039)
Business Owner 0.021 -0.091 0.015 -0.082*** -0.022 -0.084** -0.031 0.047 -0.071** -0.074**
(0.015) (0.094) (0.051) (0.027) (0.028) (0.038) (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)
Clerical or Office 
Worker
-0.032** -0.122*** -0.064 -0.101*** 0.046 -0.097** -0.028 -0.091* -0.086*** -0.099**
(0.014) (0.029) (0.047) (0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.026) (0.047) (0.024) (0.042)
Sales Worker -0.076*** -0.292*** -0.232*** -0.149*** -0.127*** -0.210*** -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.261*** -0.234***
(0.020) (0.041) (0.036) (0.051) (0.043) (0.042) (0.029) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040)
Service Worker -0.055*** -0.200*** -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.049 -0.187*** -0.118*** -0.080 -0.186*** -0.291***
(0.013) (0.036) (0.027) (0.044) (0.062) (0.047) (0.028) (0.059) (0.039) (0.031)
Construction or 
Mining Worker
-0.059*** -0.273*** -0.221*** -0.216*** -0.274*** -0.286*** -0.150*** 0.008 -0.462*** -0.247***
(0.019) (0.051) (0.039) (0.068) (0.038) (0.082) (0.034) (0.061) (0.057) (0.047)
Manufacturing 
Worker
-0.110*** -0.363*** -0.188*** -0.234*** -0.194*** -0.249*** -0.117*** -0.145* -0.314*** -0.238***
(0.023) (0.038) (0.031) (0.040) (0.059) (0.080) (0.034) (0.076) (0.053) (0.047)
Transportation 
Worker
-0.039* -0.266*** -0.083** -0.186*** -0.096** -0.211* -0.177*** -0.089* -0.355*** -0.264***
(0.020) (0.049) (0.031) (0.063) (0.045) (0.112) (0.044) (0.042) (0.051) (0.055)
Installation or 
Repair Worker
-0.068* -0.227*** -0.162*** -0.109 -0.084** -0.216*** -0.052 -0.047 -0.257*** -0.319***
(0.034) (0.048) (0.048) (0.065) (0.035) (0.070) (0.046) (0.066) (0.051) (0.058)
Farming/Fishing/
Forestry Worker 
-0.039 -0.413*** -0.320*** -0.145*** -0.110*** -0.310*** -0.152*** 0.004 -0.277*** -0.244***
(0.047) (0.075) (0.045) (0.043) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.086) (0.044) (0.041)
Country + Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40544 14382 17824 15616 17296 15038 20297 5266 31289 38472
R-squared 0.008 0.047 0.046 0.024 0.066 0.043 0.026 0.014 0.053 0.047
Countries 21 17 12 9 6 6 21 4 18 33
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0 
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sam-
ple is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6.8: Employee Engagement and Job Type by Region 
W Europe C+E Europe CIS SE Asia S Asia E Asia LA + Carib NA + ANZ MENA SSA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Job Type (v. Professional)
Manager/Executive/
Official
0.035** 0.077** 0.118* -0.036 0.017 -0.020 -0.035 -0.043 0.054 -0.063
(0.014) (0.038) (0.069) (0.063) (0.069) (0.056) (0.069) (0.043) (0.037) (0.054)
Business Owner 0.239*** 0.235** 0.155 -0.074 -0.045 0.010 0.095 0.164 0.008 0.037
(0.050) (0.097) (0.144) (0.092) (0.076) (0.039) (0.073) (0.131) (0.066) (0.066)
Clerical or Office 
Worker
-0.097*** -0.159*** -0.089** -0.145** -0.073 -0.160*** -0.124*** -0.194*** -0.085** -0.148***
(0.022) (0.028) (0.039) (0.064) (0.049) (0.028) (0.039) (0.047) (0.041) (0.040)
Sales Worker -0.020 -0.214*** -0.147*** -0.166** -0.068 -0.109*** -0.145** -0.206* -0.101** -0.121**
(0.023) (0.038) (0.030) (0.067) (0.053) (0.035) (0.054) (0.096) (0.047) (0.058)
Service Worker -0.017 -0.193*** -0.130*** -0.130** -0.033 -0.104*** -0.090** -0.048 -0.003 -0.133***
(0.014) (0.038) (0.032) (0.057) (0.035) (0.027) (0.040) (0.070) (0.045) (0.033)
Construction or 
Mining Worker
0.013 -0.230*** -0.086*** -0.206*** -0.101** -0.045 0.007 0.040 -0.115** -0.125**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.066) (0.041) (0.046) (0.064) (0.120) (0.046) (0.049)
Manufacturing 
Worker
-0.063*** -0.195*** -0.134*** -0.180*** -0.158*** -0.108*** -0.092* -0.222** -0.086* -0.151***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.029) (0.053) (0.077) (0.046) (0.054)
Transportation 
Worker
-0.011 -0.205*** -0.168*** -0.199*** -0.028 -0.105* -0.216*** -0.205** -0.126** -0.200***
(0.036) (0.046) (0.041) (0.054) (0.039) (0.054) (0.069) (0.089) (0.059) (0.048)
Installation or 
Repair Worker
-0.045 -0.262*** -0.101* -0.240*** -0.140** -0.159*** 0.017 -0.085 -0.078 -0.169***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.058) (0.061) (0.065) (0.045) (0.085) (0.115) (0.072) (0.048)
Farming/Fishing/
Forestry Worker 
0.125** -0.173** -0.197*** -0.134* -0.082** -0.088** -0.148* -0.101 -0.098* -0.203***
(0.061) (0.067) (0.058) (0.075) (0.033) (0.031) (0.081) (0.173) (0.056) (0.039)
Country + Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26334 14614 11291 5652 7108 8157 13711 3753 13752 13417
R-squared 0.009 0.030 0.032 0.017 0.032 0.018 0.011 0.020 0.011 0.028
Countries 21 17 12 9 7 5 21 4 16 30
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level. Outcome variables are standardized to have mean=0 
and SD=1. Further controls: log income, education level, marital status, household composition, gender, age and its square. Sam-
ple is 21-60 year olds. p < * 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Job Characteristics and Subjective 
Wellbeing
We now turn to look more closely at job quality. 
We have seen that being in work is a strong 
predictor of higher subjective wellbeing and 
that certain broad types of jobs are associated 
with higher and lower levels of individual 
happiness, even once we control for confound-
ing variables such as income and education. But 
what is it specifically about these different types 
of jobs that produce different levels of wellbeing 
across individuals?
In order to answer this question more precisely 
we draw on data from the European Social 
Survey (ESS), which benefits from more detailed 
questions about job characteristics together with 
several measures of subjective wellbeing. What 
ultimately makes for a ‘good job’? For a long time 
the answer to this important question was simply 
how much the job paid, and occasionally also 
how many hours of labor it entailed. The ever-in-
creasing amount of survey data available now 
allows us to go much further than this, and ask 
what particular aspects of a job are most predic-
tive of different measures of wellbeing. In the 
ESS, for example, respondents who are in work 
are asked about the amount of variety their job 
entails, how much autonomy they have in how 
they carry out their work, how much support 
they receive from co-workers around them, along 
with a number of further job characteristics. 
By regressing subjective wellbeing measures on 
such measures of work design, together with 
earnings and a number of other demographic 
variables, we are able to infer what matters  
most to people in their working lives. This is a 
distinctly democratic way of investigating what 
exactly makes a ‘good job.’ Rather than impose 
certain ideas about which characteristics are 
most important in a job, using multivariate 
regression analysis in this way we allow workers 
themselves to determine which aspects of their 
jobs are the biggest drivers of their wellbeing. 
Much of the literature in this vein focuses on the 
elements of jobs that correlate with job satisfac-
tion35, but it is also important to know what 
elements of people’s jobs ultimately feed 
through into how they evaluate their lives as a 
whole, as well how job characteristics affect the 
emotional states that people experience as they 
proceed through their lives. We thus follow 
much of the existing literature in estimating job 
satisfaction equations, but also investigate the 
effects of job characteristics on life satisfaction, 
general happiness “taking all things together,”  
as well as a positive affect measure referring to 
emotions felt in “the last two weeks.”36 
In line with the literature and general intuition, 
we find that higher wages are indeed predictive 
of greater wellbeing. Those in well-paying jobs 
are happier and more satisfied with their lives 
and jobs than those in the lower income brackets. 
The relationship is roughly log-linear, however, 
suggesting that there are diminishing returns to 
higher income: an extra $100 of salary is worth 
much more to someone at the lower end of the 
income distribution than someone already 
earning much more. It is still striking that a 
number of further aspects of people’s jobs are 
strongly predictive of the different measures of 
subjective wellbeing even once we condition 
upon log earnings. 
As always, these regressions control for a standard 
set of demographic variables, but here we also 
control for industry as well as occupation dum-
mies. That is, when we ask about having a lesser 
or greater amount of a specific job characteris-
tic—be it autonomy, security, co-worker support, 
or whatever else—we are comparing workers 
who have the same occupation and who work in 
the same industry. 
What is important, beyond income? Work-life 
balance comes out in Table 6.9 as perhaps the 
strongest workplace driver of an individual’s 
subjective wellbeing. This turns out to be true 
across the board, in terms of people’s life  
and job satisfaction, general happiness, and 
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Table 6.9: Subjective Wellbeing and Job Characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Units Life  
Satisfaction
Happiness Job  
Satisfaction
Positive Affect
Wages (Log) 0.068** 0.041* 0.084*** 0.048**
(0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019)
Hours of Work (Weekly hours) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Responsible for supervising employees (0/1) 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.025
(0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022)
High variety in work (Very True=1) 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.229*** 0.101***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.020) (0.021)
Job requires learning new things (Very True=1) 0.047** 0.059** 0.137*** 0.074***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020)
Wages depend on effort (Very True=1) 0.042 0.044 0.026 0.062*
(0.029) (0.031) (0.023) (0.035)
Can get support/help from co-workers (Very True=1) 0.107*** 0.161*** 0.249*** 0.133***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020)
Job entails health/safety risk (Very True=1) -0.155*** -0.086* -0.194*** -0.135***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.033) (0.031)
Can decide start/finish time (Very True=1) -0.040** -0.026 -0.019 -0.016
(0.016) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029)
Job is secure (Very True=1) 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.190*** 0.089***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.018)
Job requires very hard work (Strongly Agree=1) -0.034 0.018 -0.024 0.029
(0.037) (0.037) (0.031) (0.028)
Never enough time to get everything done (Strongly Agree=1) -0.015 -0.016 -0.132*** -0.081**
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.030)
Good opportunities for promotion (Strongly Agree=1) 0.107** 0.073* 0.210*** 0.111**
(0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.040)
Job prevents giving time to family/partner (Often/Always=1) -0.150*** -0.100*** -0.214*** -0.174***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021)
Worry about work problems when not working (Often/Always=1) -0.107*** -0.084*** -0.033 -0.196***
(0.025) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028)
Too tired after work to enjoy things (Often/Always=1) -0.210*** -0.201*** -0.221*** -0.405***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.033)
Control over how daily work is organized (8-10/10=1) 0.046*** 0.088*** 0.192*** -0.019
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022)
Control over pace of work (8-10/10=1) 0.085*** 0.069*** 0.091*** 0.066**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Control over policy decisions of organization (8-10/10=1) 0.031 0.040* 0.121*** 0.053**
(0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Trade Union Member (0/1) 0.020 0.040** 0.053* 0.022
(0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.021)
Self-Employed (v. Employee) (0/1) 0.053 0.008 0.039 0.026
(0.034) (0.036) (0.029) (0.036)
Education (Years) 0.004* 0.003 -0.010*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female (0/1) 0.038 0.037 0.048* -0.066**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Age (Years) -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.003 -0.036***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Age^2 (Years^2) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 11555 11555 11555 11555
R-squared  0.287 0.229 0.220 0.160
Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at the country level.  All outcome variables standardised to have mean 
of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Source: European Social Survey: Round 5 (2010). Further controls: marital status, household 
composition, migrant status, industry and occupation dummies, country dummies. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p<0.01
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moment-to-moment emotional experiences. 
Those who have a job that leaves them too tired 
to enjoy the non-work elements of their lives 
report levels of positive affect in their day-to-day 
lives that are substantially lower than those who 
do not. Furthermore, workers who report that 
their job interferes with their ability to spend 
time with their partner and family, as well as 
those who ‘bring their job home’ with them by 
worrying about work matters even when they 
are not at work, report systematically lower 
levels of subjective wellbeing across all four 
measures, controlling as always for the usual 
covariates, including the level of remuneration 
they receive and the number of hours they work 
per week. 
We can also see in Table 6.9 that the content of 
the job is important. Those with jobs that entail 
high levels of variety and the need to learn new 
things are more satisfied with their lives and 
their jobs and experience more positive emo-
tions day-to-day. Further, individual autonomy  
in the workplace is a significant driver of happi-
ness: having control over how the workday  
is organized as well as the pace at which the 
employee works is positively correlated with 
higher wellbeing outcomes. Conversely, those 
with jobs that involve risks to their health and 
safety generally score worse on the measures of 
subjective wellbeing captured in this survey. 
Social capital in the workplace is even more 
important. The level of support that a worker 
receives from his or her fellow workers is very 
strongly predictive of all four measures of 
subjective wellbeing in the sample, as is being 
able to have a say in policy decisions made by 
the organization for which the employee works. 
Furthermore, workers who report being a 
member of a trade union are generally more 
satisfied with their jobs, though the differential 
in life satisfaction as well as positive affect 
between union and non-union workers is statis-
tically insignificant in the sample. 
As we saw earlier in our discussion of the 
spillover effects of unemployment, job security 
is a robust driver of individual wellbeing. Those 
who feel their livelihood is at risk systematically 
report lower levels of subjective wellbeing than 
those who report having high levels of perceived 
job security. Connected to this is the notion of 
being able to ‘get on in life’: those who feel they 
have a job that has good opportunities for 
advancement and promotion—even controlling 
for their current level of remuneration and the 
current content of their job—feel more satisfied 
with their jobs and lives and also tend to experi-
ence more positive affective states. 
Finally, bosses have been shown to be important. 
Although the data does not permit us here to 
measure and quantify the importance of who 
one’s boss is and how he or she affects one’s 
wellbeing, recent work has demonstrated that 
bosses and supervisors can play a substantial 
role in determining subjective wellbeing. In 
particular, the competence of bosses has been 
shown to be a strong predictor of job satisfaction, 
even controlling for individual fixed effects in a 
longitudinal analysis that follows people who 
stay in the same job as their boss gains (or loses) 
competence over time.37 
Conclusion
As has been shown in the various editions of  
the World Happiness Report, national levels of 
subjective wellbeing vary greatly across the 
globe. The different kinds of work that people  
in different corners of the world do may well 
contribute in some way to these cross-country 
differentials. After all, work makes up such an 
important part of our lives. The structure of 
economies differs a great deal, both across 
countries at any one point in time as well as 
within countries as they develop over time. Thus 
the kind of work that people actually engage in 
during their days differs greatly—whether they 
sit in offices, work on production lines, or work 
in the fields—and this can be a potentially 
W O R L D  H A P P I N E S S  R E P O R T  2 0 1 7
171
contributing factor to the global differences in 
wellbeing that we observe. 
This chapter has aimed to bring an empirical 
perspective to the relationship between happiness 
and employment, job type, and job characteristics 
around the world. Throughout the world, em-
ployed people evaluate the quality of their lives 
much higher than those who are unemployed. 
The clear importance of employment for happi-
ness emphasizes the damage that unemployment 
can do. As such, this chapter delved further into 
the dynamics of unemployment to show that 
individuals’ happiness adapts very little over 
time to being unemployed and that past spells of 
unemployment can have a lasting impact even 
after regaining employment. The data also 
showed that rising unemployment negatively 
affects everyone, even those still employed. 
These results are obtained at the individual level, 
but they also come through at the macroeconomic 
level, with national unemployment levels being 
negatively correlated with average national 
wellbeing across the world. 
We also considered how happiness is related to 
the broad type of job being performed. The 
principal result on job type is that data from 
around the world reveal a significant difference 
in how manual and non-manual labor are 
related to happiness. Even when accounting for 
relevant covariates between these two broad cate-
gories of job type, we found that blue-collar work 
is systematically correlated with less happiness. 
We also investigated job quality more closely by 
looking at specific workplace characteristics and 
how they relate to happiness. Well-paying jobs 
are conducive to happiness, but this is far from 
being the whole story. A range of further aspects 
were found to be strongly predictive of varied 
measures of happiness. Some of the most 
important job factors that were shown to be 
driving subjective wellbeing included work-life 
balance, autonomy, variety, job security, social 
capital, and health and safety risks. 
The results and inferences drawn from the 
available data are far from exhaustive but aim to 
inspire further research as well as provide some 
empirical guidance to employees, employers, 
and policy-makers. Given the importance of 
employment for happiness, it is evident that 
even more weight could be given to fostering 
employment. Equally, policies aimed at helping 
people to manage the non-monetary as well as 
the monetary difficulties associated with being 
unemployed, in addition to helping them back 
into work, will likely help to raise societal wellbe-
ing. In addition to the quantity of jobs, policy 
instruments can be used to encourage employers 
to improve the quality of jobs. In turn, recent 
research suggests that high levels of worker well-
being may even lead to gains in productivity and 
firm performance,38 a finding that points toward 
the benefits of engaging in what might be called 
‘high-road’ employment strategies conducive to 
employee wellbeing. Generally, the analyses 
reported in this chapter provide additional 
empirical evidence for the merit of policies that 
focus on both the quantity and the quality of 
employment to support worldwide wellbeing.
1    OECD Guidelines on Measuring Subjective Wellbeing 
(2013)
2    De Neve and Oswald (2012), Oswald, Proto, and Sgroi 
(2015), Edmans (2011)
3    The Cantril ladder item to survey life evaluation asks the 
following question: “Please imagine a ladder, with steps 
numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of 
the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the 
bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for 
you. On which step of the ladder would you say you 
personally feel you stand at this time?”
4    The measure for positive affect is an index that measures 
respondents’ experienced positive wellbeing on the day 
before the survey using the following five items: (i) Did you 
feel well-rested yesterday?; (ii) Were you treated with 
respect all day yesterday?; (iii) Did you smile or laugh a lot 
yesterday?; (iv) Did you learn or do something interesting 
yesterday?; (v) Did you experience the following feelings 
during a lot of the day yesterday? How about enjoyment? 
5    The measure for negative affect is an index that measures 
respondents’ experienced negative wellbeing on the day 
before the survey using the following five items: (i) Did you 
experience the following feelings during a lot of the day 
yesterday? How about physical pain?; (ii) Did you experi-
ence the following feelings during a lot of the day yester-
day? How about worry?; (iii) Did you experience the 
following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How 
about sadness?; (iv) Did you experience the following 
feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How about 
stress?; (v) Did you experience the following feelings 
during a lot of the day yesterday? How about anger?
6    The questionnaire measure asks respondents to chose 
whether they are either “satisfied” or “dissatisfied” with 
their job. 
7    The survey measure asks respondents how engaged they 
are with the job they do, with 3 response categories: 
“actively engaged”, “not engaged”, and “actively disen-
gaged”.
8    Throughout this chapter we restrict our analyses to the 
working age population between the ages of 21-60.
9    We follow a procedure analogous to that outlined in 
Chapter 2. When calculating world or regional averages, 
we in all cases use population-adjusted weighting. Gallup’s 
own weights sum to the number of respondents in each 
country. To produce population-adjusted weights for the 
period 2014-2016 here, we first adjust the Gallup weights 
such that each country has an equal weighting. We then 
multiply that weight by the total population aged between 
15 and 64 in 2015 (this population data is drawn from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators). 
10    See, e.g., Clark and Oswald (1994); Clark (2010); Kassen-
böhmer and Haisken-DeNew 2009
11     See, e.g., Clark and Oswald (1994); Winkelmann and 
Winkelmann (1998); Helliwell and Huang (2014).
12    The non-pecuniary effects of unemployment have been 
the subject of decades of research in psychology and 
economics. A seminal study back in the 1930s (Eisenberg 
and Lazersfeld 1938), for example, found that, when 
someone loses their job they lose not only their income 
but also other things that are important to them such 
status, social contact with others in the workplace, and 
daily structure and goals.
13    Evidence for this has been provided by a handful of 
studies including recent work on a large-scale US panel 
study that evaluated whether the wellbeing of adolescents 
predicted their labor market outcomes. De Neve and 
Oswald (2012) found that adolescents and young adults 
who report higher life satisfaction or positive affect grow 
up to earn significantly higher levels of income later in life 
(controlling for socio-economic status) and significant 
mediating pathways included a higher probability of 
getting hired and promoted.  
14    See, e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald (2004).
15    Kassenböhmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009).
16    It is worth noting that self-employment can refer to a 
huge range of things – from owning a large multinational 
grocery chain all the way to being a sole-trader on a 
market stall.  
17    We look here at 10 world regions: Western Europe (W 
Europe), Central and Eastern Europe (C+E Europe), The 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), South-East 
Asia (SE Asia), South Asia (S Asia), East Asia (E Asia), 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LA+Carib), North 
American and Australia and New Zealand (NA+ANZ ), 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA).
18    The notable exceptions here are South-East Asia and 
South Asia where self-employed individuals report less 
negative affect as compared to being full-time employees.
19    See, e.g., Clark et al (2008); Clark and Georgelis (2013).
20    Our approach here follows Clark et al (2008) and Clark 
and Georgelis (2013). We take advantage of the longitudi-
nal nature of the German Socio-Economic Panel, which 
has been running since the 1980s, and take a within-per-
son (i.e. fixed effect) approach and ask to what extent 
people who become unemployed and stay unemployed 
adapt to their circumstances in terms of happiness. We 
look at both the 4 years prior to becoming unemployed as 
well as the 4+ years following that event. Those entering 
the panel already unemployed are dropped from the 
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analysis (i.e. we exclude any left-censored spells). For each 
individual, we look only at the first occurrence of 
unemployment they experience in the panel, and 
examine how the respondent’s happiness adapts as they 
experience their first spell of unemployment. Specifically, 
we run the following regression:  
 
LSit = αi + θ’Xit + β-4U-4,it + β-3U-3,it + β-2U-2,it + β-1U-1,it + 
β0U0it + β1U1it + β2U2it + β3U3it + β4U4it + εit  
 
where LSit refers to the life satisfaction on a 0-10 scale of 
person i in year t and X is a vector of control variables 
typical to the literature. Those who are unemployed are 
split into five categories: the U dummies (U0 to U4) refer 
to those who have been unemployed for under a year, 
those unemployed between 1-2 years, and so on up to 
four (or more) years. The U-4 to U-1 dummies refer to 
future entry into unemployment in the next 0-1 years, 1-2 
years and so on. Figure 4 reports these lag and lead 
coefficients from this equation, along with 95% confi-
dence intervals. The omitted category in this equation is 
those who will not enter into being unemployed in the 
following four years. The sample is all those individuals 
who are not unemployed in their first year in the panel. 
The αI term is an individual fixed effect, such that the 
adaptation we are examining here compares the life 
satisfaction of someone who has been unemployed for 3 
years with their own life satisfaction before becoming 
unemployed.
21    See, e.g., Clark et al (2001); Knabe and Rätsel (2011).
22    Di Tella et al (2001).  
23    E.g. Knabe and Rätsel (2011); Luechinger et al (2010).
24    In addition to job insecurity effects caused by others’ 
unemployment, there may be further psychological 
conduits. One is that in times of high unemployment 
people may be more likely to stay in jobs they do not 
particularly enjoy, given the difficulty of finding a more 
agreeable job when labor market conditions are poor. A 
second is that those who are left in work may feel some 
level of guilt being unemployed whilst those around them 
are being laid off and suffering the consequences of job 
loss. Finally, there may be more immediate spill-over 
effects, with those close to unemployed people – spouses 
and other family members in particular – suffering as 
they live with and attempt to provide support for the 
unemployed
25    See Clark (2003).
26    In order to present an up-to-date picture of the relation-
ship, we calculate the 2016 unemployment rate for each 
country using the Gallup World Poll sample. This is the 
fraction of those participating in the labor force between 
the ages of 21 and 60 who report being unemployed. The 
most recent set of unemployment rate figures produced 
by the World Bank (in the 2016 World Development 
Indicators) pertain to 2014; an analogous analysis using 
this data together with the 2014 Gallup data produce 
similar results. 
27    Note that Helliwell and Huang (2014) obtain the negative 
correlation between unemployment and wellbeing in the 
cross-sectional data for the United States without even 
including those individuals that are themselves unem-
ployed.
28    See, e.g. Kristof-Brown et al (2005) for a review. 
29    See, e.g., Rosen (1986). 
30    See, e.g., Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009).
31    Our analyses do not address the theory of “compensating 
differentials” head-on but it is worthwhile noting that 
there are a number of possible reasons behind why such 
stark differences are observed in the happiness levels 
associated with different job types even though compen-
sating differentials in terms of income may suggest 
otherwise (holding skill levels constant). One plausible 
reason being that most individuals may not have a wide 
range of options to choose from in terms of which type of 
job to perform (even when holding skill levels constant) 
and, as such, there is not as much free movement between 
job types as economic theory would have it. Another 
reason why we find that the classic notion of compensat-
ing differentials does not fit these data well is because 
monetary compensation is really only but a part of the 
overall package of job characteristics that relate job type to 
happiness. 
32    See, e.g., Freeman (1978); Harter et al. (2002, 2003); 
Bockerman and Ilmakunnas (2012), Judge et al (2001).
33    The question was incuded in the Gallup World Poll 
between 2006 and 2012. Here we map the country 
averages over this period. More detailed information on 
these figures is provided in Table A6.13.
34    Bryson and Mackerron (2017).
35    See, e.g. Clark (2010). There are a number of approaches 
to the measurement of job quality. For a useful overview, 
see Osterman (2013). 
36    The survey questions we use are: 1) “All things consid-
ered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
nowadays?” 2) “Taking all things together, how happy 
would you say you are?” 3) “How satisfied are you in your 
main job?” 4) A positive affect measure aggregated from 
three questions asking how much in the last two weeks 
the respondent has “felt cheerful and in good spirits”, 
“felt calm and relaxed”, “felt active and vigorous”.
37    Artz et al. (2016).
38    See, e.g., Oswald, Proto, and Sgroi (2015), Edmans (2011), 
and Harter et al. (2002)
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The central paradox of the modern American 
economy, as identified by Richard Easterlin (1964, 
2016), is this: income per person has increased 
roughly three times since 1960, but measured 
happiness has not risen. The situation has gotten 
worse in recent years: per capita GDP is still 
rising, but happiness is now actually falling. 
The predominant political discourse in the 
United States is aimed at raising economic 
growth, with the goal of restoring the American 
Dream and the happiness that is supposed to 
accompany it. But the data show conclusively 
that this is the wrong approach. The United 
States can and should raise happiness by  
addressing America’s multi-faceted social 
crisis—rising inequality, corruption, isolation, 
and distrust—rather than focusing exclusively or 
even mainly on economic growth, especially 
since the concrete proposals along these lines 
would exacerbate rather than ameliorate the 
deepening social crisis.
Figure 7.1 shows the U.S. score on the Cantril 
ladder over the last ten years. If we compare the 
two-year average for 2015/6 with the two-year 
average for 2006/7, we can see that the Cantril 
score declined by 0.51. While the US ranked 
third among the 23 OECD countries surveyed in 
2007, it had fallen to 19th of the 34 OECD 
countries surveyed in 2016.
To understand America’s falling happiness, we 
make use of the framework from Chapter 2 of 
this Report to explain the sources of subjective 
well-being using six underlying variables: log 
income per capita (lgdp), healthy life expectancy 
(hle), social support (ssup), freedom to make  
life choices (freedom), generosity of donations 
(donation), and perceived corruption of govern-
ment and business (corruption). Of these sources, 
two involve personal material conditions (lgdp, 
hle); one focuses on individual values (donation); 
and two involve social capital (ssup, corruption). 
The last, freedom, should be interpreted as a 
combination of individual factors (wealth, skills) 
and social factors (democracy, civil rights, and 
social rights). 
As noted, the observed decline in the Cantril 
ladder between 2006/7 and 2015/6 is 0.51. In 
Table 7.1, we decompose this decline according 
to the six factors. While two of the explanatory 
variables moved in the direction of greater  
U.S. happiness (lgdp, hle), the four social vari-
ables (ssup, freedom, donation, corruption) all  
Table 7.1. Accounting for the Change in US Happiness, 2006/7 to 2015/6
Source: Decomposition based on the global explanatory equation shown in Table 2.1. GDP levels are in PPP 2011 constant  
dollars. Data details can be found in the Statistical Appendix for Chapter 2.
Figure 7.1. US Happiness Score, 2006-2016
Source: Gallup International Cantril ladder
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deteriorated—US showed less social support, 
less sense of personal freedom, lower donations, 
and more perceived corruption of government 
and business. Applying the coefficients from the 
regression model in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, the 
six factors account for a net decline of 0.27 (with 
an unexplained residual of another 0.24 points 
of decline). 
America’s crisis is, in short, a social crisis, not 
an economic crisis. 
This America social crisis is widely noted, but 
 it has not translated into public policy. Almost 
all of the policy discourse in Washington DC 
centers on naïve attempts to raise the economic 
growth rate, as if a higher growth rate would 
somehow heal the deepening divisions and 
angst in American society. This kind of 
growth-only agenda is doubly wrong-headed. 
First, most of the pseudo-elixirs for growth— 
especially the Republican Party’s beloved nostrum 
of endless tax cuts and voodoo economics— 
will only exacerbate America’s social inequalities 
and feed the distrust that is already tearing 
society apart. Second, a forthright attack on  
the real sources of social crisis would have a 
much larger and more rapid beneficial effect on  
U.S. happiness. 
We can see this in the following thought experi-
ment. Suppose that the U.S. were to return to the 
2006/7 baselines for the social variables. This 
would boost happiness substantially. We can 
then calculate the equivalent rise in U.S. GDP 
that would lead to the same increase in happiness 
as an improvement in social conditions. It 
becomes immediately clear that restoring social 
conditions would be the faster and more reliable 
way to achieve the same gain in happiness.
Consider the corruption variable, for example. 
The U.S. corruption index rose by 0.10 between 
2006/7 and 2015/6. With a coefficient -0.53 in 
the happiness regression, the negative effect on 
U.S. happiness is 0.054. Reversing the rise in 
perceived corruption would therefore raise 
happiness by 0.054. To achieve the same gain in 
happiness through higher income growth would 
require a rise in lgdp equal to 0.054/0.341, 
which translates into a rise in the level of GDP 
from roughly $53,000 to $62,000. 
The needed rise in income to offset the recent 
decline in America’s social support networks 
would be even greater. The decline in social 
support measured 0.064, with a coefficient on 
happiness of 2.332. This implies a loss of happi-
ness of 0.15 points on the Cantril ladder. To 
offset this loss, lgdp would need to rise by 
0.15/0.341, which translates into a rise in GDP 
from $53,000 to $82,000. Such an increase in 
GDP would take decades to achieve, while an 
improvement in social conditions that reverts 
back to the social conditions of 2006 would 
presumably be much faster. Strangely, however, 
Table 7.2. Comparison of the US and the Nordic Countries in 2016
Note: All data definitions can be found in the Statistical Appendix for Chapter 2. 
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these sociological variables are nowhere to be 
seen in the U.S. political debate.
Putting this all together: The combined effect of 
the four social variables (ssup, freedom, donation, 
corruption) is a reduction of happiness of 0.31 
points, implying that lgdp would have to increase 
by 0.314/.341, or GDP would have to raise from 
$53,000 to around $133,000 to offset the com-
bined deterioration of social capital. 
There is another way to view the ramifications 
for happiness of America’s social crisis. Consid-
er the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), all of which score 
far higher than the U.S. in happiness. If we 
compare the US with a simple average score 
across the Nordic countries in 2016, shown in 
Table 7.2, we can see that the Nordic countries 
are 0.73 points higher on the Cantril ladder, even 
though the U.S. has a higher GDP per capita—
around $53,000 compared with $47,000 in 
terms of PPP constant 2011 international dollars. 
The explanation is that the Nordic countries far 
outpace the U.S. on personal freedom, social 
support, and lower corruption, thereby account-
ing for the higher levels of Nordic happiness. 
It is of course well-known that social capital in 
the United States has been in decline for several 
decades now. Robert Putnam’s1 pioneering 
research played a major role in opening the eyes 
of Americans to the fraying of social ties. In 
recent years, the evidence of social crises has 
become overwhelming, across every aspect of 
social life. A small group at the top of the income 
distribution has continued to make striking 
gains in wealth and income, while the rest of 
society has faced economic stagnation or decline, 
worsening public health indicators including 
Figure 7.2. Decline of Generalized Trust
Figure 7.4. The Rise of Inequality in the  
United States, 1962-2014
Figure 7.3. Decline in US Trust in Government
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rising rates of drug addiction and suicide, and 
declining social trust. 
To spell this out: Generalized trust among 
Americans has been falling for decades, as 
illustrated in Figure 7.2. Trust in government 
has plummeted to the lowest level in modern 
history, as seen in Figure 7.3, consistent with  
the rise in the perception of corruption (see also 
Dalton, 2017). Income inequality has reached 
astronomical levels, with the top 1 percent of 
American households taking home almost all of 
the gains in economic growth in recent decades, 
while the share of the bottom 50% plummets,  
as shown in Figure 7.4. The top 1 percent of 
households now claims around 23 percent of 
income, roughly equal to the share of the bottom 
70 percent. 
At the same time, the extent of pro-social  
behavior among Americans seems to be on  
the decline. In one well-known experiment, 
stamped and addressed envelopes were dropped 
in public areas (sidewalks, shopping malls, 
phone booths), to see whether people pick them 
up and put them in a mailbox. This is a measure 
of helping behavior among strangers. A recent 
study2 showed that the extent of helping behavior 
by U.S. residents declined sharply between 
2001 and 2011, but this was not true for Canadi-
an residents. 
Another very stark indicator of social collapse is 
the startling finding that mortality rates rose 
between 1999 and 2013 for white, non-Hispanics 
aged 45-54.3 For women, the rise in the age-spe-
cific mortality rate is observed over the entire 
interval, while for men, the rise in the morality 
rate between 1999 and 2005 was mostly reversed 
during 2005-2013. This trend stands in sharp 
contrast to the experience of Western Europe 
and Canada, where mortality rates continue to 
fall. What makes the United States case so 
disturbing and revealing is that it is clearly a 
social crisis as much as a health crisis—the 
increased mortality rates are accounted for 
mainly by drug and alcohol poisoning, suicide, 
and chronic liver disease and cirrhosis. There 
are several factors at work in this interconnected 
destruction of social capital, and their relative 
importance has not been determined with any 
precision or consensus. I would point to five. 
The first is the rise of mega-dollars in U.S. 
politics. A typical federal election cycle now 
involves at least $7 billion in campaign financing, 
and billions of dollars more in corporate lobby-
ing outlays that are indirect forms of campaign 
financing. Because of profoundly damaging 
Supreme Court decisions, most especially 
Citizens United, billionaires and large corpora-
tions are able to make enormous and essentially 
untraceable campaign contributions to candi-
dates. There is a strong and correct feeling 
among Americans that the government does  
not serve their interest, but rather the interest  
of powerful lobbies, wealthy Americans, and  
of course, the politicians themselves. Political 
scientists such as Martin Gilens have shown that 
only rich Americans have real input into political 
decision making. 
The second, and closely related, factor is the 
soaring income and wealth inequality. Since the 
1980s, America has been in a new gilded age, 
with tax cuts for the rich, special privileges for 
the wealthy to hide income in offshore tax 
havens, the destruction of union power, financial 
deregulation, and other steps to shift national 
income to the very top of the income distribution. 
It has worked better and longer than could have 
been imagined. Of course, the big money in 
politics keeps the political direction towards 
further tax cuts and benefits for the super-rich.
The third factor is the decline in social trust 
related to the post-1965 surge in immigration to 
the United States, especially the rise of the 
Hispanic population. Putnam4 reported that 
communities with higher ethnic diversity also 
have lower measures of social trust.5 This find-
ing seems true for the United States, but not 
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consistently so for other countries (such as 
Canada). Some sociologists suggest that the U.S. 
high ethnic diversity is also characterized by 
considerable economic and ethnic segregation, 
so that the potential for inter-group contact 
to diminish distrust is not as operative in the 
United States as in other countries: “American 
exceptionalism may be linked to relatively high 
levels of heterogeneity combined with the 
pronounced segregation of cities in the United 
States compared with other Western countries … 
and the persistence of ethnic inqualities.”6 
The fourth factor relates to the aftermath of 9/11. 
America’s reaction to these unprecedented 
terrorist attacks was to stoke fear rather than 
appeal to social solidarity. The U.S. government 
launched an open-ended global war on terror, 
appealing to the darkest side of human nature 
by invoking a stark “us versus them” dualism, 
and terrifying American citizens through the 
government’s projections of fear. Since then, the 
United States has been involved in non-stop 
war—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and 
Yemen among others—and Americans are  
subject to daily indignities of searches, frisking, 
body pat downs, orders barked at airports, and 
terrorist alerts. In the meantime, the U.S. 
government has repeatedly misled its own 
citizens about the scope of its activities, whom  
it is spying on, and where it is fighting. 
The fifth and final factor that I would raise is the 
severe deterioration of America’s educational 
system. On the demand side, the market premium 
for a college degree has continued to rise in the 
United States, reflecting the fact that new tech-
nologies demand better technical skills. Yet on 
the supply side, the share of young Americans 
completing a bachelor’s degree or higher is 
essentially stagnant at around 36 percent. 
College tuition has soared and student aid has 
been pared back dramatically. The result is a $1 
trillion mountain of student debt and a generation 
of young people with half-finished bachelor’s 
degrees facing a precarious future. 
This matters because the failure of America to 
educate its young people is a major force behind 
the rise in income inequality (condemning those 
with less than a bachelors degree to stagnant or 
falling incomes) and, it appears, to the fall of 
social capital as well. The US political divide is 
increasingly a divide between those with a 
college degree and those without. This is reflect-
ed in the recent presidential election. According 
to exit polling, college graduates backed Hillary 
Clinton by a margin of 52-43, while those without 
a college degree backed Trump by 52-44. If U.S. 
states are ranked according to the share of 25-29 
year olds with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
Clinton won 17 of the top 18 states, while Trump 
won 29 of the bottom 32 states. The deep social 
and economic divisions according to educational 
attainment seem to be similar to the dynamics of 
the Brexit vote and other anti-migrant parties in 
Europe, which find their base among voters with 
lower educational attainment. 
In sum, the United States offers a vivid portrait 
of a country that is looking for happiness “in all 
the wrong places.” The country is mired in a 
roiling social crisis that is getting worse. Yet the 
dominant political discourse is all about raising 
the rate of economic growth. And the prescriptions 
for faster growth—mainly deregulation and tax 
cuts—are likely to exacerbate, not reduce social 
tensions. Almost surely, further tax cuts will 
increase inequality, social tensions, and the 
social and economic divide between those with a 
college degree and those without. 
To escape this social quagmire, America’s 
happiness agenda should center on rebuilding 
social capital. This will require a keen focus on 
the five main factors that have contributed to 
falling social trust and confidence in government. 
The first priority should be campaign finance 
reform, especially to undo the terrible damage 
caused by the Citizens United decision. The 
second should be a set of policies aiming at 
reducing income and wealth inequality. This 
would include an expanded social safety net, 
wealth taxes, and greater public financing of 
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health and education. The third should be  
to improve the social relations between the 
native-born and immigrant populations. Canada 
has demonstrated a considerable success with 
multiculturalism; the United States has not tried 
very hard. The fourth is to acknowledge and 
move past the fear created by 9/11 and its mem-
ory. The US remains traumatized to this day; 
Trump’s ban on travel to the United States from 
certain Muslim-majority countries is a continuing 
manifestation of the exaggerated and irrational 
fears that grip the nation. The fifth priority, I 
believe, should be on improved educational 
quality, access, and attainment. America has lost 
the edge in educating its citizens for the 21st 
century; that fact alone ensures a social crisis 
that will continue to threaten well-being until 
the commitment to quality education for all is 
once again a central tenet of American society. 
1  See Putnam (2000).
2  See Hampton (2016).
3  See Case & Deaton (2015).
4  See Putnam (2007).
5   It is sometimes suggested that the degree of ethnic diversity 
is the single most powerful explanation of high or low social 
trust. It is widely believed that Scandinavia’s high social 
trust and happiness are a direct reflection of their high 
ethnic homogeneity, while America’s low and declining 
social trust is a reflection of America’s high and rising 
ethnic diversity. The evidence suggests that such “ethnic 
determinism” is misplaced. As Bo Rothstein has cogently 
written about Scandinavia, the high social trust was far 
from automatically linked with ethnic homogeneity. It was 
achieved through a century of active social democratic 
policies that broke down class barriers and distrust (see 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2003). Social democracy was but-
tressed by a long tradition and faith in the quality of 
government even before the arrival of democracy itself in 
Scandinavia. Moreover, highly diverse societies, such as 
Canada, have been able to achieve relatively high levels of 
social trust through programs aimed at promoting multicul-
turalism and inter-ethnic understanding.
6 See van der Meer and Tolma, 2014, p. 474.
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